Jordaan v. Hall

• Decision Date: 07 August 2003
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 3:03-CV-0706-G.,CIV.A. 3:03-CV-0706-G.
• Citation: 275 F.Supp.2d 778
• Parties: Jakes JORDAAN, Plaintiff, v. Sydney HALL and the Honorable Marylea Lewis, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

275 F.Supp.2d 778

Jakes JORDAAN, Plaintiff, v. Sydney HALL and the Honorable Marylea Lewis, Defendants.

No. CIV.A. 3:03-CV-0706-G.

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

August 7, 2003.

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Patricia Riley Jordaan, Jordaan & Riley, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.

Katherine A. Kinser, Pezzulli Kinser, Michael F. Pezzulli, Pezzulli Kinser, Dallas, TX, James Carlton Todd, Attorney General of Texas, Austin, TX, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

FISH, Chief Judge.

On June 11, 2003, Patricia Riley Jordaan, Esq. ("Riley"), counsel for the plaintiff Jakes Jordaan ("Jordaan"), appeared before this court to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed upon her for violation of Rule 11, FED. R. CIV. P. At the close of that hearing, the court held that Riley and her law firm had violated Rule 11 and sanctions were therefore imposed. The purpose of this memorandum order is to elaborate on the basis of those sanctions and to reinforce the proper boundaries of Rule 11.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 11, 1999, Jordaan and the defendant Sydney Ann Hall ("Hall") ended a two-year divorce battle¹ when they signed an agreed final decree of divorce (the "final decree" or "decree") and submitted it for entry by the 330th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas (the "330th District Court" or the "state court"). See Defendant Sydney Hall's Reply to Plaintiff's Response to the Court's Order to Show Cause ("Hall's Show Cause Reply") at 4-5; Plaintiff's Original Complaint, Request for Declaratory Judgment & Application for Injunctive Relief ("Original Complaint") ¶¶ 21-22 and n. 4. The contentious nature of this divorce is exemplified by the final decree's algorithmic child custody provisions and highly particularized asset distribution provisions, which detail everything from trust funds, heirlooms, and jewelry to trash cans, bath mats, and "various towels." See Appendix to Defendant Sydney Hall's Reply to Plaintiff's Response to the Court's Order to Show Cause ("Hall's Show Cause Appendix") at 1-39. Of particular significance here, however, are the provision prohibiting the making of "disparaging remarks about the other parent" in the presence of the parties' children and the provision restricting the dissemination of "audio taped voice mail messages," or transcripts of such recordings, which contain statements made by Hall while suffering from clinical depression.² See Hall's Show Cause Reply at 4-5.

In exchange for acceptance of the final decree's terms, Hall agreed, among other things, to pay Jordaan 862,000 dollars within twenty-four hours following the court's entry of the decree and Jordaan's signing of certain enumerated documents. See Hall's Show Cause Reply at 4-5; Hall's Show Cause Appendix at 29, 32. Jordaan did not object to the constitutionality of the final decree nor did he choose to appeal that decree. See Hall's Show Cause Reply at 5; Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support Thereof ("Hall's Motion") ¶ 4.

Unfortunately, the final decree proved to be not an end to the war but only a temporary cessation of hostilities. On January 22, 2002, Hall filed an emergency motion with the state court to enforce compliance with the final decree, alleging that Jordaan, in the course of a mediation,³ had disclosed the contents of an audio tape to Donna Harris, the mediator, in "clear violation of the [state court's] order contained on page [twenty-four] of the [agreed final divorce decree]." Hall's Dismissal Appendix at 47-48; see also Hall's Motion ¶ 5. Hall further alleged that Jordaan "has played or permitted to be played the audio tapes in his possession at issue in this case by . . . Kim Castleberry and Patricia Riley Jordaan," actions which "constitute separate and independent violations of the [final decree]." Hall's Dismissal Appendix at 48. Hall requested, in addition to appropriate sanctions, that the court order Jordaan to post a twenty-five thousand dollar bond, to relinquish all original audio tapes and copies made therefrom, and to pay her reasonable attorney fees. Id. at 48-49.

Jordaan responded the next day by filing a motion to recuse Judge Marylea Lewis ("Judge Lewis"), the state judge with continuing jurisdiction over his divorce case. See Hall's Show Cause Appendix at 40-48. Jordaan's recusal motion alleged that Judge Lewis had displayed "clear favoritism" toward Hall and her counsel, Katherine Kinser ("Kinser"), as evidenced by "the number and nature of arbitrary and egregious rulings made by Judge Lewis," an enigmatic "congratulatory hug" (apparently witnessed by a third-party) between Judge Lewis and Kinser, and Judge Lewis's setting of a temporary hearing that allowed Hall to maximize her "significant war chest and . . . economic advantage." See id. at 41-44. The motion asserted that because "Jordaan will be deprived of a fair trial in violation of the due process clauses of both the Texas and United States Constitutions if [Judge] Lewis were to preside," id. at 44, Judge Lewis should stand recused in favor of an "impartial" judge. Id. at 45.

On January 29, 2002, Judge Theo Bedard ("Judge Bedard") ruled on Hall's emergency motion, ordering the parties to "produce and deliver to the 330th Judicial District Court . . . any and all original tapes, copies of tapes, in any form, or transcripts of tapes which contain the voice of SYDNEY ANN HALL prior to . . . August 11, 1999," and that these items be "placed and sealed in the Dallas County District Clerk's safe." See Hall's Motion ¶ 5; Hall's Dismissal Appendix at 63-64. Judge Bedard further ordered that the prohibition on disseminating "audio tapes, copies of tapes[,] and the contents thereof on page [twenty-four] of [the] [d]ecree shall remain in full force and effect." See Hall's Motion ¶ 5; Hall's Dismissal Appendix at 64. On February 11, 2002, Judge Bedard ruled on Jordaan's recusal motion, denying it as "untimely" and "totally without merit." See Hall's Show Cause Reply at 5; Hall's Show Cause Appendix at 49-50. Jordaan did not appeal any of Judge Bedard's rulings. Hall's Motion ¶ 5.

On March 31, 2003, Hall filed a second motion to hold Jordaan in contempt. See Hall's Show Cause Appendix at 51-62. Hall's second contempt motion asserted that Jordaan had violated the final divorce decree and related state court orders by failing to obtain health insurance coverage for his children, failing to pay his children's outstanding medical bills, continuing to make disparaging remarks about Hall, and unilaterally discontinuing the children's psychotherapy sessions. See id. at 52-59. The motion requested that the 330th District Court hold Jordaan in contempt and order that he be jailed — for up to six months — and/or required to pay a fine, that he pay the children's outstanding medical expenses plus interest, and that he pay Hall's reasonable attorney fees. See id. at 59.

One week later, on April 7, 2003, Jordaan, represented by Riley — his law partner and current wife⁴ — filed this suit against Hall and Judge Lewis. See Docket Sheet. Jordaan's federal complaint alleged that the final decree's prohibitions on "disparaging remarks" and dissemination of "audio taped voice mail messages" — both of which the 330th District Court enjoined — constitute an impermissible "prior restraint" in violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Original Complaint ¶¶ 4, 6, 21-22, 27-28. Subject matter jurisdiction was grounded solely on the basis of a federal question pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See id. ¶ 4.⁵ As relief, Jordaan asked this court, inter alia, to declare void certain orders of the 330th District Court, to order the judge of that court, Judge Lewis, to withdraw those orders, and to award him damages and reasonable attorney fees.⁶ See Original Complaint at 11- 12; Memorandum Order, May 27, 2003 at 2.

On April 9, 2003, just two days after commencing his federal action, Jordaan filed a second motion to recuse Judge Lewis. See Hall's Show Cause Reply at 6; Hall's Show Cause Appendix at 147-172. Jordaan's motion asserted that, because Judge Lewis had been named as an "adverse party" in a related federal case, she simply could not "serve as an impartial and disinterested judge" and therefore should be recused. See Hall's Show Cause Appendix at 147-48. Jordaan additionally alleged that Judge Lewis had an "imputed" conflict of interest, engaged in ex parte communications, and circumvented an arbitration agreement. See id. at 148-53. At the end of his motion Jordaan also strategically attempted to reassert — through a wholesale "cut and paste" effort — each of the arguments contained in his first recusal motion, which, as mentioned previously, Judge Bedard had denied on February 11, 2002 as untimely and frivolous. See id. at 42-43, 49-50, 153-56.

On April 25, 2003, Jordaan amended his federal complaint and asserted for the first time that this court had subject matter jurisdiction not only under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 but also pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq. (the "FAA"). See Amended Complaint ¶ 4; Docket Sheet. The amended complaint claimed that Hall violated the express terms of a July 2, 2002 arbitration agreement⁷ by filing two contempt motions with the 330th District Court instead of pursuing arbitration.⁸ See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 27-30. Jordaan's amended complaint requested that, in addition to the relief previously sought, this court enter a "mandatory order . . . directing Defendant Lewis to stay all proceedings in the 330th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas pending arbitration of such disputes in accordance with the terms of the Arbitration Agreement." See id. at 15.⁹

On May 27, 2003, after reviewing all pleadings and related documents then on file in this case, the court issued a memorandum order concluding that Riley and her firm likely violated Rule 11(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by "attempting to...