Jordan v. Shelby Mut. Plate Glass & Casualty Co.
Decision Date | 11 April 1944 |
Docket Number | No. 5218,5219.,5218 |
Citation | 142 F.2d 52 |
Parties | JORDAN v. SHELBY MUT. PLATE GLASS & CASUALTY CO. (two cases). |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Langhorne Jones, of Chatham, Va. (Carter & Williams, of Danville, Va., on the brief), for appellants.
Henry M. Sackett, Jr., and Samuel H. Williams, both of Lynchburg, Va., for appellee.
Before PARKER, SOPER, and DOBIE, Circuit Judges.
The facts, about which there is little or no dispute, of these cases (which were heard together), were thus set out by Judge Barksdale in his opinion below, D.C., 51 F.Supp. 240:
The insurance policy, on which appellant relies, reads:
(Italics ours.)
Section 4326a of the Code of Virginia makes the following provision, which is conventionally known as "the omnibus clause":
"* * * No such policy shall be issued or delivered in this State to the owner of a motor vehicle, by any corporation or other insurer authorized to do business in this State, unless there shall be contained within such policy a provision insuring such owner against liability for damages for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in the operation of such motor vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person legally using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner." (Italics ours.)
It is conceded that we must here apply the law of Virginia. And, as Judge Barksdale pointed out, it was expressly stated by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, Kavanaugh v. Wheeling, 175 Va. 105, 115, 7 S.E.2d 125, 129:
"There is no contradiction of the evidence of either the employers or the driver (Hurley) that the latter used the car without the consent of the former for a purpose directly contrary to the specific instructions of his employers."
We are convinced, after a careful study of the Virginia cases, that Judge Barksdale arrived at the correct conclusion when he granted the motion of the defendant-insurer for a summary judgment in its favor.
We agree with Judge Barksdale that the opinion of the highest Virginia court in Phoenix Indemnity Co. v. Anderson & Powell, Receivers (hereinafter called the Anderson case), 170 Va. 406, 196 S.E. 629, is determinative of the instant case. Counsel for appellant strenuously attempt to distinguish that case from the instant case on two grounds: (1) The Virginia court, in the Anderson case, was applying the law of North Carolina and not the law of Virginia; (2) in the Anderson case, the coverage of the policy was limited to commercial purposes, while the instant coverage included both commercial and social purposes.
The answer to the first of appellant's contentions, we think, is that the Virginia court decided the Anderson case on principle, and not on the authority of North Carolina decisions. The Virginia court, too, used language (hereinafter set out) which, to our minds, shows clearly that this court decided on the law which the court thought was the law and also ought to be the law, with a crisp indication that the same result would have been reached had the court been determining the apposite law of Virginia.
As to appellant's second contention, we point out that the specific ratio decidendi of the Anderson case was not the fact that the policy-coverage there was limited to commercial purposes. On the contrary, the court expressly held that the use of the car there was not with the permission of the owner, and therefore the "omnibus clause" did not apply. The facts of the two cases, the Anderson and the instant case, are more than strikingly similar.
The facts of the Anderson case, as set out in the opinion of Associate Justice Holt (170 Va. at pages 408, 409, 196 S.E. at page 630), were:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Emick v. Dairyland Ins. Co.
...more readily to be assumed where the use of the car is for social or non-business purposes . . . ." Jordan v. Shelby Mutual Plate Glass & Casualty Co., 142 F.2d 52, 56 (4 Cir. 1944). See also Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Vaughn, 307 F.Supp. 805, 808 (W.D.Va.1969), aff'd per curiam 427 F.2d......
-
Hooper v. Maryland Cas. Co.
...the action. This conclusion finds complete support in many well considered decisions in other jurisdictions. Jordan v. Shelby Mut. Plate Glass & Casualty Co., 4 Cir., 142 F.2d 52; Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Rivet, 5 Cir., 89 F.2d 74; Globe Indemnity Co. v. Nodlere, 10 Cir., 69 F.2d 955; ......
-
Federal Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co.
...192 F.2d 1022 (6th Cir. 1951); Jordan v. Shelby Mut. Plate Glass & Casualty Co., 51 F.Supp. 240, 242 (W.D.Va.1943), aff'd, 142 F.2d 52, 56 (4th Cir. 1944); Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Freeport Insurance Co., 30 Ill.App.2d 69, 173 N.E.2d 543, 545 (1961); see Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 10, 33; Annot......
-
Safeway Ins. Co. v. Harvey
...the coverage of automobile liability policies consistent with the clear public policy reflected in the Statute Jordan v. Shelby Mutual Plate Glass & Casualty Co., 4 Cir., 142 F.2d 52. A liberal interpretation of the coverages of such policies is consistently adhered to.' 347 Ill.App. 560 at......