Jong Pil Ree v. City of Chicago
| Decision Date | 27 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 22 CV 4284 |
| Parties | JONG PIL REE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Plaintiff Jong Pil Ree (“Plaintiff”) brings suit against the City of Chicago (“City”), Chicago police officers Tony Ramirez, Joseph Lopez, Peter Kontil, Gwendolyn Perez, and Brett Kim, and Chicago police detectives Jerad Tim, Emily Merida, Kelly Brogan, Marina Markopoulos, and Seung Cho (together, the “Individual Defendants”) for allegedly arresting him unlawfully, fabricating evidence and unlawfully detaining him in the Cook County Jail for over two years awaiting trial on charges that were ultimately dismissed.[1]This matter is currently before the Court on the City's motion to dismiss [Dkt. 38] and the Individual Defendants' motion to dismiss [Dkt. 37]. For the following reasons, both motions are granted, but Plaintiff is given until May 19, 2023 to file an amended complaint consistent with this opinion.
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's complaint [Dkt. 1] and assumed to be true for purposes of Defendant's motion to dismiss. Roe v. Dettlebach, 59 F.4th 255, 262 (7th Cir. 2023). Plaintiff is originally from North Korea and does not speak or understand English. [Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 12, 17.] On January 18, 2019, Plaintiff was arrested by members of the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) for allegedly committing the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault. [Id. ¶ 16.] Plaintiff denies committing the offense [id. ¶ 35] and takes the position that Defendants lacked probable cause for his arrest [id. ¶ 18]. Plaintiff alleges that at the time of his arrest, none of the arresting officers had a warrant for his arrest, none believed that there was a warrant issued for his arrest, and none had observed him commit any criminal offense. [Id. ¶¶ 29-31.] He further alleges that none of the arresting officers had received any information from any source that Plaintiff “had committed any criminal offense as it relates to the complaining witness.” [Id. ¶ 32.]
Following his arrest, Plaintiff was interrogated. He was not provided with the services of a “qualified interpreter who was fluent in the Korean language.” [Id. ¶ 19.] Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that “after arresting the plaintiff, the arresting officers and other members of the Chicago Police Department conspired and agreed to fabricate a story in an attempt to justify the unlawful arrest, and to cause the plaintiff to be wrongfully detained and prosecuted.” [Id. ¶ 33.] In particular, Plaintiff alleges that “[o]ne or more of the arresting officers and detectives”: (1) prepared police reports containing a false account of how and where Plaintiff was placed under arrest; (2) “attested through the official police reports regarding the false account of the circumstances” of Plaintiff's arrest; and (3) “communicated the false narrative to the prosecutors,” resulting in Plaintiff's alleged “wrongful prosecution for the crime he did not commit.” [Id. ¶ 34.] Following the interrogation, Plaintiff was charged with three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault (case no. 19CR240501). [Id. ¶ 20.]
On February 21, 2019, Plaintiff appeared before the presiding judge in the Cook County Circuit Court, Criminal Division. [Id. ¶ 21.] One week later, Plaintiff was formally arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. [Id. ¶ 22.] Plaintiff was appointed an attorney from the Public Defender's Office to represent him. [Id. ¶ 23.] Plaintiff remained in the custody of the Cook County Department of Corrections for approximately two and a half years, until August 13, 2021. [Id. ¶ 25.] On that date, the prosecution moved to nolle prosequi all of the charges.
Plaintiff brings a seven-count complaint based on these allegations. The particulars of the counts are discussed in more detail below as necessary to resolve Defendants' motions. The first three counts are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count I alleges that the Individual Defendants arrested and detained Plaintiff without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Count II alleges a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment based on the same facts. Count III is a Monell claim against the City. Plaintiff also brings state law claims against the Individual Defendants for malicious prosecution (Count IV) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count V), and against the City for respondeat superior (Count VI) and indemnification under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/9-102 (Count VII).
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), plaintiff's complaint must allege facts which, when taken as true, ‘plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level.'” Cochran v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 828 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007)). The Court “accept[s] all well-pleaded facts as true and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor.” Id. at 600 (citing Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008)). The Court reads the complaint and assesses its plausibility as a whole. See Atkins v. City of Chicago, 631 F.3d 823, 832 (7th Cir. 2011).
“Ordinarily, when adjudicating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a district court is limited to the allegations of the complaint.” Financial Fiduciaries, LLC v. Gannett Co., 46 F.4th 654, 663 (7th Cir. 2022). If the Court considers “matters outside the pleadings,” the “motion must be treated as one for summary judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). However, “there is an exception under which a court may consider documents that are (1) referenced in the plaintiff's complaint, (2) concededly authentic, and (3) central to the plaintiff's claim” without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Financial Fiduciaries, 46 F.4th at 663. The purpose of this “incorporation-by-reference doctrine” is to “prevent[] a plaintiff from ‘evad[ing] dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) simply by failing to attach to his complaint a document that prove[s] his claim has no merit.'” Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Tierney v. Vahle, 304 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2002)).
Plaintiff brings suit against each of the Individual Defendants for false arrest and detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment (Count I), violation of the Due Process Clause (Count II), malicious prosecution (Count IV) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count V). The Individual Defendants move to dismiss all of the claims.
Plaintiff's counsel concedes that certain claims are subject to dismissal.[2]In particular, counsel concedes that Count I is time-barred to the extent it is based on Plaintiff's arrest (but not his detention). “The applicable statute of limitations for a § 1983 false arrest claim arising in Illinois is two years.” Brooks v. City of Chicago, 564 F.3d 830, 832 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing 735 ILCS 5/13-202). Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest accrued once Plaintiff was “detained . . as a result of a lawful process”-in this case, arraignment. Regains v. City of Chicago, 918 F.3d 529, 533-34 (7th Cir. 2019); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 390-91 (2007).
Plaintiff was arraigned on February 28, 2019 [Dkt. 1, ¶ 22], and filed his complaint more than two years later, on August 13, 2022.
Plaintiff's counsel also concedes that the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is time barred. “[T]he applicable statute of limitations for intentional infliction of emotional distress is two years, because the tort is a form of personal injury.” Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 798 N.E.2d 75, 85 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 2003) (citing 735 ILCS 5/13-202). A “claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress in the course of arrest and prosecution accrues on the date of the arrest.” Bridewell v. Eberle, 730 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Evans v. City of Chicago, 434 F.3d 916, 934 (7th Cir. 2006)). Plaintiff was arrested and taken into custody beginning on January 18, 2019 [Dkt. 1, ¶ 16], but did not file his complaint until nearly two and a half years later on August 13, 2022.
Lastly, Plaintiff's counsel concedes that, as drafted, Count II does not state a viable claim for a due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment. “Manuel I makes clear that the Fourth Amendment, not the Due Process Clause, governs a claim for wrongful pretrial detention.” Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 365-69 (2017)); see also Patrick v. City of Chicago, 974 F.3d 824, 834 (7th Cir. 2020) ().
When the conceded claims are dismissed, that leaves (1) Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim to the extent it is based on his allegedly unlawful detention and (2) his state law malicious prosecution claim. “The Fourth Amendment prohibits government officials from detaining a person in the absence of probable cause,” which “can happen when the police hold someone without any reason before the formal onset of a criminal proceeding” and “also can occur when legal process itself goes wrong- when, for example, a judge's probable-cause determination is...
To continue reading
Request your trial