Jordan v. Hutcheson

• Decision Date: 27 August 1962
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 3688.
• Parties: Joseph A. JORDAN, Jr., E. A. Dawley, Jr., L. W. Holt, Plaintiffs, v. Joseph C. HUTCHESON, Chairman, Virginia's Legislative Committee on Offenses against the Administration of Justice, William H. King, Honorable Charles Leavitt, City Sergeant, Committee on Offenses against the Administration of Justice, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

208 F. Supp. 131

Joseph A. JORDAN, Jr., E. A. Dawley, Jr., L. W. Holt, Plaintiffs, v. Joseph C. HUTCHESON, Chairman, Virginia's Legislative Committee on Offenses against the Administration of Justice, William H. King, Honorable Charles Leavitt, City Sergeant, Committee on Offenses against the Administration of Justice, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 3688.

United States District Court E. D. Virginia, Norfolk Division.

August 27, 1962.

Jordan, Dawley & Holt, Norfolk, Va., for plaintiffs.

William H. King, Richmond, Va., Fred T. Gray and Robert McIlwane, Asst. Attys. Gen. of Virginia, Richmond, Va., and Charles R. Cloud, Norfolk, Va., for defendants.

WALTER E. HOFFMAN, Chief Judge.

This action is instituted by three Negro attorneys, members of the Virginia State Bar, seeking a declaratory judgment, damages and preliminary and permanent injunctions against the defendants, most of whom are members of a Virginia legislative committee created by an Act of the General Assembly (Chap. 373, Acts of Assembly 1958). Plaintiffs pray that this court restrain the defendants from "further harassment, intimidation and other unlawful acts — done under color of law — as part of a conspiracy" to prevent plaintiffs from continuing to oppose racial segregation.

Plaintiffs allege that "as a part of the conspiracy and program of destroying those who oppose segregation, the Virginia General Assembly passed laws creating * * * THE COMMITTEE ON OFFENSES AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE." They allege that "the sole function of this committee * * * has been to investigate, harass, intimidate and urge the prosecution of those lawyers who are willing to handle cases which may result in an end to some of the forms of racial segregation and racial discrimination so prevalent in Virginia."

It is further alleged in the complaint that plaintiffs have been "investigated" by the defendants, that the defendants have "urged and asked" plaintiffs' clients to "abandon" them, and that defendants "did further state, publish and cause to be published statements and papers" pointing out plaintiffs as violators of the laws. Plaintiffs allege that on or about September 7, 1961, the defendants did "raid" the plaintiffs' offices "seeking to gather confidential papers and notes in violation of the attorney-client relationship" and that the defendants stated that they intended to continue harassing and raiding plaintiffs' offices.

Plaintiffs also contend that "this conspiracy and abuse of power by the defendants" is being done "under color of laws" and that irreparable damage has been, is being, and will be done in the future unless this court grants injunctive relief. Adopting the language of the complaint, it is said that "restraint of these practices is sought on the grounds that the practices are contrary to the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and are the end product of a conspiracy to preserve racial segregation and prevent black men from opposing it."

A temporary restraining order was issued on September 26, 1961. Thereafter motions for extension of the restraining order, for preliminary injunction and various others were filed by plaintiffs and a motion to dismiss was tendered by defendants. A hearing was held on these various motions on October 23, 1961, at which time decision on the motion to dismiss was deferred and time allowed for the parties to submit briefs in support of their respective positions. In the interim period pending decision on the motion to dismiss the defendants assured the court that no further action would be taken by them.

The controlling question appears to be whether a federal court has the authority to enjoin a state legislative committee from performing its duties under a statute which has been declared constitutional by the highest court of the state, on the grounds that (1) the purpose or "function" for which the committee was created is unconstitutional, and (2) the committee has acted or is authorized to act beyond the scope of the legislative function in assuming powers properly reserved to the executive or judicial branches of government.

The authority of the committee is granted by the Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended, §§ 30-42 through 30-51. The various statutes in controversy make no mention of race or racial problems.

At the outset the plaintiffs are met with the decision in National Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. Committee on Offenses, etc., 201 Va. 890, 114 S.E.2d 721, where the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia considered the same statutes. Essentially all of the points now raised by the plaintiffs have been before Virginia's highest court with no application for certiorari.

It is to be noted that plaintiffs are not attacking the constitutionality of the statute itself, the main thrust of their argument being that the statute was enacted with an improper "motive" on the part of the state legislature which created the Committee on Offenses to perform an unconstitutional "function."

It appears well settled that it is not within the function of the judiciary to inquire into the subjective mental processes behind the enactment of legislation or into the wisdom of legislative provisions. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 57 S.Ct. 554, 81 L.Ed. 772 (1936). The few cases which have raised the question of whether declaratory judgments, damages or injunctions may be successfully sought against members of duly constituted legislative committees, when they are acting within the bounds of the legislative function, have generally been resolved in favor of the legislative committee members. This result has usually been premised upon either the doctrine of separation of powers between the three great branches of our government, or the concept of legislative privilege as it comprehends immunity from civil process of legislators while they are acting in a legislative capacity.

The case which perhaps is most closely applicable to the case at bar is that of Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 653 (1951), in which the plaintiff had refused to testify before a legislative committee of the California Senate and was thereafter prosecuted for contempt and acquitted. He then sued the members of the committee for damages under the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, contending that the defendants had deprived him of rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution of the United States. Plaintiff alleged that the committee hearing was not held for "a legislative purpose" but was designed "to intimidate and silence plaintiff and deter and prevent him from effectively exercising his constitutional rights of free speech, etc." After discussing the privilege of legislators to be exempt from civil process for what they do or say in the process of legislative proceedings, the court said (341 U.S. 377, 71 S.Ct. 788):

"The claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but for the public good.

* * * * * *

"The holding of this Court in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 130, 3 L.Ed. 162 that it was not consonant with our scheme of government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators, has remained unquestioned. * * *

"Investigations, whether by standing or special committees, are an established part of representative government. Legislative committees have been charged with losing sight of their duty of disinterestedness. In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are readily attributed to legislative conduct and as readily believed. Courts are not the place for such controversies. Self-discipline and the voters must be the ultimate reliance for discouraging or correcting such abuses. The courts should not go beyond the narrow confines of determining that a committee's inquiry may fairly be deemed within its province. To find that a committee's investigation has exceeded the bounds of legislative power it must be obvious that there was a usurpation of functions exclusively vested in the Judiciary or the Executive."

In Pauling v. Eastland, D.C.C.A., 288 F.2d 126, plaintiff was directed by the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the United States Senate to appear before it and to bring with him all signatures to a certain petition presented by him on a particular date to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. He was also directed to bring all the letters of transmittal by which he had received such signatures. While plaintiff was willing to submit the signatures, he declined to disclose the letters of transmittal. Neither wishing to comply with the committee's directive nor desiring to render himself liable to a citation for contempt if he refused to comply, the plaintiff brought a civil action for a declaratory judgment and an injunction praying that the committee directive be declared void and its enforcement enjoined. The district court dismissed the complaint and, on appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed, stating (288 F.2d 128, 129):

"It seems quite clear that as a matter of basic general principle a court cannot interfere with or impede the processes of the Congress by proscribing anticipatorily its inquiries.

* * * * * *

"The

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