Jordan v. Doe
| Decision Date | 02 December 1994 |
| Docket Number | 92-2009,Nos. 91-3042,s. 91-3042 |
| Citation | 38 F.3d 1559 |
| Parties | Robert Allen JORDAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John DOE, Chief U.S. Marshal, Defendants, David Adkins, Lydia Blakey, Joseph Enders, John Hardman, Augustus Lawson and Ivar Swanson, Defendants-Appellants. Robert Allen JORDAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John DOE, U.S. Marshal, Deputy U.S. Marshal, United States of America, et al., Defendants, David Adkins, Lydia Blakey, Joseph Enders, John Hardman, Ivar Swanson, Augustus Lawson, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Warren A. Zimmerman, Asst. U.S. Atty., Tampa, FL, Freddi Lipstein, Jonathan R. Siegel, Appellate Staff, Civil Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, for appellants in No. 91-3042.
Arthur Addess, Lake Worth, FL, for appellee.
Robert Genzman, U.S. Atty., Tampa, FL, Warren A. Zimmerman, Asst. U.S. Atty., Freddi Lipstein, Jonathan Siegel, Appellate Staff, Civil Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, for appellants in No. 92-2009.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before COX and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and CLARK, Senior Circuit Judge.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Robert Allen Jordan filed this Bivens 1 action against officials of the United States Marshals Service. Jordan was arrested on a charge of bank robbery in 1986 and held without bail pending trial. While in federal custody, Jordan was transported and held in various local county jails in the Middle District of Florida. The Marshals Service had contracted with these local jails to house federal pretrial detainees on a temporary basis.
On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court construed Jordan's complaint as follows: count one alleged that the defendants placed Jordan in local "contract" jails where they knew unconstitutional conditions existed; count two alleged that the defendants released Jordan to state custody without a writ and in violation of an agreement governing federal detainees; and count three alleged that Jordan was denied adequate medical care while in local jails. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Marshals Service officials in their official capacities on all counts, based on sovereign immunity. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the Marshals Service officials in their individual capacities on counts two and three.
On count one, the court granted summary judgment in favor of several Marshals Service officials because it found that Jordan had failed to present significantly probative evidence of unconstitutional conditions at the local jails to which these officials had transported Jordan. The court denied summary judgment on count one to Defendants-Appellants David Adkins, Lydia Blakey, Joseph Enders, John Hardman, Ivar Swanson, and Augustus Lawson ("the marshals") because it found that Jordan had raised an issue of material fact as to whether unconstitutional conditions existed at the Hillsborough County and Gilchrist County jails and whether the marshals were aware of those conditions. Deputy Marshals Adkins, Blakey, Hardman, Swanson, and Lawson ("the transporting marshals") had transported Jordan to the Hillsborough and Gilchrist jails. Enders, Assistant Director of the U.S. Marshals Service, had signed the contracts with county officials to house federal pretrial detainees.
With respect to the Hillsborough County jail, Jordan alleges that "he was forced to sleep on the floor due to overcrowding, that vermin, roaches and mice were rampant, the plumbing was faulty, and that conditions were filthy." R.2-79 at 10-11. Jordan also alleges that "Gilchrist County jail did not allow him to use the phone, was filthy, and did not have a law library." Id. at 11. Jordan submitted four inspection reports documenting ongoing problems at the Hillsborough County jail, including severe overcrowding and other problems with food, sanitation and housing that stemmed from overcrowded conditions. R.1-38 at exs. 3-6. Another report indicated that the Gilchrist County facility "continue[d] to be very clean, orderly and well maintained," R.1-38 at ex. 8, but Jordan submitted an affidavit by a prisoner, Joe Kotvas, contradicting the report and indicating problems with sanitation in his cell and the serving of cold food at the jail. R.1-59 at ex. 2. Kotvas further "stated that he had complained to the U.S. Marshals about problems such as overcrowding and the bad plumbing in his cell." Id. An affidavit by prisoner James David Strickland stated that "[t]he U.S. Marshals were told numerous times of the violations of the jails, but failed to respond." R.1-38 at ex. 12.
The district court denied the marshals' motions for summary judgment based on qualified immunity because: (1) the marshals had not established that they were acting within their discretionary authority; (2) the marshals did not explain what law and facts were known to the individual marshals; (3) the marshals might prevail on the merits so that the question of qualified immunity would not be reached; and (4) the marshals might not be entitled to qualified immunity if conditions at the Hillsborough and Gilchrist jails were unconstitutional and the marshals knew of such conditions. R.2-79 at 16-17. However, the court indicated that its denial was not permanent because it stated that it could not "at this juncture address whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity," R.2-79 at 17, and that it "await[ed] a properly argued and supported motion for summary judgment...." Id. at 15 n. 12.
These statements and other aspects of the district court's order led the defendants to believe that the court was not referring to their latest motion for summary judgment. Thus, the defendants filed a motion to reconsider along with more affidavits. After reassignment to another judge, the district court denied the motion to reconsider and stated that the December 1990 order constituted a ruling on the defendants' more recent motion for summary judgment. The marshals now appeal the district court's denial of their motions for summary judgment based on qualified immunity and the district court's denial of their motion to reconsider.
II. Jurisdiction and Standards of Review
Our jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal is governed by Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). In Mitchell, the Supreme Court held that "a district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable 'final decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment." Id. at 530, 105 S.Ct. at 2817. Assuming we have jurisdiction, the issue of a government official's qualified immunity from suit presents a question of law, and "like the generality of such questions, must be resolved de novo on appeal." Elder v. Holloway, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1019, 1022, 127 L.Ed.2d 344 (1994).
III. Discussion
Jordan asserts that the district court's order is not appealable because "the district court merely deferred a final decision in order for the defendants to submit additional proof as to their assertions of qualified immunity as a defense." Appellee's Br. at 12. Jordan relies on Riley v. Wainwright, 810 F.2d 1006 (11th Cir.1986), where we held that a district court's denial of the defense of qualified immunity did not turn on an issue of law, and thus was not subject to interlocutory appeal, because the case "required substantial factual development." Id. at 1007.
The marshals respond to this assertion by noting that the district court "ordered that the case proceed to trial" and they had "to move the district court to stay the trial pending appeal." Appellants' Reply Br. at 3. Thus, the marshals contend that the district court's order was final and appealable under Mitchell.
We agree that the district court's order was an appealable "final decision" under Mitchell. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that qualified immunity is not simply a defense to liability, but an immunity from suit which "is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 2815; see Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, ----, 112 S.Ct. 534, 536, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991). Our decision in Riley is distinguishable from the present case because in this case Jordan's complaint, together with the affidavits and other documents he submitted, 2 sufficiently identified the facts underlying Jordan's claim to enable the district court to resolve the qualified immunity issue. 3
Because the district court later denied the defendants' motion to reconsider, and scheduled the case for trial, we find no merit in Jordan's contention that the district court merely "postponed" deciding the issue of qualified immunity. We conclude that this court has jurisdiction pursuant to Mitchell to review the district court's denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
"A necessary concomitant to the determination of whether the constitutional right asserted by a plaintiff is 'clearly established' at the time the defendant acted is the determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all." Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991). Thus, before we scrutinize the marshals' assertion of qualified immunity, we first examine Jordan's contentions to determine whether he asserts a cognizable constitutional claim.
1. The Constitution and Conditions of Confinement
We begin with the proposition that, while the Constitution does not require prisons to be comfortable, it also does not permit them to be inhumane, "and it is now settled that 'the ... conditions under which [a prisoner] is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.' " Farmer v. Brennan, --- U.S. ----, ----, ...
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