Joon Young Chul Kim v. Capital Dental Tech. Lab., Inc.

• Decision Date: 02 October 2017
• Docket Number: No. 14–cv–5014,14–cv–5014
• Parties: Joon YOUNG CHUL KIM, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CAPITAL DENTAL TECHNOLOGY LABORATORY, INC., d/b/a LSK 121, and Luke S. Kahng, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

279 F.Supp.3d 765

Joon YOUNG CHUL KIM, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.CAPITAL DENTAL TECHNOLOGY LABORATORY, INC., d/b/a LSK 121, and Luke S. Kahng, Defendants.

No. 14–cv–5014

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed October 2, 2017

Ryan J. Kim, Inseed Law PC, Des Plaines, IL, for Plaintiffs.

Kearney Wood Kilens, Peter C. Kim, Christie Bolsen Benear, Litchfield Cavo LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Elaine E. Bucklo, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs Joon Young Chul Kim ("Young Chul Kim") and Kee June Kim ("June Kim"), along with three of their former coworkers, sue their former employer Capital Dental Technology Laboratory, Inc., d/b/a LSK 121 ("LSK 121") and former manager Luke Kahng ("Kahng") for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. , and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law ("IMWL"), 820 ILCS § 105/1 et seq. Specifically, they allege that defendants failed to provide overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek. Before me is defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, which seeks to limit certain plaintiffs' claims according to the FLSA and the IMWL statutes of limitations; to resolve which overtime compensation method applies to plaintiffs' claims; and to resolve in their favor the claims asserted by two plaintiffs—June Kim and Christian Djurickovic ("Djurickovic")—on the ground that these employees fall within the FLSA's executive employee exemption for overtime purposes. For the reasons that follow, I deny defendants' motion.

I.

The following facts are undisputed except where noted. Plaintiffs are five former employees of defendant LSK 121, a dental prosthetics laboratory owned and managed by defendant Kahng and located in Naperville, Illinois. At LSK 121, plaintiffs performed laboratory technician work in several different capacities and departments. Plaintiffs Young Chul Kim and Michelle Minjung Ko ("Ko") were ceramists. Plaintiffs June Kim and Marc Jaehyung Cho ("Cho") worked in the wax-metal department, and plaintiff Djurickovic performed computer-aided design ("CAD") work. Defendants assert, and plaintiffs' allegations likewise suggest, that all five former employees were paid a set salary every two weeks during the course of their employment.¹ Plaintiffs claim that they regularly worked more than forty hours in a workweek and that defendants failed to pay them overtime compensation for these additional hours worked.

Defendants contend that plaintiffs June Kim and Djurickovic were supervisors who fell within the FLSA's overtime exemption for executive employees. Defendants point to a job description that purports to identify June Kim's position as supervisory and exempt. June Kim Dep., Exh. 14. June Kim testified that he had never seen this document before his deposition. June Kim Dep. at 77–78. Defendants also cite signed statements from two employees, including plaintiff Cho, stating that June Kim supervised five technicians in the wax-metal department. Defs.' L.R. 56.1 Stmt., Exh. 7. Additionally, the record shows that June Kim participated in performance reviews of three wax-metal department employees in 2009 and 2010, and defendants assert that he signed vacation requests for employees in the wax-metal department. June Kim Dep. at 56–59, 62–68, Exhs. 5–13.

Plaintiff Djurickovic was the most senior employee in defendant LSK 121's CAD department when he worked there. Djurickovic Dep. at 50–51. In the CAD department, Djurickovic worked with three other employees, whom he trained, assisted, and corrected. Id. at 52–53, 57. After Djurickovic stopped working for LSK 121, he applied for a lab manager position with another company. Id. at 28–29; Defs.' L.R. 56.1 Stmt., Exh. 8. In his application, Djurickovic identified his position at LSK 121 as "CAD/CAM Composite Manager." Defs.' L.R. 56.1 Stmt., Exh. 8.

Plaintiff Young Chul Kim filed the original complaint on July 1, 2014. Plaintiffs amended their complaint on October 10, 2014, adding June Kim as a named plaintiff. Opt-in plaintiffs Cho, Ko, and Djurickovic filed their consent-to-join forms with the court on June 11, 2015. Defendants filed the present motion for partial summary judgment on July 17, 2017, seeking to narrow the issues in advance of trial.

II.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence demonstrates that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby , Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "The underlying substantive law governs whether a factual dispute is material," and a dispute is "genuine" for the purposes of Rule 56 when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Carroll v. Lynch , 698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012).

The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and of identifying the portions of the evidence that demonstrate an absence of a genuine dispute. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If "the moving party puts forth evidence showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to provide evidence of specific facts creating a genuine dispute." Carroll , 698 F.3d at 564. Where material facts are disputed, courts must "view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable" to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).

In this case, defendants move for partial summary judgment on three distinct issues. First, they argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs Cho and Djurickovic's claims accrued before June 11, 2012, and plaintiff June Kim's claims accrued before October 10, 2011. In defendants' view, these claims are barred by the FLSA and the IMWL's three-year statutes of limitations. Second, defendants seek summary judgment as to the proper method for calculating any overtime damages. Defendants contend that, based on the compensation scheme they have employed, the fluctuating workweek method ("FWW") for calculating overtime should apply—permitting overtime to be paid at 50 percent of the employees' regular rate rather than 150 percent. Finally, defendants urge me to grant summary judgment in their favor on the claims of June Kim and Djurickovic on the basis that they are exempt employees not entitled to overtime pay under the FLSA.

A. Statute of Limitations

The default limitations period for an unpaid overtime claim brought under the FLSA is two years² from the date that the cause of action accrued—i.e., from the date that the overtime payment became due. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) ; see Halferty v. Pulse Drug Co., 821 F.2d 261, 271 (5th Cir.), modified on other grounds , 826 F.2d 2 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). For willful violations of the FLSA's overtime provisions, the limitations period extends to three years. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Generally, the limitations period stops running on a plaintiff's claims once he files his complaint or joins an existing lawsuit. 29 U.S.C. § 256(a) ; see Robinson v. Doe , 272 F.3d 921, 922 (7th Cir. 2001) ("The statute of limitations in a suit based on federal law ... stops running when the complaint is filed."). In FLSA collective actions, potential opt-in plaintiffs do not become parties to a suit until they file written consent with the court. Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk , 569 U.S. 66, 75, 133 S.Ct. 1523, 185 L.Ed.2d 636 (2013) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) ). The statute of limitations therefore continues to run on opt-in plaintiffs' claims until they give their consent to join the suit. 29 U.S.C. § 256(b) ; Davis v. Vanguard Home Care, LLC , No. 16-CV-7277, 2016 WL 7049069, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 2016). Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense,³ Hodgson v. Humphries , 454 F.2d 1279, 1284 (10th Cir. 1972) ; Braddock v. Madison Cty. , 34 F.Supp.2d 1098, 1112 (S.D. Ind. 1998), it is defendants' burden to establish that plaintiffs' claims are barred as untimely.⁴

Defendants urge the application of the default rules and seek summary judgment on all claims that fall outside the three-year limitations period. Specifically, they assert that because plaintiff June Kim did not join the suit until October 10, 2014, any of his overtime claims that accrued before October 10, 2011 are time-barred. Likewise, defendants argue that plaintiffs Cho and Djurickovic, who both filed their consent forms on June 11, 2015, cannot seek overtime claims that accrued before June 11, 2012. Because the dates on which these plaintiffs joined the suit are undisputed, defendants have met their initial burden of demonstrating that June Kim's claims before October 10, 2011, and Cho and Djurickovic's claims before June 11, 2012, are presumptively time-barred.

The burden therefore shifts to plaintiffs to identify evidence to overcome this presumption. Carroll , 698 F.3d at 564. In this context, plaintiffs must identify evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that an exception to the default limitations period applies. See Cortez v. Medina's Landscaping, Inc. , No. 00-cv-6320, 2002 WL 31175471, *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2002). Plaintiffs contend that the statute of limitations must be tolled because defendants failed to post and keep posted required materials concerning employees' FLSA rights. According to federal regulations, employers with any employees covered by the FLSA must "post and keep posted a notice explaining the Act, as prescribed by the Wage and Hour Division, in conspicuous places in every establishment where such employees are employed so as to permit them to observe readily a copy." 29 C.F.R. § 516.4. Along with their response brief, plaintiffs submit declarations from all five employees stating that they never saw "any poster...