Joopanenko v. Gavagan
| Decision Date | 06 October 1953 |
| Parties | JOOPANENKO v. GAVAGAN. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Gregory G. G. Joopanenko, in pro. per.
Neal D. Evans, Jr., Jacksonville, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a final judgment based on a motion to dismiss a complaint in an action for slander.
According to the allegations of the amended complaint, the plaintiff was a resident of Jacksonville Beach in Duval County, Florida, and was the owner and operator of a duplex apartment in that city. On the 24th of April, 1950 at the city hall of Jacksonville Beach a public meeting was held and there were approximately 1500 people present. The defendant (appellee) in the presence of all these people maliciously spoke of and concerning the plaintiff (appellant) the following false and defamatory words: 'Don't let that man speak, I known him and he is a Communist.' The amended complaint then charges that the words were meant and intended to be understood and were understood and that they were false and defamatory and spoken with the intent to injure and damage the plaintiff in his good name and reputation and by reason thereof he has been injured in his good name, reputation and business, has suffered great pain and mental anguish and has been held up to ridicule and contempt. The appellee filed a motion to dismiss which was granted by the trial Judge. In the order of dismissal it is stated:
* * *'
A motion for rehearing was filed which was denied.
It should be noted that the Court below based its order upon the failure of the amended complaint to charge (a) a criminal offense, or (b) a present existing venereal or other loathsome and communicable disease, or (c) conduct, characteristics or a condition imcompatible with the proper exercise of his lawful business, trade, profession or office.
It is unnecessary to pass upon the question of whether or not the offense charged was a criminal offense, or that he has an existing or other loathsome communicable disease, but it certainly charges him with having a loathsome state of mind or loathsome ideas which are communicable. As a matter of fact he alleges in the amended complaint that the words spoken were intended to be understood and were understood and that they held appellant up to ridicule and contempt among his friends, customers and the public in general.
In the case of Sharp v. Bussey, 137 Fla. 96, 187 So. 779, 780, 121 A.L.R. 1148, the case of Briggs v. Brown, 55 Fla. 417, 46 So. 325, was cited with approval, and a portion of the opinion quoted as follows:
"Where a publication is false and not privileged, and is such that its natural and proximate consequence necessarily causes injury to a person in his personal social, official or business relations of life, wrong and injury are presumed or implied, and such publication is actionable per se."
The case of Sharp v. Bussey, supra, was not a case for libel but was a case for slander and by quoting from the case of Briggs v. Brown, supra, this Court made applicable to a slander case the words hereinabove quoted. The Court then discussed in Sharp v. Bussey, supra, what was common and general knowledge and where the conduct which was such that it would cause a person to be held in contempt and despised by self-respecting citizens would constitute slander per se. The Court then said:
'It is our view that the language alleged to have been used by the defendant of and concerning the plaintiff, if false and not privileged, was such that its natural and proximate consequences necessarily caused injury to the plaintiff in his social, official and business relations of life. * * *'
The case of Sharp v. Bussey, supra, was not decided because the words spoken charged a crime or a loathsome disease, but because the language used was such that its natural and proximate consequences necessarily caused injury to the plaintiff in his social, official and business relations of life.
In the case of Le Moine v. Spicer, 146 Fla. 758, 1 So.2d 730, 733, the Court pointed out the difference between charging a person with the statutory crime of intoxication by the use of intoxicating liquor and such a charge without respect to the criminal feature, and then said:
'He or she who so indulges will become an object of contempt and an outcast from society and the world of business and worthwhile enterprise.'
In the case of Commander v. Pedersen, 116 Fla. 148, 156 So. 337, 340, the defendant had called the plaintiff a 'crook.' There is no crime defined as a crook. This Court said:
'* * * The word 'crook' has come to have a very definite meaning amongst the people of all English speaking countries. To charge that one is a 'crook' is in effect to charge that such a one is unscrupulous, dishonest, and not worthy of confidence and, therefore, a person deliberately and outside of a privileged communication charges, either orally or in writing, that another is a 'crook,' such language is actionable per se, because such words come within the purview of the authorities hereinbefore cited. We have seen that in 17 R.C.L. 263 et seq., it is said, 'Words may be actionable in themselves or per se, or they may be actionable only on allegation and proof of special damage or per quod * * *. The noxious quality in both lies in the fact that they are the natural and proximate cause of pecuniary damage to those concerning whom they are maliciously uttered * * *. In the case of words actionable per se their injurious character is a fact of common notoriety established by the general consent of men and the court consequently takes judicial notice of it. They necessarily import damage and, therefore, in such cases general damages need not be pleaded or proved but are conclusively presumed to result and special damages need not be shown to sustain the action.''
Words spoken which are false and not privileged may be slanderous per se without being used with such particularity that they would constitute a crime in an information or an indictment. To say of a person that he is a murderer, a rapist, a burglar or a thief would not meet the requirements of charging a crime in an information or an indictment, but they may be sufficient to be slanderous per se.
In the case of Loeb v. Geronemus, Fla., 66 So.2d 241, 244, which was a case...
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