Jordan, In re

• Citation: 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 878,4 Cal.4th 116,840 P.2d 983
• Decision Date: 07 December 1992
• Docket Number: No. S025000,S025000
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: , 840 P.2d 983 In re Gary Walter JORDAN on Habeas Corpus.

Page 878

13 Cal.Rptr.2d 878

4 Cal.4th 116, 840 P.2d 983

In re Gary Walter JORDAN on Habeas Corpus.

No. S025000.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Dec. 7, 1992.

Quin Denvir, Sacramento, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for petitioner.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Gary W. Schons, Asst. Atty. Gen., David I. Friedenberg and Robert M. Foster, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.

GEORGE, Justice.

This case presents the question whether the "prison-delivery" rule remains viable in California. The rule provides that a prisoner's notice of appeal is deemed timely filed if delivered to prison authorities within the 60-day filing period set forth in rule 31(a) of the California Rules of Court. ¹ (See People v. Lepe (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1347, 1349, fn. 2, 241 Cal.Rptr. 388; People v. Wychocki (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1063, 1065, 233 Cal.Rptr. 830.) A recent Court of Appeal decision has held, however, that the prison-delivery rule no longer is applicable in California, instead concluding that a prisoner's notice of appeal is timely filed only when actually received by the appropriate county clerk within the 60-day period, or when the prisoner demonstrates that he or she placed the notice in the prison mail "sufficiently in advance of the filing deadline" that, in the normal course of postal operations, the county clerk would have received the notice by the 60th day after rendition of the judgment. (People v. Casillas (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1365, 1370-1371, 267 Cal.Rptr. 700; accord, People v. Grey (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1336, 1340, 275 Cal.Rptr. 572.) We granted review to resolve the conflict among these decisions.

As we shall explain, we conclude that the prison-delivery rule, well-established in California jurisprudence when the filing period prescribed by rule 31(a) was 10 days in duration, continues to apply even though the period for filing an appeal was substantially extended in 1972 (to the 60 days presently provided). The prison-delivery rule ensures that an unrepresented defendant, confined during the period allowed for the filing of an appeal, is accorded an opportunity to comply with the filing requirements fully comparable to that provided to a defendant who is represented by counsel or who is not confined. Affording such equality of treatment is as important under the current 60-day filing period as it was under the former 10-day filing period.

The prison-delivery rule also furthers the efficient use of judicial resources by establishing a "bright-line" test that permits courts to avoid the substantial administrative burden that would be imposed were courts required to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether a prisoner's notice of appeal was delivered to prison authorities "sufficiently in advance of the filing deadline" to permit the timely filing of the notice in the county clerk's office.

On the basis of these same considerations, the United States Supreme Court has concluded that the prison-delivery rule applies to filings by federal prisoners in federal proceedings (Houston v. Lack (1988) 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245), and, for similar reasons, the courts of other states also have recently endorsed the prison-delivery rule. (See, e.g., Haag v. State (Fla.1992) 591 So.2d 614, 615-618; Commonwealth v. Hartsgrove (1990) 407 Mass. 441, 553 N.E.2d 1299, 1300-1303.) Because of the continued vitality of the reasoning underlying the prison-delivery rule, we conclude it should be reaffirmed.

I. FACTS

On November 7, 1990, a jury in San Bernardino County Superior Court convicted petitioner Gary Jordan of possession for sale of a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.) (Case No. MCR 83.) On December 13, 1990, another jury convicted petitioner of receiving stolen property (Pen.Code, § 496, subd. (1)) and two additional charges of possession for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351, 11378). (Case No. MCR 61.) On January 25, 1991, in these two cases, the trial court sentenced petitioner to a prison term totaling three years, eight months, which petitioner presently is serving in the state prison at Jamestown.

In his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner alleges that after the trial court's rendition of judgment, he discussed his appellate rights with his trial counsel, and counsel assured him he would handle the matter, either by preparing and filing a notice of appeal on petitioner's behalf or by preparing a notice which petitioner could file in propria persona. According to petitioner, however, several weeks passed without counsel preparing the notice of appeal. ² Petitioner thereafter prepared the notice in propria persona, designating case No. MCR 61 and omitting case No. MCR 83. Petitioner dated the notice March 23, 1991 (the 57th day after the rendition of judgment) and, on that date, placed the notice in the California Department of Corrections mail service. Petitioner had addressed the envelope (containing the notice) to the court that had sentenced him, the San Bernardino County Superior Court, East Desert District, located in Joshua Tree. The envelope was postmarked March 25, 1991, in Stockton.

On April 1, 1991, the San Bernardino County Clerk for the Central District, located in San Bernardino, stamped petitioner's notice "received but not filed--untimely." The county clerk informed petitioner that further information regarding his appellate rights could be obtained by contacting Appellate Defenders, Inc., located in San Diego. The record fails to explain why six days apparently were required to transport the letter from Stockton to San Bernardino.

His notice having been received, but not filed, petitioner, assisted by Appellate Defenders, Inc., thereafter filed in the Court of Appeal a "Request For Finding Of Constructive Filing Of Notice Of Appeal From Judgment Entered In Superior [Court] Case [Nos.] MCR 61/MCR 83." The Court of Appeal summarily denied the request, and this petition in propria persona for writ of habeas corpus followed.

Following our receipt of the petition, we ordered the Director of Corrections (hereafter, respondent) to show cause "why petitioner's notice of appeal should not be deemed constructively filed as of the date he delivered it to prison authorities for mailing to the court. (Compare People v. Dailey (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 101 with People v. Casillas (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1365 .)" ³

II. DISCUSSION

A. The parties' contentions

The question whether a notice of appeal has been filed in a timely manner presents a jurisdictional issue. Unless the notice is actually or constructively filed within the appropriate filing period, an appellate court is without jurisdiction to determine the merits of the appeal and must dismiss the appeal. (Rule 45(c) ["The time for filing a notice of appeal ... shall not be extended...."]; rule 45(e) ["The reviewing court for good cause may relieve a party from a default occasioned by any failure to comply with these rules, except the failure to give timely notice of appeal...."]; In re Benoit (1973) 10 Cal.3d 72, 79-87, 109 Cal.Rptr. 785, 514 P.2d 97; People v. Slobodion (1947) 30 Cal.2d 362, 365, 181 P.2d 868; 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) §§ 3220-3224, pp. 3979-3984.)

Against the backdrop of these fundamental principles, petitioner contends his notice of appeal was constructively filed as of the date he delivered it to the prison authorities, regardless whether or not such delivery allowed sufficient time for the county clerk to receive the notice prior to expiration of the 60-day filing period. According to petitioner, his delivery of the notice to the prison authorities prior to expiration of the filing period manifested due diligence on his part, and the county clerk's subsequent refusal to file the notice violated petitioner's appellate rights. (See In re Benoit, supra, 10 Cal.3d 72, 109 Cal.Rptr. 785, 514 P.2d 97; People v. Slobodion, supra, 30 Cal.2d 362, 181 P.2d 868; People v. Dailey (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 101, 345 P.2d 558.)

Respondent characterizes petitioner's argument as anachronistic, contending it was derived from case law abrogated by the 1972 amendment to rule 31(a). According to respondent, the prison-delivery rule has been stripped of its persuasive force because the amendment's extension of the filing period from 10 days to 60 days allows ample time for the filing of a notice of appeal. Respondent therefore urges this court to adopt the elevated standard of diligence set forth recently by the Court of Appeal in People v. Casillas, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d 1365, 267 Cal.Rptr. 700. As explained more fully below, Casillas held that, in the absence of a prisoner's demonstration that a county clerk's untimely receipt of a notice was the fault of someone beyond the prisoner's control, relief from default should be denied. (Id. at p. 1370, 267 Cal.Rptr. 700.) Because petitioner in the present case allegedly fails to make that showing, respondent contends Casillas mandates the rejection of petitioner's notice of appeal. ⁴

B. Whether the prison-delivery rule remains viable in the wake of the 1972 amendment to rule 31(a)

1. People v. Slobodion: Origin of the prison-delivery rule

The touchstone case underlying application of the prison-delivery rule is People v. Slobodion, supra, 30 Cal.2d 362, 181 P.2d 868, which addressed the 10-day filing period then prescribed by rule 31(a) for a notice of appeal. In Slobodion, a prisoner deposited with prison authorities his notice of appeal six days prior to expiration of the filing period, but they failed to forward it in a manner that would have permitted its timely filing. The notice was received by the county clerk five days after expiration of the filing period. In denying a motion to dismiss the appeal, we observed that the county clerk's untimely receipt of the prisoner's notice was not the fault of the prisoner, but...