Jordan v. Brackin, 02-260.
| Decision Date | 21 November 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-260.,02-260. |
| Citation | 2003 WY 151,79 P.3d 536 |
| Parties | Lené JORDAN, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Chris Allen BRACKIN, Appellee (Defendant). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellant: Lené Jordan, Pro se.
Representing Appellee: Mark W. Harris, Evanston, Wyoming.
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, and VOIGT, JJ., and JAMES, D.J.
[¶ 1] Appellant Lené Jordan (Jordan) appeals the district court's determination that Appellee Chris Allen Brackin (Brackin) could properly cease child support payments on each son's eighteenth birthday. Jordan contends that because the age of majority was nineteen when the divorce decree was entered, the district court erred by not ruling that the child support obligation should continue until the nineteenth birthday.
[¶ 2] We hold that the district court properly determined that the current statutory age of majority was applicable, and Brackin was entitled to cease payments when the parties' sons turned eighteen. We affirm.
[¶ 3] Jordan presents the following issue for our review:
[¶ 4] Jordan and Brackin first married in 1981 and had two sons, one born on May 24, 1984, and one born on March 7, 1986. The parties divorced in 1988 but remarried in February of 1992. The couple divorced again in October of 1992. As part of that divorce decree, a separation agreement was incorporated stating that the parents would share equally in the physical custody, support and maintenance of the children so long as parents lived within 100 miles of each other. No child support was awarded or ordered for either party.
[¶ 5] Two years later, when Brackin planned to move over 100 miles away to Evanston, the parents negotiated an amendment to the settlement agreement that Brackin would begin paying child support to Jordan. That amendment was never filed with the court. Later, the parties did petition to modify child support, and an order was entered in 1996 that was later modified in 2000. Under that later order, Brackin began paying $548 per month in child support.
[¶ 6] Our review of the separation agreement and the court's child support orders indicates that none addressed the duration of the payment of child support nor the continuation of the court's jurisdiction after the children reached age eighteen. The district court held a hearing on Brackin's motion to reduce his child support when his eldest son turned eighteen and granted the motion based upon statutory requirements that terminate the child support obligation at age eighteen unless certain circumstances exist. Jordan filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the district court should apply the statutory age of majority that existed when the separation agreement was executed and the divorce decree was final. The district court denied reconsideration, and this appeal followed.
[¶ 7] In 1993, the Wyoming legislature changed the age of majority from nineteen to eighteen.1 Thomas v. Thomas, 913 P.2d 854, 855 (Wyo.1996). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-313 (LexisNexis 2003) provides for the cessation of a child-support obligation when the child reaches the age of majority.2 The child support obligation may continue under some circumstances such as when the child is disabled or still attending high school; however, none of those circumstances apply in this case. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-204 (LexisNexis 2003).
[¶ 8] At the hearing, Jordan clarified that she was seeking the additional year of support because her son planned to attend college and she asserted that it was in his best interests that Brackin continue to pay child support to assist with college expenses. The district court determined that the statutory language deprived it of jurisdiction to order continued child support payments beyond the eighteenth year. On appeal, Jordan does not challenge this determination, but instead points to our decision in Thomas as permitting the prospective application of the 1993 statutory change in the age of majority. She contends that because the separation agreement and the divorce decree were final in 1992, the district court had jurisdiction to apply the 1992 statute and allow the child support obligation to continue until her sons' nineteenth birthdays.
[¶ 9] The precise issue considered in Thomas was:
Where before the effective date of a statute changing the age of majority from nineteen (19) to eighteen (18) years a child support order specified 19 years as the age at which the divorced father's duty to make support payments would end, was the district court in error in terminating the duty of support at the new age of majority?
[¶ 10] The issue in Thomas questioned an existing child support order that did not specify when the child support obligation was to cease. Id. at 856. Thomas held that the legislature intended that this change would apply prospectively and, thus, the district court should not apply the statutory change to an existing child support order. Id. Thus, in Thomas, the father...
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In re Guardianship of Meo
...However, we need not reach this issue to afford Mother her desired relief, so "its resolution must wait another day." Jordan v. Brackin, 2003 WY 151, ¶ 12, 79 P.3d 536, 538 they lack jurisdiction to divest parents of custody rights); In re Guardianship of Lupe C., 112 N.M. 116, 812 P.2d 365......
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