Jordan v. United States
Citation | 345 F.2d 302 |
Decision Date | 03 May 1965 |
Docket Number | No. 7980.,7980. |
Parties | Ronald JORDAN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit) |
Stephen LeSatz, Jr., Denver, Colo., for appellant.
Jack R. Parr, Oklahoma City, Okl. (B. Andrew Potter, U. S. Atty., with him on brief), for appellee.
Before MURRAH, Chief Judge, and LEWIS and SETH, Circuit Judges.
The appellant, Ronald Jordan, was convicted by a jury upon a three count indictment for the violation of the narcotic laws (i. e. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4704(a), 4705(a) and 21 U.S.C. § 174) and sentenced to fifteen years on each count to run concurrently. On appeal he complains of (1) refusal of the Court to specially instruct the jury on the credibility of the informer; (2) undue curtailment of cross-examination to impeach the informer's testimony; (3) failure to properly define "narcotic drug"; (4) insufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction on count II, i. e. sale of narcotics under § 4705(a); and (5) prejudicial conduct of the trial generally.
In Todd v. United States, March Term, 10 Cir., 345 F.2d 299, decided this day involving the testimony of the same informer, we suggested the desirability of giving cautionary instructions in all cases of this kind but refused to reverse for failure to give such instructions in view of the substantial corroboration of the informer in critical respects and the trial court's careful instructions on credibility generally. The informer testimony in this case follows the same evidentiary pattern as the following facts will demonstrate.
On March 14, 1964, the informer called appellant and "asked him if he could get me any heroin and he said yes, that he thought he could." The informer then conveyed this information to a Federal Narcotics Agent and testified that on the same afternoon the appellant and Joe Don Sarsycki came to his house, inquired of him if he still desired to purchase heroin and if he "had the money then." Informer stated that he told the appellant he did not have the money at this time but "that I would see him about 4:00 o'clock at McDonald's Drive-In and give it to him then." After appellant and his friend left the informer's house, he met with a Federal Narcotics Agent and a police officer in the parking lot of another Drive-In restaurant. At this time, the officers searched the informer and the automobile in which he was to meet the appellant; all of his money was taken; and he was given marked money. The informer then testified that the police officer "drove the (searched) car to McDonald's Drive-In * * * whereas I went with Agent Rose in his car, and went out there." Upon arrival at the Drive-In, informer entered the searched automobile and waited for the appellant, while the officers observed from across the street. After twenty-five to thirty minutes had elapsed, the appellant and Joe Don Sarsycki arrived in a red pickup. Appellant then got into the car with the informer and inquired if he had the money. The informer answered "yes" and Appellant got into the informer's car and As soon as appellant left the Drive-In, the officers came to the car and were handed the package by the informer. It was later found to contain heroin.
The police officer corroborated the informer's testimony in all material respects except the actual exchange of the money and the package. The Federal Narcotics Agent also corroborated the informer's testimony in the same respects and added that he observed the exchange of the money and the package through binoculars from his car across the street.
The same trial judge gave substantially the same, if not identical, instructions on credibility as in Todd v. United States, supra. He refused to give the appellant's requested cautionary instruction on credibility of an informer "since the informer's testimony is strongly corroborated and the instructions given regarding the credibility of the witnesses adequately cover this case." We affirm the ruling of the trial court though, as we have indicated, it would have been better practice to call...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Verdugo v. United States
...was not simply uncontroverted, it is incontrovertible. Trotter v. United States, 359 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1966); Jordan v. United States, 345 F.2d 302, 304 (10th Cir. 1965); United States v. Pisano, 193 F.2d 355, 359-360, 31 A.L.R.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1951); cf. Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 70......
-
U.S. v. Mauro
...States v. Ricciardi, 357 F.2d 91, 96-98 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 814, 87 S.Ct. 35, 17 L.Ed.2d 55 (1966); Jordan v. United States, 345 F.2d 302, 304 (10th Cir. 1965); United States v. Pecora, 267 F.2d 512, 515-516 (3d Cir. 1959). For over a hundred years it has been considered false......
-
Com. v. Green
...359, 96 L.Ed. 683, reh. denied, 342 U.S. 950, 72 S.Ct. 551, 96 L.Ed. 706 (1952) (heroin is a derivative of opium); Jordan v. United States, 345 F.2d 302, 304 (10th Cir.1965) (heroin derivative of opium and hence a narcotic); United States v. Gould, 536 F.2d 216, 218-219 (8th Cir.1976) (coca......
-
United States v. Mills
...this testimony, we might take judicial notice, see United States v. Marizal, 421 F.2d 836, 837 (5th Cir. 1970); Jordan v. United States, 345 F.2d 302, 304 (10th Cir. 1965), that cocaine, as a derivative of coca leaves, is embraced within that definition, a fact judicial authority amply conf......