Jordan v. City of Centerville, 25548.
Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
Writing for the Court | John E. Parrish |
Citation | 119 S.W.3d 214 |
Parties | Paul JORDAN and Martha Patricia Jordan, his wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. CITY OF CENTERVILLE, Defendant-Appellant. |
Docket Number | No. 25548.,25548. |
Decision Date | 10 November 2003 |
v.
CITY OF CENTERVILLE, Defendant-Appellant.
[119 S.W.3d 215]
Nicole Harris, A.W. Dieffenbach, Jr., Wegmann, Gasaway, Stewart, Dieffenbach, Tesreau & Sherman, Hillsboro, Christina L. Kime, Michael J. Hackworth, Hackworth & Kime, Piedmont, for Appellant.
No appearance, for Respondent.
JOHN E. PARRISH, Judge.
City of Centerville (city) appeals a judgment declaring a provision of its municipal liquor license as "arbitrary, unreasonable and unconstitutional." The judgment is reversed.
Paul Jordan and Martha Patricia Jordan (plaintiffs) brought this action for declaratory judgment in which they challenge the validity of Section 12 of city's municipal liquor license ordinance, Ordinance No. 2001-1. Section 12 states:1
(a) The number of establishments, taverns or persons licensed to sell intoxicating liquor or malt liquor or non-intoxicating beer by the drink for consumption on the premises or in the original package not to be consumed on the premises where sold is hereby set, fixed and determined at not more than one.
(b) The number of establishments licensed to sell non-intoxicating beer in the original package, not to be consumed on the premises, or at retail by the drink for consumption on the premises, is hereby set, fixed and determined at not more that one.
This case was submitted to the trial court on written stipulated facts. Facts recited in this opinion are gleaned from that written stipulation.
On or about July 1, 2001, plaintiffs made an oral request to city for issuance of a license for either a package liquor store or bar. The request was to city's mayor. City held a special meeting of its Board of Alderpersons on August 13, 2001, at which plaintiffs' request for a license was denied. City had no ordinance at that time regarding restriction of establishments that served or sold liquor or other types of alcoholic beverages.
On November 8, 2001, city enacted Ordinance No. 2001-1. Prior to enactment of Ordinance No. 2001-1, city had never had an ordinance that restricted the sale of alcohol within its city limits. On November 8, 2001, there was one establishment within city that sold liquor either by the drink or in the original package. It was Centerville Quick Stop. It currently holds city's only issued liquor license.
On December 11, 2001, plaintiffs applied in writing for issuance of a liquor license to open a package liquor store or bar.2 That application was amended January 30, 2002, to request only a package liquor license for premises within city. City denied the application on February 14, 2002, at a meeting of its Board of Alderpersons.
On June 12, 2002, plaintiffs filed this action seeking declaratory judgment that city's ordinance was unconstitutional. On July 30, 2002, at the request of city and using an application form provided by city, plaintiffs again formally applied for a license to operate a package liquor store. City denied the application October 10, 2002, at a meeting of its Board of Alderpersons.
The trial court entered judgment March 7, 2003, declaring ordinance No. 2001-1 "arbitrary, unreasonable and unconstitutional and, therefore, ... set aside and held for naught."
This case was tried before the court without a jury. Appellate review is undertaken pursuant to Rule 84.13(d). The judgment will be affirmed unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, is against the weight of the evidence or erroneously declares or applies the law. Parnell v. Sherman, 899 S.W.2d 900, 901 (Mo.App.1995).
Artilla Cove Resort, Inc. v. Hartley, 72 S.W.3d 291, 293 (Mo.App.2002).
City presents one point on appeal. It contends the trial court erred in entering judgment setting aside the ordinance; that the trial court "misapplied the law in finding that the ordinance is arbitrary and unreasonable due to the fact that it eliminates competition for the sale of liquor in that the limiting of the number of liquor licenses within the city is a valid exercise of police power in the interest of the public despite any resulting restraint of trade." City's point further asserts that there are no other grounds on which the trial court could have properly set aside the ordinance.
City is a city of the fourth class located in Reynolds County, Missouri. Its population, according to the 2000 census, is 171. Thus, it is a municipal corporation. State ex rel. Casey's General Stores, Inc. v. City of West Plains, 9 S.W.3d 712 (Mo.App.1999), explains the authority of a municipal corporation regarding control and regulation...
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Turner v. Missouri Dep't of Conservation, SD30817
...we must "adjudicate [his] claim of error without benefit of whatever argument [he] might have presented." Jordan v. City of Centerville, 119 S.W.3d 214, 217 n.4 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003). Jones's brief correctly notes various deficiencies in the Department's brief, including the addition of an "......
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Turner v. Mo. Dep't of Conservation, SD 30817.
...we must “adjudicate [his] claim of error without benefit of whatever argument [he] might have presented.” Jordan v. City of Centerville, 119 S.W.3d 214, 217 n. 4 (Mo.App. S.D.2003). Jones's brief correctly notes various deficiencies in the Department's brief, including the addition of an “I......
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Turner v. Mo. Dep't of Conservation, SD30817
...we must "adjudicate [his] claim of error without benefit of whatever argument [he] might have presented." Jordan v. City of Centerville, 119 S.W.3d 214, 217 n.4 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003). Jones's brief correctly notes various deficiencies in the Department's brief, including the addition of an "......
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Vaughan v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., WD 74345.
...will not, on review, convict a lower court of error on an issue which was not put before it to decide.” Jordan v. City of Centerville, 119 S.W.3d 214, 217 n. 6 (Mo.App. S.D.2003). Thus, Appellants' argument regarding the applicability of SORNA's registration requirements to persons convicte......