Joo v. Capitol Switch, Inc., 14976
Decision Date | 22 November 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 14976,14976 |
Citation | 650 A.2d 526,231 Conn. 328 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | Joseph JOO v. CAPITOL SWITCH, INC., et al. |
Kenneth E. Lenz, Cheshire, with whom, on the brief, was Philip D. Lewis, Brookfield, for appellant (plaintiff).
Theodore J. Greene, with whom, on the brief, were Patrick J. Filan and Jeannine M. Foran, Stamford, for appellees (defendants).
Before PETERS, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT and PALMER, JJ.
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether a person who elects to pursue a federal age discrimination claim in a Connecticut state court must first exhaust state administrative remedies. The plaintiff, Joseph Joo, brought suit in the trial court alleging that the defendants, Capitol Switch Inc. (Capitol), and its president, Richard J. Warren, had discharged him in violation of various provisions of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. 1 The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff's failure to exhaust state administrative remedies deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the ADEA claims. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). We hold that neither federal nor state law imposes a requirement that state administrative remedies must be exhausted before a federal age discrimination claim can be brought to state court, and therefore we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff, who was born in 1935, 2 was first employed by Capitol in 1962. In 1984, Warren was elected president of Capitol and remained in that position through May 16, 1988, when the plaintiff was discharged. At the time of the plaintiff's discharge and for the relevant period beforehand, Capitol had employed twenty or more employees and had continuously been engaged in an industry that affects commerce. 3
On or about September 19, 1988, following his discharge, the plaintiff filed timely complaints with the Connecticut commission on human rights and opportunities (CHRO) and the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). On February 21, 1990, 4 less than two years after his discharge, the plaintiff filed this private civil action against the defendants in the trial court alleging violations of the ADEA and setting forth other grounds for relief. 5 Thereafter, on February 7, 1991, the CHRO informed the plaintiff that it had found no reasonable cause for his allegation of age discrimination. The plaintiff's request for reconsideration was denied on June 12, 1991. The trial court thereafter granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's cause of action. 6
None of the parties disputes that the ADEA requires the plaintiff to have filed his complaint with the CHRO. Their disagreement arises from their differing interpretations of the consequences that flow from that filing requirement. The plaintiff argues, as he did in his opposition to the motion to dismiss, that the ADEA does not impose a state exhaustion requirement on a person who files an ADEA claim in state court. In addition, the plaintiff argues that application of a state exhaustion requirement in the circumstances of this case would violate the due process guarantee of article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution, because the combination of an exhaustion requirement, if applicable and the ADEA statute of limitations would deprive him of any opportunity to pursue his claim in state court. 7 The defendants, on the other hand, emphasize that the plaintiff had no obligation to elect state rather than federal court as the forum in which to pursue his action. Although they concede that, had the plaintiff chosen to sue in federal court, he would not have been required to exhaust the CHRO proceedings, they maintain that the plaintiff's election to remain in Connecticut state court bound the plaintiff to complete the CHRO proceedings that the ADEA had required him to commence. The plaintiff's noncompliance with this exhaustion requirement, according to the defendants, properly led the trial court to dismiss his complaint. 8
We are persuaded that no exhaustion requirement limits a plaintiff's right to bring an ADEA action in state court for three principal reasons: (1) the language of the relevant federal statute and the construction given that statute by the federal courts; (2) the inferences to be drawn from the grant of concurrent jurisdiction over ADEA claims; and (3) the inferences to be drawn from the time frame within which an ADEA claim must be brought.
Our analysis of the plaintiff's federal claim begins with an examination of the ADEA and the cases decided thereunder. The ADEA provides that, before an aggrieved person may initiate a private action, he or she must file with the EEOC a charge alleging unlawful age discrimination. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). If the alleged acts of age discrimination occurred in a state that has enacted a law prohibiting age discrimination in employment and establishing an agency to grant or seek relief from such discrimination (deferral state), the aggrieved person must also file a signed written statement of the facts with the state agency, 29 U.S.C. § 633(b). 9 The person must wait sixty days after filing with either agency before bringing a private action. 10 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(d) and 633(b). During that period, if the EEOC commences an action to vindicate the aggrieved person's rights, the person's authority to bring a private civil action terminates. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1). Unlike § 626(c), however, § 633(b) contains no provision divesting the aggrieved person of authority to initiate a private civil action because of any actions initiated by the state agency during the deferral period. 11
Although the ADEA requires charges to be filed with federal and state agencies, nothing in the statute requires a person to exhaust additional administrative remedies before filing a private civil action. As the United States Supreme Court recognized, § 633(b) Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 761, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 2074, 60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1979). "By its terms ... the section requires only that state proceedings be commenced 60 days before federal litigation is instituted; besides commencement no other obligation is placed upon the ADEA grievant." Id., at 759, 99 S.Ct. at 2073.
The United States Supreme Court further observed that the ADEA permits the federal and state administrative deferral periods to run simultaneously. This grant of concurrent administrative jurisdiction reflects Congress' recognition that delay in the prosecution of age discrimination claims Id., at 757, 99 S.Ct. at 2072. The Oscar Mayer & Co. decision makes clear, therefore, that the requirements of § 633(b) must be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with "[t]he purpose of expeditious disposition" of age discrimination claims. Id.
The United States Supreme Court has also held that federal courts in ADEA cases "should recognize no preclusion by state administrative findings with respect to age discrimination claims." Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 110, 111 S.Ct. 2166, 2171, 115 L.Ed.2d 96 (1991). The court held that the purpose of § 633(b) outweighs the presumption in favor of administrative preclusion. According to the court, the provisions of §§ 626(d)(2) and 633(b), when read together, "plainly assume the possibility of federal consideration [of the merits of an ADEA claim] after state agencies have finished theirs." Id., at 111, 111 S.Ct. at 2171. For such consideration to be meaningful, the court reasoned, it must be plenary. Id. Application of the doctrine of administrative preclusion to the ADEA would leave the provisions calling for federal consideration "essentially without effect"; id., at 112, 111 S.Ct. at 2171; a result the United States Supreme Court refused to countenance. The Solimino decision therefore further indicates how limited a role the deferral requirement of § 633(b) plays in the jurisdictional underpinnings of the ADEA.
Federal appellate and district courts have consistently rejected the proposition that § 633(b) imposes a state exhaustion requirement. In Curto v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 552 F.Supp. 891, 899-900 (N.D.Ill.1982), for example, the court held that § 633(b) The court concluded by stating that §§ 626(d) and 633(b) ...
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