Jordan v. Mallard Exploration, Inc.

Decision Date08 December 1982
Citation423 So.2d 896
PartiesBilly R. JORDAN, George W. Hauer, Sharon G. Davis, Bruce Hammonds and Peggy Timothy v. MALLARD EXPLORATION, INC. Civ. 3351.
CourtAlabama Court of Civil Appeals

James E. Hart, Jr., Brewton, for plaintiffs-appellants.

George M. Walker of Hand, Arendall, Bedsole, Greaves & Johnston, Mobile, for defendant-appellee.

BRADLEY, Judge.

This is an appeal from the granting of a motion for summary judgment in favor of appellee, Mallard Exploration, Inc.

The original plaintiffs in this action--Billy R. Jordan, George W. Hauer, Sharon G. Davis, Bruce Hammonds, and Calvett Pettis--filed a complaint on December 3, 1980 against Mallard Exploration, Inc., alleging that the company had breached a permanent employment contract. A jury demand accompanied the complaint. In essence, the employees alleged that they had been promised permanent employment with Mallard Exploration, Inc., that they had given up other gainful employment to come to work for the company at its Big Escambia Creek treatment facility, and that they were dismissed without cause. The employees sought $10,000 in damages. Subsequently, Peggy Timothy was added as a plaintiff and Calvett Pettis was dismissed. Mallard answered by denying that the employees had been wrongfully terminated and filed a motion for summary judgment. In an order dated December 21, 1981, the court granted Mallard's motion for summary judgment, finding that no permanent employment relationship existed between the plaintiffs and Mallard and that even if there had been such a relationship, the plaintiffs were properly terminated because the company had ceased to do business in Alabama by June 1, 1979. Following a denial of their motion for rehearing, the employees have appealed to this court.

The facts in the instant appeal can be stated in a straightforward fashion: Mallard Exploration, Inc., a Texas corporation, was engaged in the business of exploring for and producing oil and natural gas. The company came to Escambia County in the 1970s where it subsequently established the Big Escambia Creek treatment facility to process impurities out of gas. Mallard operated the plant in conjunction with Exxon and various individuals but retained control over the day-to-day operations of the facility, including the hiring, firing, and supervising of all employees. Each of the employees who is an appellant in this case was hired by plant manager, N.W. Mitchell, and each continued to work for Mallard from the time of his hiring until the company ceased operations in Alabama on June 1, 1979. Each of the employees, with the exception of Sharon G. Davis, gave up other gainful employment to come to work for Mallard. On June 1, 1979 Mallard transferred its interest in the facility to Exxon, retaining only a three percent interest in the profits. The company subsequently sold this interest to Grace Petroleum retroactively as of January 15, 1980. By July 14, 1980 Mallard Exploration was dissolved as a corporation, and its assets were distributed to its shareholders.

The main thrust of the employees' argument in this court consists of the contention that Mallard's motion for summary judgment was improperly granted because they were promised permanent employment by plant manager, N.W. Mitchell. They further argue that they gave valuable consideration for their contracts when they left other employment to come to work for Mallard. They claim that Mitchell had the authority to offer permanent employment with the company and that their contracts were wrongfully terminated. Mallard answers these arguments by saying that Mitchell was not authorized to offer permanent employment with the company and that even if he had been given authority, the company had ceased to do business in Alabama by June 1, 1979.

Alabama case law has long recognized the existence of permanent employment contracts. Alabama Mills, Inc. v. Smith, 237 Ala. 296, 186 So. 699 (1939). In National Union Life Insurance Co. v. Ingram, 275 Ala. 310, 154 So.2d 666 (1963), our supreme court stated that two elements must be present before a contract of permanent employment will be found to exist. First, the employee must show that he has given some valuable consideration to the employer. Second, "where the promisor is a corporation, in the absence of ratification or estoppel, it must appear that the individual or individuals who acted on behalf of the corporation had actual, as opposed to implied, authority to bind the corporation." National Union Life Insurance Co. v. Ingram, supra (citations omitted). It is also...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama
    • 18 de junho de 1985
    ...903, 906 (Ala.1982); United Security Life Ins. Co. v. Gregory, 281 Ala. 264, 201 So.2d 853, 854-55 (1967); Jordan v. Mallard Exploration, Inc., 423 So.2d 896, 898-99 (Ala.App.1982). In the present case, it is undisputed that Amoco sold its retail LPG business to Norgas, and abandoned the re......
  • City of Starkville v. 4-COUNTY ELECTRIC POWER ASSN.
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • 10 de janeiro de 2002
    ...is fixed with sufficient certainty no matter how uncertain the occurrence of the event may be." See Jordan v. Mallard Exploration, Inc., 423 So.2d 896, 898 (Ala.Civ.App.1982) (a contract for permanent employment will last as long as the employer shall be engaged in business and has work for......
  • Harrell v. Reynolds Metals Co.
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 19 de setembro de 1986
    ...409 So.2d 791 (Ala.1982); United Security Life Insurance Co. v. Gregory, 281 Ala. 264, 201 So.2d 853 (1967); Jordan v. Mallard Exploration, Inc., 423 So.2d 896 (Ala.Civ.App.1982); and "permanent employment" was treated as lifetime employment in Masters v. Cobb, 431 So.2d 540 Our interpretat......
  • Salter v. AmSouth Bank, N.A.
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • 4 de dezembro de 1985
    ...the granting of summary judgment, we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Jordan v. Mallard Exploration, Inc., 423 So.2d 896 (Ala.Civ.App.1982). Salter's first contention is that he was not a comaker of the promissory note in question but merely an accomm......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT