Jordan v. Cnty. of Chemung

• Decision Date: 05 September 2017
• Docket Number: 6:13–CV–06247 EAW
• Citation: 264 F.Supp.3d 497
• Parties: Edith JORDAN, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF CHEMUNG, Christopher J. Moss, William A. Schrom, John Doe(s), and Jane Doe(s), Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

264 F.Supp.3d 497

Edith JORDAN, Plaintiff,

v.COUNTY OF CHEMUNG, Christopher J. Moss, William A. Schrom, John Doe(s), and Jane Doe(s), Defendants.

6:13–CV–06247 EAW

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed September 5, 2017

Daniel William Flynn, A.J. Bosman, Bosman Law Firm LLC, Rome, NY, for Plaintiff.

Jeremy J. Hourihan, Matthew Joseph Rosno, Barclay Damon, LLP, Elmira, NY, for Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Edith Jordan ("Plaintiff") filed this action on May 14, 2013, complaining of violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq. ("FMLA"), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"), the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL") and the New York Constitution. (Dkt. 1). The parties have completed discovery. (See Dkt. 49). Defendants County of Chemung, New York ("Chemung County" or "the County"), Christopher J. Moss ("Moss"), and William A. Schrom ("Schrom") (collectively, "Defendants") moved for summary judgment on August 1, 2016. (Dkt. 50). Plaintiff responded (Dkt. 55), and Defendants replied to Plaintiff's response. (Dkt. 59). Oral argument was held on January 20, 2017, at which time the Court reserved decision. (See Dkt. 64).

For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND ¹

Plaintiff was employed by the Chemung County Sheriff's Office as a part-time Corrections Officer in the Chemung County Jail ("the Jail"), starting in August 2006. (Dkt. 50–18 at ¶¶ 1, 14; Dkt. 55–1 at 51; Dkt. 55–18 at ¶¶ 1, 14). At all relevant times, Moss was the Sheriff and Schrom was the Undersheriff of Chemung County. (Dkt. 50–18 at ¶¶ 3–4; Dkt. 50–3 at ¶ 1; Dkt. 51 at ¶ 1; Dkt. 55–18 at ¶¶ 3–4). Major John Hamula ("Hamula") was the superintendent of the Jail (Dkt. 50–18 at ¶ 9; Dkt. 55–18 at ¶ 9); Captain Charles Wilson ("Wilson") was responsible for Jail administration and operations (Dkt. 50–18 at ¶ 7; Dkt. 55–18 at ¶ 7); and Daniel Mandell ("Mandell"), a Lieutenant and then Captain, was Plaintiff's supervisor (Dkt. 50–18 at ¶ 8; Dkt. 55–18 at ¶ 8).

Plaintiff was initially hired to work only as needed, on a fill-in basis for other corrections officers, but was later given regular, prescheduled shifts on Tuesdays and Sundays. (See Dkt. 50–18 at ¶¶ 15–16; Dkt. 55–18 at ¶ 15–16; see also Dkt. 55–1 at 52). Plaintiff was a competent employee when she worked. (Dkt. 50–18 at ¶ 17; Dkt. 55–18 at ¶ 17). On or about June 18, 2010, Plaintiff submitted an FMLA request, seeking intermittent leave "to attend to her sick children and/or their personal needs." (Dkt. 50–18 at ¶ 21; Dkt. 55–18 at ¶ 21; see, e.g., Dkt. 55–1 at 121). On June 28 or 29, 2010, Plaintiff requested that Wilson remove her from her regularly scheduled Tuesday shift. (Dkt. 50–18 at ¶ 22; Dkt. 55–7 at 2; Dkt. 55–18 at ¶ 22). The County accepted and approved Plaintiff's FMLA request on June 30, 2010. (Dkt. 50–18 at ¶ 23; Dkt. 55–18 at ¶ 23).

Plaintiff last appeared for work on December 9, 2010. (Dkt. 50–18 at ¶ 27; Dkt. 55–18 at ¶ 27). Plaintiff submitted a claim for unemployment on August 30, 2010, which was opposed by the Chemung County Sheriff's Office. (Dkt. 50–18 at ¶ 30; see Dkt. 55–18 at ¶ 30). The County ultimately terminated Plaintiff's employment on September 28, 2011. (Dkt. 55–12 at 2).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's 11 causes of action are: (1) violation of the FMLA by Chemung County; (2) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause by all Defendants; (3) gender discrimination under Title VII by Chemung County; (4) gender discrimination under the NYSHRL by Moss and Schrom; (5) violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by all Defendants; (6) retaliation in violation of the First Amendment by all Defendants; (7) retaliation in violation of Title VII by Chemung County; (8) retaliation in violation of the NYSHRL by Moss and Schrom; (9) violation of the New York State Constitution, Article I § 11 by all Defendants; (10) violation of the New York State Constitution, Article I § 6 by all Defendants; and (11) violation of the New York State Constitution, Article I § 8 by all Defendants. (Dkt. 1). Defendants seek summary judgment on each cause of action. (See Dkt. 50–19).

The Court first addresses Plaintiff's FMLA claim, then proceeds to discuss her Due Process claim, Title VII claims, First Amendment claim, Equal Protection Clause claim, and, finally, her claims under the NYSHRL and the New York State Constitution.

I. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment should be granted if the moving party establishes "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court should grant summary judgment if, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court finds that no rational jury could find in favor of that party. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ).

Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... [T]he nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. " Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348 ). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment...." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

II. Plaintiff's FMLA Claim Survives Summary Judgment in Part

Plaintiff claims a violation of the FMLA against Chemung County. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 20–24). The County argues that Plaintiff's FMLA claim fails as a matter of law. (Dkt. 50–19 at 4–8).

FMLA allows eligible employees up to a total of 12 weeks of unpaid leave during any 12–month period to allow an employee to care "for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health condition." 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). "[A]t the end of an employee's leave[,] the employee has the right to return to the position [s]he held before the leave or its equivalent...." Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 174 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2614 ).

A state employee may seek equitable relief or damages against a state employer if the employer interferes with, restrains, or denies the exercise of FMLA rights under § 2612(a)(1)(C). 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) ; Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724–25, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 155 L.Ed.2d 953 (2003). But see Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 33, 132 S.Ct. 1327, 182 L.Ed.2d 296 (2012) (disallowing money damages suits against states for violations of § 2612(a)(1)(D) ).

The regulations promulgated pursuant to the FMLA explain that " ‘[i]nterfering with’ the exercise of an employee's rights would include, for example, not only refusing to authorize FMLA leave, but discouraging an employee from using such leave," 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b), and that "[a]n employer is prohibited from discriminating against employees or prospective employees who have used FMLA leave." 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c).

Potenza v. City of N.Y., 365 F.3d 165, 167 (2d Cir. 2004).

In a general sense, an employee brings an "interference" claim when her employer has prevented or otherwise impeded the employee's ability to exercise rights under the FMLA. "Retaliation" claims, on the other hand, involve an employee actually exercising her rights or opposing perceived unlawful conduct under the FMLA and then being subjected to some adverse employment action by the employer. The two types of claims serve as ex ante and ex post protections for employees who seek to avail themselves of rights granted by the FMLA.

Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).

As a threshold matter, the Court notes that although the complaint fails to specify whether Plaintiff raises an interference and/or retaliation claim, it is properly read as raising both types of FMLA claims. Plaintiff alleges that Chemung County "intentionally and willfully interfered with and denied the exercise of rights provided under the FMLA by removing her from the work schedule, taking away all of her hours, and then discharging her." (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 23). And, although clearer pleading would have been preferable, the Court reads Plaintiff's complaint to assert that Chemung County removed Plaintiff's regularly scheduled Sunday shifts and then terminated her in retaliation for Plaintiff's exercise of FMLA rights. This is sufficient to plead an FMLA retaliation claim.

A. Plaintiff's FMLA Interference Claim Fails

[T]o prevail on a claim of interference with [ ] FMLA rights, a plaintiff must establish: 1) that she is an eligible employee under the FMLA; 2) that the defendant is an employer as defined by the FMLA; 3) that she was entitled to take leave under the FMLA; 4) that she gave notice to the defendant of her intention to take leave; and 5) that she was denied benefits to which she was entitled under the FMLA.

Graziadio v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 817 F.3d 415, 424 (2d Cir. 2016).

Here, the County does not dispute that Plaintiff was eligible for FMLA benefits, that it is an employer as defined by the FMLA, that Plaintiff was entitled to take leave under the FMLA, and that she gave notice to Wilson of her intent to take such leave. (See Dkt. 50–18 at ¶¶ 21–24). Plaintiff took leave to care for her son, pursuant to § 2612(a)(1)(C). (See Dkt....