Jordan v. Amerada Hess Corp.

• Decision Date: 15 November 1979
• Docket Number: Civ. No. F78-19,F78-23.
• Parties: Rick W. JORDAN and Suzanne Jordan, Plaintiffs, v. AMERADA HESS CORPORATION et al., Defendants. Lydia HEPPNER, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Henry J. Heppner, Jr., Deceased, Plaintiff, v. AMERADA HESS CORPORATION et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Alaska

479 F. Supp. 573

Rick W. JORDAN and Suzanne Jordan, Plaintiffs, v. AMERADA HESS CORPORATION et al., Defendants.

Lydia HEPPNER, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Henry J. Heppner, Jr., Deceased, Plaintiff, v. AMERADA HESS CORPORATION et al., Defendants.

Civ. Nos. F78-19, F78-23.

United States District Court, D. Alaska.

November 15, 1979.

James A. Parrish and Roger Brunner, Fairbanks, Alaska, for plaintiffs.

Robert L. Eastaugh, Anchorage, Alaska, Girard E. Boudreau, Jr., O'Melveny & Myers, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

VON DER HEYDT, Chief Judge.

THESE CAUSES come before the court on defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Two cases have been consolidated for the purpose of this motion in order to determine the scope of the strict liability provision of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1653(a)(1).

The Jordan case (F78-19) arises from personal injuries allegedly sustained in an automobile accident that occurred in the vicinity of the Alaska pipeline. The Heppner case is a wrongful death action arising as the result of a construction accident in the Alaska pipeline right-of-way. In both cases the plaintiffs allege that the injuries and death and the damages arising therefrom were in connection with or resulting from activities along or in the vicinity of the Trans-Alaska pipeline right-of-way and that the defendants are liable under the strict liability provisions of the pipeline authorization act.

43 U.S.C. § 1653(a)(1) states:

Except when the holder of the pipeline right-of-way granted pursuant to this chapter can prove that damages in connection with or resulting from activities along or in the vicinity of the proposed trans-Alaskan pipeline right-of-way were caused by an act of war or negligence of the United States, other government entity, or the damaged party, such holder shall be strictly liable to all damaged parties, public or private, without regard to fault for such damages, and without regard to ownership of any affected lands, structures, fish, wildlife, or biotic or other natural resources relied upon by Alaska Natives, Native organizations, or others for subsistence or economic purposes.

Claims for such injury or damages may be determined by arbitration or judicial proceedings.

The word "damages" is only qualified by the phrase "in connection with or resulting from activities along or in the vicinity of the proposed trans-Alaskan pipeline right-of-way."

The defendant oil companies contend that "the strict liability provisions here at issue were affirmatively and specifically designed to deal with a single clearly delineated and acknowledged problem of national concern—the unique environmental risks inherent in the construction and operation of the pipeline." Defendants' Brief in Support at 74. The defendants further contend that the legislative history of this provision makes it clear such does not apply to the automobile accident and the construction accident involved in these cases. The plaintiffs rely upon the language of the statute which is not limited by its own terms to damage to land, wildlife, and other environmental and subsistence values. They contend that this court should not rely upon the legislative history to limit the plain words of the statute. The first question the court must determine is the extent to which the court should consider the legislative history in limiting the open ended language of section 1653(a)(1).

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that:

Frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular act.

Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459, 12 S.Ct. 511, 512, 36 L.Ed. 226 (1892). Accord: United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534, 543, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1940); Armstrong Co. v. Nu Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 333, 59 S.Ct. 191, 83 L.Ed. 195 (1938); Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 446-448, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932); United States v. Ryan, 284 U.S. 167, 175, 52 S.Ct. 65, 76 L.Ed. 224 (1931); Kenai Peninsula Borough v. Andrus, 436 F.Supp. 288, 291 (D.Alaska 1977). But see TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 n. 33, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978). The Court's recent decision in TVA v. Hill casts some doubt on the issue of consultation of legislative history to avoid "absurd" results when the plain language of the statute covers the fact situation before the court. In that case the Court took a very literalist view of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 and held that construction of the Tellico Dam, which was 80% completed, must be halted to protect the snail darter, an endangered species. Justice Powell, relying upon the Church of the Holy Trinity case, wrote a dissent which contended that the result sanctioned by the Court, halting a nearly completed dam, was an absurd result which justified the Court's deviation from the literal words of the statute. 437 U.S. at 202-206, 98 S.Ct. 2279 (dissenting). This court has examined Hill and finds that it does not prevent examination of the legislative history of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act to determine whether the oil companies are strictly liable for all damages of any kind that occur "in connection with" or "in the vicinity of the proposed trans-Alaska pipeline right-of-way." As Justice Powell explained, "The real difference between the Court and myself on this issue arises from our perceptions of the character of today's result. The Court professes to find nothing particularly remarkable about the result produced by its decision in this case." 437 U.S. 204 n. 14, 98 S.Ct. 2307 n.14 (dissenting). This court finds the result urged by the plaintiffs in this case to be quite absurd and preposterous and finds that their contention must be supported by some legislative history before it reasonably could be sustained. In addition, the Court in TVA v. Hill did not cease its inquiry with the plain language of the statute but went on to examine the legislative history. In that case the Court found support in the legislative history for its view of the language.

In this case there is no legislative history that would indicate that the Congress intended to include damage caused by automobile or construction accidents within the strict liability provisions of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act. An examination of the legislative history shows that these provisions were designed to establish the permit holders of the pipeline right-of-way as strictly liable for a broad range of damages to the land, fish, wildlife, air, water, and the subsistence lifestyle of the Alaskan Native.

The problem the provision was designed to remedy was raised by many witnesses at the committee hearings. For example, William Hensley, President of the Alaska Federation of Natives, told the Senate Committee:

The danger we fear from the pipeline proposal that would not provide an indemnification to the Natives is that there could be interference with those migration patterns of caribou, with the spawning of the salmon or other fish in the various streams, that would not be within the areas of land selection rights granted to the native people, but would represent a severe detrimental depletion of their

...