Jordan v. Presidio Trust
| Decision Date | 30 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 16-cv-02122-KAW |
| Parties | PATRICIA JORDAN, Plaintiff, v. THE PRESIDIO TRUST, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
On April 21, 2016, Plaintiff Patricia Jordan filed the instant case against Defendants Presidio Trust and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated from her position with the Presidio Trust based on her age and gender, and brings a single cause of action for declaratory relief on whether her employment claims are subject to the "Presidio Trust Procedures Related to Claims of Workplace Discrimination." (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 58-59.) Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Defs.' Mot., Dkt. No. 39.)
The Court deemed the matter suitable for disposition without hearing pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b) and VACATED the hearing previously set for January 19, 2017. Having considered the papers filed by the parties and the relevant legal authority, the Court GRANTS the motions, for the reasons set forth below.
The Presidio Trust ("Trust") was established as a wholly-owned government corporation to manage the Presidio, located in the Golden Gate National Recreation Area. Presidio Trust Act, Pub. L. No. 104-333 (1996) (). The Presidio Trust Act exempts the Trust from certain federal laws and regulations. E.g., Presidio Trust Act § 104(b) (). At issue in this suit is § 103(c)(7), which states:
(7) Staff.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Trust is authorized to appointment and fix the compensation and duties and terminate the services of an executive director and such other officers and employees as it deems necessary without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, or other laws related to the appointment compensation or termination of Federal employees.
In 2004, Deputy Attorney General Noel J. Francisco issued an opinion which concluded that the Trust was exempt from section 717 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and section 15 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), to the extent these statutes applied to appointment, compensation, duties, or termination of Trust employees. Applicability of Anti-Discrimination Statutes to the Presidio Trust, 28 Op. Att'y Gen. 84, 84-85 (2004). In 2006, the Trust issued the "Presidio Trust Procedures Related to Claims of Workplace Discrimination," which created a "framework for adjudicating complaints of discrimination where issues arise." (Compl., Exh. 2 at 1.) Per the Presidio Trust Procedures, claims of employment discrimination or retaliation under Title VII, the ADEA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Equal Pay Act must be processed in accordance with the Presidio Trust Procedures, and cannot be raised to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). (Id. at 2.)
Plaintiff worked at the Presidio's Office of the Executive Director from December 2, 2013 to August 2, 2014. (Compl. ¶¶ 32-34.) During her employment Plaintiff had a medical condition affecting her uterus. (Compl. ¶ 35.) In May 2014, Plaintiff had a medical problem requiring treatment, requiring her to go to her direct supervisor, Joshua Steinberger. (Compl. ¶¶ 37-7, 39.) During this meeting, Plaintiff explained her problem. (Compl. ¶ 39-2.) Plaintiff alleges that after she finished, Steinberger simply responded, "It is what it is" in a cold and impersonal tone. (Compl. ¶¶ 39-4-39-5.) Although Steinberger had been friendly to Plaintiff prior to the meeting, following the meeting "he looked at Jordan like she had some type of terrible disease" and "never smiled at her anymore." (Compl. ¶¶ 39-9-39-12.) Steinberger also excluded Plaintiff from adepartmental quarterly retreat, despite having invited her before. (Compl. ¶¶ 40-1-40-3.) Plaintiff also alleges that when a co-worker asked Steinberger about his weekend, he walked over to where Plaintiff was sitting and talked about how great his weekend was, and how he had "cleaned out his underwear drawer" and bought new underwear, and "how great it felt wearing clean underwear." (Compl. ¶¶ 41-2-41-5.) He then looked at Plaintiff and winked; Plaintiff "felt the clear implication was she was wearing dirty, soiled underwear due to her problem," and that Steinberger's innuendo and sarcasm was meant to demean her in front of the group. (Compl. ¶¶ 41-6-41-8.) Plaintiff then went to the restroom and cried, humiliated by Steinberger's actions. (Compl. ¶ 41-10.)
On July 2, 2014, Plaintiff was informed by Steinberger and Human Resources Director Bart Ferrell that it was her last day of employment. (Compl. ¶ 42-5.) Plaintiff was shocked, but when she asked for a reason, Ferrell told her that because she was an at-will employment no reason had to be given. (Compl. ¶¶ 42-6-42-8.) Ferrell gave her a document which stated that the reason for termination was due to "lack of funds." (Compl. ¶¶ 42-11-42-14.) Plaintiff believes this reason was pretextual, as neither Steinberger nor Ferrell had mentioned the lack of funds when her employment was terminated. (Compl. ¶ 42-15.) Later, on November 14, 2014, Plaintiff noticed that the Presidio had re-advertised the availability of her prior position, which she believes further shows pretext. (Compl. ¶¶ 44-1, 44-5.)
On May 6, 2015, Plaintiff filed a claim with the EEOC. (Compl. ¶ 46-1.) Plaintiff also filed a claim with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing. (Compl. ¶ 46-2.) She was told by both agencies that because she was a federal employee, her claim was outside of their jurisdiction. (Compl. ¶ 46-4, 46-5.) Plaintiff was advised to visit the "EEO Counselor" at the Presidio Trust. (Compl. ¶ 46-6.) When Plaintiff contacted the Presidio, they were initially unable to provide the name and contact information of the EEOC Counselor because they needed to hire one. (Compl. ¶ 50.) The Presidio later identified Keena Ashley as the EEOC counselor. (Compl. ¶ 51.) On June 5, 2015, Plaintiff completed the intake questionnaire with Ashley, and on July 9, 2015, "Ashley noticed [Plaintiff]'s right to file a formal complaint." (Compl. ¶¶ 52-53.) The following day, Plaintiff filed her formal complaint. (Compl. ¶ 54.) Ashley confirmed receipt of the complaint on July 16, 2015. (Compl. ¶ 54-2.)
On August 11, 2015, Ashley again confirmed receipt of Plaintiff's complaint, and also provided the Presidio Trust Procedures. (Compl. ¶¶ 45-6, 54-3.) These procedures require that "[a]n aggrieved person . . . initiate contact with a Counselor within 45 days after the date of the allegedly discriminatory incident or, in the case of a personnel action, within 45 days of the effective date after the action." (Compl., Exh. 2 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that this was the first time she was made aware of the Presidio Trust Procedures, as these procedures are not available online and were never provided to her when she was hired, during her employment, or when she was terminated. (Compl. ¶¶ 45-4-45-11.)
After filing her complaint, 180 days passed without an agency decision. (Compl. ¶ 17-2.) Plaintiff contends that if the EEOC regulations did apply to her claim, "she would now have available substantial rights and remedies," including the right to request an evidentiary hearing or to file suit in federal court. (Compl. ¶¶ 17-3.) Plaintiff then filed the instant suit, seeking declaratory relief on whether her discrimination claims are subject to the Presidio Trust Procedures, or "whether her claims enjoy the rights under Title VII, the ADEA and EEOC Regulations." (Compl. ¶¶ 58-59.) Should Plaintiff's request for declaratory relief be granted, she intends to bring claims for gender and age discrimination. (Compl., Exh. 1.)
On September 30, 2016, Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). On December 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed her opposition, attaching a proposed First Amended Complaint raising a claim for injunctive relief to have her claim processed under Title VII, the ADEA, and the EEOC Regulations. (Plf.'s Opp'n, Dkt. No. 46.) On January 5, 2017, Defendants filed their reply brief. (Defs.' Reply, Dkt. No. 48.)
A defendant may move to dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion tests whether a complaint alleges grounds for federal subject matter jurisdiction. A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction will be granted if the complaint on its face fails to allege facts sufficient toestablish subject matter jurisdiction. See Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). In considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court "is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction." McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). Once a party has moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the opposing party bears the burden of establishing the court's jurisdiction. See Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).
In considering such a motion, a court must "accept as true all of the factual allegations...
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