Jordan v. Helix Energy Solutions Grp., Inc., CIVIL ACTION NO. H-16-1808

Decision Date11 October 2018
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. H-16-1808
Citation346 F.Supp.3d 890
Parties Ralph JORDAN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, v. HELIX ENERGY SOLUTIONS GROUP, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

Curt Christopher Hesse, Melissa Moore, Moore & Associates, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff.

Michael Carter Crow, Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SIM LAKE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Ralph Jordan ("Jordan" or "Plaintiff") brought this action against defendant Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc., ("Helix" or "Defendant") asserting claims for violation of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 and 211.1 Pending before the court are Defendant Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's MSJ") (Docket Entry No. 27), and Plaintiff Ralph Jordan's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's MPSJ") (Docket Entry No. 29). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's MPSJ will be denied, plaintiff's objection to certain paragraphs of the Kenric McNeal Declaration will be overruled, and Defendant's MSJ will be denied.

I. Factual and Procedural Background
A. Factual Background

Helix provides, inter alia, rigless offshore well intervention services using specialized well intervention vessels. Jordan and the only other individual to opt-in to this action, Christopher Gordon ("Gordon"), worked as drillers on Helix's Q4000 and Q5000 vessels, respectively. Both the Q4000 and the Q5000 are semisubmersible rigless vessels used to conduct well intervention in water depths of up to 10,000 feet. Kenric McNeal, Helix's Director of Human Resources, states in his declaration that because these vessels are rigless no actual drilling occurs.2 Each vessel has a drill crew consisting of some combination of roughnecks, assistant derrickmen, derrickmen, and assistant drillers, all of whom are classified as non-exempt and paid on an hourly basis with overtime.3 On the vessels the drill crew is supervised by the driller.4 Helix classified the driller position as exempt, and at all relevant times, plaintiffs were aware of that classification.5

A driller spends the majority of his time sitting in a control room, monitoring a series of computer screens to ensure that the well intervention operations are running smoothly.6 Drillers also review the well program with the toolpusher, company man, subsea engineer, superintendents, and any service hands, and if the driller disagrees with any portion of the well program, he makes recommendations to the toolpusher.7 Drillers also supervise drill crews.8 Drillers complete performance appraisal evaluations for their drill crew members every hitch, which entails scoring individuals on competency and commenting on areas of strength and areas in need of training.9

Helix hired Jordan as an assistant driller in February of 2008, and Jordan worked in that position until October of 2013 when he was promoted to the position of driller.10 Jordan worked as a driller from October of 2013 until June of 2016 when he was discharged.11 Helix calculated Jordan's pay on a daily basis, which during his employment as a driller, ranged from $923.00-$1,014.00 per day.12 Jordan's daily rate of pay stayed constant regardless of the number of hours he worked in a day.13 Jordan was paid on a bi-weekly basis and he always received more than $455.00 for any week that he worked.14 Jordan earned more than $100,000.00 each complete year he worked as a driller.15

Helix hired Gordon as a driller in November of 2013, and Gordon worked in that position until June of 2015 when he was discharged.16 Helix rehired Gordon as a driller in July of 2015 and he worked in that position until December of 2016 when he was demoted to the position of assistant driller.17 Helix calculated Gordon's pay on a daily basis, which during his employment as a driller, ranged from $923.00-$985.00 per day.18 Gordon's daily rate of pay stayed constant regardless of the number of hours he worked, he was paid on a bi-weekly basis, always received more than $455.00 in any week that he worked, and earned more than $100,000.00 each year he worked as a driller.19

B. Procedural History

On June 23, 2016, Jordan filed an Original Complaint, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, seeking damages for unpaid overtime wages pursuant to the FLSA based on allegations that Helix misclassified him as exempt and improperly paid him on a day rate basis with no overtime compensation.20

On July 18, 2016, Helix filed its Original Answer denying plaintiff's allegations, and asserting several affirmative defenses, including that Jordan was exempt from the FLSA's overtime requirements under the executive, highly compensated, administrative, and combination exemptions.21

The parties stipulated to conditional certification,22 and only one other individual, Christopher Gordon ("Gordon"), joined the class.23

On April 27, 2018, Helix filed Defendant's MSJ, asserting that no genuine issues of material fact exist that Jordan and Gordon are exempt under two FLSA exemptions: the executive and highly compensated exemptions, that it is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of willfulness, and that fact issues exist on the administrative and combination exemptions.24

On April 30, 2018, Jordan filed his MPSJ, arguing that Helix waived its right to assert FLSA exemptions as affirmative defenses, and that even if it did not waive its affirmative defenses, Helix cannot meet its burden on the executive, highly compensated, administrative, combination, professional, and foreign exemptions, and that Helix cannot prove that it acted in good faith.25

Both parties have filed responses in opposition to the other party's summary judgment motion,26 and replies in support of their respective motions for summary judgment.27

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is warranted if the movant establishes that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An examination of substantive law determines which facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Material facts are those facts that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. A genuine issue as to a material fact exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable trier of fact could resolve the dispute in the nonmoving party's favor. Id. at 2511. The Supreme Court has interpreted the plain language of Rule 56(a) to mandate the entry of summary judgment "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant must inform the court of the basis for summary judgment and identify relevant excerpts from pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits that demonstrate there are no genuine fact issues. Id. at 2553.

If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party "must produce evidence that ‘would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’ " Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport Board v. INet Airport Systems, Inc., 819 F.3d 245, 255 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991) ). For example if a defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative defense, "it must establish beyond dispute all of the defense's essential elements." Bank of Louisiana v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare Inc., 468 F.3d 237, 241 (5th Cir. 2006). If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.

If the movant satisfies its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, or other evidence that summary judgment is not warranted because genuine fact issues exist. Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The nonmovant may not rest upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for trial. Id. In reviewing the evidence "the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). Factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, "but only when ... both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc ) (per curiam). "When parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, [the court must] review ‘each party's motion independently, viewing the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Cooley v. Housing Authority of City of Slidell, 747 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Department of Transportation, 264 F.3d 493, 498 (5th Cir. 2001) ).

III. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

Jordan has alleged that he and Gordon were non-exempt employees under the FLSA and that Helix violated the FLSA by failing to pay them overtime.28 Helix has responded that Jordan and Gordon were exempt from the FLSA's overtime requirements under the executive, administrative, professional, combination, and/or highly compensated employee...

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