De Jonge v. Hunt

• Citation: 61 N.W. 341,103 Mich. 94
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan
• Decision Date: 18 December 1894
• Parties: DE JONGE v. HUNT.

61 N.W. 341

103 Mich. 94

DE JONGE v. HUNT.

Supreme Court of Michigan

December 18, 1894

Error to circuit court, Kent county; William E. Grove, Judge.

Action by George W. De Jonge against Frank Hunt to recover damages for breach of contract for the sale of real estate by defendant to plaintiff. There was a judgment for defendant and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Martin Rozema (C. O. Smedley, of counsel), for appellant.

Wesselius & Corbitt, for appellee.

GRANT J. (after stating the facts).

Two questions are presented: (1) Is the contract void, within the statute of frauds, for lack of a description of the land? (2) Did the two letters constitute a valid and binding contract for the sale of the property? We deem it unnecessary to determine the first question, since the answer to the second is conclusive of the case. In order to complete the contract, it was necessary that the plaintiff should write an unqualified acceptance of the defendant's offer. The offer was to sell for $500 cash, net. This meant payment to the defendant at his residence in Iowa. The acceptance requested that defendant send the deed to a party in Grand Rapids, with whom the plaintiff would deposit the money on receipt of the deed. It became, therefore, necessary for the defendant to write another letter in order to close the transaction. It was to be a cash transaction, and plaintiff's duty was to remit the money, and pay or tender it to him, within a reasonable time after an unqualified acceptance. A response necessitating delay and further correspondence is not an unqualified acceptance. If it had taken weeks instead of days for letters to pass certainly the defendant would not have been bound to wait and notify the proposed purchaser that he must send the money to him at his place of residence,-a statement already in the offer. It does not appear when defendant's letter was received by the plaintiff. We may, however, assume that, in due course of mail, it was received before the sale to Wesselius. The only authority cited by plaintiff to sustain his position is Matteson v. Scofield, 27 Wis. 671. In that case the plaintiff, residing at Hudson Wis., wrote a letter to defendant, in Connecticut, accepting his offer for the sale of land; suggesting that he make out a deed and send it to the bank, with instructions, and that he suggested this method of making the transfer, as it would save time and expense. The defendant replied that he would come out to Hudson, and...