Jordan v. State

Decision Date25 June 1959
Docket NumberNo. 65,65
Citation148 A.2d 292,219 Md. 36
PartiesGeorge Thomas JORDAN v. STATE of Maryland.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Submitted on brief by William T. Speer, Riverdale, and Joseph G. Lindamood, Jr., Laurel, for appellant.

Charles B. Reeves, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. (C. Ferdinand Sybert, Atty. Gen., Blair H. Smith, State's Atty. for Prine George's County, Frank P. Flury, Deputy State's Atty. for Prince George's County, Upper Marlboro, on the brief), for appellee.

Before BRUNE, C. J., and HENDERSON, HAMMOND, PRESCOTT and HORNEY, JJ.

PRESCOTT, Judge.

This is an appeal by George Thomas Jordan from the judgment and sentence of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County upon his conviction by the court, sitting without a jury, of receiving stolen property of the value of $100 or upwards.

The defendant was arrested on March 7, 1958, and charged with the larceny of a motor vehicle owned by John C. Clifford of the value of $1,200 to $1,500. On April 2, 1958, while awaiting possible indictment by the grand jury, the defendant filed a petition and suggestion, pursuant to the terms of Code (1957) Art. 27, Sec. 592, wherein he waived his right to indictment and sought immediate trial on a criminal information. The information contained three counts-larceny, receiving stolen property and unauthorized use. When arraigned, he entered a general plea of 'not guilty.' At the close of the State's evidence, the defendant moved for a directed verdict of not guilty, which was overruled; and at the close of the whole case the motion was renewed and again overruled. The verdict of the court was not guilty of larceny and unauthorized use, but guilty of receiving. He was sentenced to a term of five years in the Penitentiary.

On the evening of March 6, 1958, at approximately 7:30 p. m., Clifford parked his automobile in the Eastover Shopping Center. When he returned about an hour later it was gone. At 2:30 a. m. in the morning following, while he was on a routine patrol, Pvt. John Nagy of the county police department, observed the automobile of the defendant which had become mired when it was being backed into a pathway in the woods along the 5800 block of Oxon Hill Road in or near Seat Pleasant. As the officer drove up, the defendant came out of the woods to the left of the mired vehicle and requested the officer to tow his automobile out of the mud. When approaching the defendant's vehicle, the officer noticed a floor mat under the right rear wheel; and in flashing his light around he picked up a reflection from an object about fifty or seventy-five feet farther in the woods along the pathway into which the defendant had backed his automobile. Upon investigation, the officer discovered the stolen automobile, or what was left of it. The vehicle had been almost completely stipped. The hood, back seat, back bumper, wheels, radiator, battery, coil and parking and dome lights had been removed. All removed parts, except the back seat and hood, had been stacked in a 'neat pile' at the rear of the stolen vehicle. The floor mat had also been removed but it was not included in the pile. Other than the mat, no parts of the stolen vehicle were found near, in or on the defendant's automobile, and the floor mat of the defendant's automobile was in place.

When walking back to make an examination of the stolen car, Nagy heard a 'thump' behind him and, upon turning, saw Jordan standing near the right side of his (Jordan's) car. The officer returned to Jordan's automobile and noticed that the floor mat, which had been under the right rear wheel, was no longer there. The defendant refused to answer a question as to its whereabouts; but the officer discovered it about 15 feet to the right of Jordan's car.

The officer attempted to interrogate the defendant while they were still in the woods, but Jordan 'just buttoned his lip and wouldn't say nothing,' and, at Police Headquarters he refused to talk with the detectives on the ground that he was 'too sleepy.'

An examination of the stolen car disclosed no fingerprints, but there were marks identified as made by leather gloves. A pair of leather gloves found under the seat of the defendant's automobile were introduced in evidence, although Nagy testified that it was impossible to tell if they were the leather gloves which had made the marks on the stolen car.

Officer Nagy, who was called as a witness by both the State and the defense, further testified that on the populated side of the road there was a driveway (approximately every hundred feet.' On the wooded side of the road there is a shoulder which he estimated to be ten feet in width, at least wide enough to accommodate a parked car. Beyond the shoulder was a 'drop off' of about 16 inches. The defendant's automobile had been backed off the road about 10 or 15 feet.

It was conceded by all of the witnesses that Jordan's car was mired at the place where Officer Nagy first saw it. There were two sets of automobile tracks on the 'path'--one set led to the stolen Clifford car and the other set ended at the place where the defendant's vehicle had come to rest. Marks on the highway indicated that one car 'made a left hand turn and went directly into the woods' while another set of tracks 'came up the dirt portion of the road approximately twenty feet and backed up into' the path.

The defendant testified that he had driven his 'girl friend' to her sister's residence about 2:30 a. m. and had then proceeded along Oxon Hill Road to return to the home of his mother, with whom he was living, in Pomonkey. He realized that, although he 'wasn't going in the wrong direction,' it would be 'nearer home' if he turned around and took another route. He said that he intended to turn into one of the driveways on the populated side of the highway, which lay to his right but 'kind of missed the driveway' and backed up to turn around. In some manner which he did not make clear, this maneuver brought his automobile to the opposite side of the road, i. e., the wooded side. He noticed that other vehicles were approaching him and that there 'was kind of a driveway, old road' behind him. Although he intended to remain on the road, he backed farther 'to avoid an accident' and the rear wheels of his car dropped over the 'drop off' on the far side of the shoulder. At this time, his automobile was 'about three feet' from the road itself.

Jordan stated that he found he could not pull his car forward and got out with a flashlight to ascertain the difficulty. He discovered that his left wheel was on solid ground but that his right wheel was spinning and 'wouldn't catch hold.' He thought that if he could find something to put under the wheel, he could back up farther to get enough traction to 'spin out.' In looking for an object to put under his wheel, he spied the floor mat lying on the edge of the woods and placed it under the right rear wheel. At this moment, he testified, Officer Nagy pulled up, and he requested the officer to help him get out of the mud.

The defendant further stated that when the officer went to investigate the stolen car he (Jordan) started his motor in a further attempt to get out of the woods and upon the highway (a fact flatly denied by the officer), and he didn't know how the mat got where the officer found it but he 'assumed' that when he started his motor 'it may have done it.' He flatly denied that he stole Clifford's car, or that he had any connection with it, other than using the floor mat. He stated that the gloves found in his car were necessary in his work.

He also testified that two detective examined the gloves and his clothes at the scene of the stolen car and found them 'clean.' This fact is not disputed in the testimony. On cross-examination, he admitted a series of convictions for larceny and robbery in this State and other jurisdictions.

The facts and testimony have been set forth at some length as there was a motion for a direct verdict.

The defendant assigns four grounds of error: (1) that there could be no finding of guilt under the waiver of indictment in that the waiver referred to 'motor vehicle larceny,' a felony, and he was convicted of receiving stolen goods, a misdemeanor; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of receiving stolen goods; (3) that assuming the corrections of the findings by the lower court, these facts did not constitute the crime of receiving stolen goods; and (4) that the floor mat was the only stolen property in the actual possession of the defendant and therefore the sentence of five years was not permissible; because such a sentence is permitted only when the value of goods stolen is in excess of $100.

I

There is no merit in the first contention. All of the arguments advanced by the defendant in this Court were fully answered in Heath v. State, 198 Md. 455, 85 A.2d 43; besides, he made no objection to the trial on the information in the lower court and thereby waived any right that he may have had to a trial on an indictment. Heath v. State, supra.

II, III and IV

These contentions of the defendant may be considered together. Our statutes, Code (1957) Article 27, Sections 466 and 467, do not define the crime of receiving stolen property, they merely prescribe the punishment therefor. Henze v. State, 154 Md. 332, 140 A. 218. It is generally recognized that four elements are necessary to constitute the offense: (a) the property must be received; (b) it must, at the time of its receipt, be stolen property; (c) the receiver must have guilty knowledge that it is stolen property; and (d) his intent in receiving it must be fraudulent. Clark & Marshall, Crimes (6th ed.) Sec. 12.37; Hochheimer, Criminal Law (1st ed.) Sec. 787.

(b) and (d)

Property must be stolen and intent fraudulent. These two elements may be disposed of summarily. Clifford testified flatly that his car was stolen and there was no denial of the same; therefore a finding that it was stolen was amply...

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