Jordan v. United States

Decision Date07 June 2016
Docket Number1:12-CV-00557 EAW,1:07-CR-00019 EAW
Citation190 F.Supp.3d 331
Parties Martell Jordan, Petitioner, v. United States of America, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of New York

Martell Jordan, Ray Brook, NY, pro se.

DECISION AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge

INTRODUCTION

On June 14, 2012, Petitioner Martell Jordan ("Petitioner") filed a Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. (Dkt. 404).1 Petitioner seeks to vacate his conviction and sentence on the ground that he was denied effective assistance of counsel by attorney John P. Pieri, Esq. (Id. at 4-6). Petitioner claims that his attorney incorrectly advised him as to his mandatory minimum sentence if convicted at trial and, on the basis of this incorrect information, persuaded Petitioner to reject a plea agreement proposal that Petitioner was otherwise inclined to accept. (Id. at 7-9). Petitioner further claims that his attorney was ineffective because he (1) failed to call Alonzo Scott and Arthur Jordan as trial witnesses and (2) failed to move for a mistrial based on the Government's introduction of improper "overview" testimony. (Dkt. 404-1 at 9-17).

For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim to the extent it is based on the failure to call trial witnesses and the failure to move for a mistrial. However, the Court finds there are outstanding questions of fact with respect to Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the plea negotiations in this matter and as a result, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted on Petitioner's § 2255 petition.

DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard

"Under Section 2255 of Title 28, United States Code, a federal prisoner may move the sentencing court to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence on the ground that such sentence was illegally imposed." Puglisi v. United States , 586 F.3d 209, 213 (2d Cir.2009). "The statute further provides that '[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall ... grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto."' Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ). " Section 2255 provides relief in cases where the sentence: (1) was imposed in violation of the U.S. Constitution or the laws of the United States; or (2) was entered by a court without jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) exceeded the maximum detention authorized by law; or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack." Adams v. United States , 372 F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cir.2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ). "To warrant a hearing on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant need establish only that he has a 'plausible' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, not that 'he will necessarily succeed on the claim."' Puglisi , 586 F.3d at 213 (quoting Armienti v. United States , 234 F.3d 820, 823 (2d Cir.2000) ).

II. An Evidentiary Hearing is Required Regarding Plea Negotiations

As set forth above, the relevant statute provides that "[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). "[A]n evidentiary hearing is required on a Section 2255 motion only when the papers on the motion, measured by the same standards of competence and admissibility applicable to motions for summary judgment, reveal the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." Lam b erti v. United States , 22 F.Supp.2d 60, 71 (S.D.N.Y.1998). "An evidentiary hearing is not required 'where the allegations are insufficient in law, undisputed, immaterial, vague, conclusory, palpably false or patently frivolous."' United States v. Sahabir , 880 F.Supp.2d 377, 383 (N.D.N.Y.2012) (quoting United States v. Malcolm , 432 F.2d 809, 812 (2d Cir.1970) ).

"[A] defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at all critical stages in the proceedings after the initiation of formal charges, which has been held to include plea negotiations." United States v. Gordon , 156 F.3d 376, 379 (2d Cir.1998) (quotations omitted). "A defendant seeking a hearing on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 'need establish only that he has a "plausible" claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, not that he will necessarily succeed on the claim."' Raysor v. United States , 647 F.3d 491 (2d Cir.2011) (quoting Puglisi , 586 F.3d at 213 ). "The procedure for determining whether a hearing is necessary is in part analogous to ... a summary judgment proceeding. ... If material facts are in dispute, a hearing should usually be held, and relevant findings of fact made." Puglisi , 586 F.3d at 213.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must show both that '"counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness"' and that '"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."' Forbes v. United States , 574 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 688–94, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ). "Prima facie evidence may include a petitioner's own statement, as was offered here; however, in order for the statement to be sufficiently credible to justify a full hearing, it must be accompanied by some 'objective evidence,' such as a significant sentencing disparity, that supports an inference that the petitioner would have accepted the proposed plea offer if properly advised." Raysor , 647 F.3d at 495.

Here, Petitioner claims that he was offered two plea agreement proposals by the Government, the first of which agreed to recommend a prison sentence of 120 to 125 months, and the second of which agreed to recommend a prison sentence of 84 to 90 months. (Dkt. 404 at 7). Petitioner claims that he rejected the plea offers because his attorney advised him (1) that the evidence against Petitioner was so weak that he was confident of winning an acquittal at trial and (2) that Petitioner's mandatory minimum sentence, if convicted at trial, would be 120 months (when, in actuality, it was 240 months). (Id. at 8). Petitioner further alleges that his attorney failed to advise him of the adverse consequences should the Government file an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851. (Id. ). Plaintiff states that he was inclined to accept both of the proposed plea agreements offered by the Government before being advised to reject them by his attorney and that "if [he] had been provided accurate information by counsel regarding the sentencing exposure [he] faced if convicted at trial, [he] would have entered into a plea agreement and received a much lower sentence." (Id. at 9). Plaintiff was sentenced to 300 months incarceration after he was found guilty on Counts 1 through 4 of the Superseding Indictment at trial. (Dkt. 377).

Pursuant to an Order of the Court dated June 14, 2013 (Dkt. 421), Mr. Pieri has submitted an affidavit dated July 2, 2013 (Dkt. 422) in which he sets forth a different version of the facts surrounding the plea negotiations in this matter. According to Mr. Pieri, he advised Petitioner to take both the proposed plea agreements offered by the Government, advised Petitioner that the Government would file a sentencing enhancement information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, and advised Petitioner of the mandatory minimum and maximum penalties he faced if convicted at trial. (Dkt. 422 at ¶¶ 3-14).

In determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, the Court must first consider whether, accepted as true, the facts alleged by Petitioner would satisfy both prongs of the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel (i.e. that counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable and that Petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's unreasonable performance). With respect to the first prong, if counsel did, as Petitioner claims, "grossly underestimat [e] [Petitioner's] sentencing exposure," he would have "breached his duty as a defense lawyer in a criminal case to advise his client fully on whether a particular plea to a charge appears desirable." United States v. Gordon , 156 F.3d 376, 380 (2d Cir.1998) (quotation omitted) (affirming finding of ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel advised petitioner that maximum sentencing exposure would be 120 months, but guideline range for imprisonment was 262 to 327 months, and petitioner had turned down plea offer of 84 months in reliance on erroneous advice). Such a breach would "[fall] below the prevailing professional norms for advising a client during plea negotiations of his maximum exposure to imprisonment at sentencing." Id. (quotation omitted).

Lake v. United States , 465 Fed.Appx. 33 (2d Cir.2012), relied upon by the Government, does not compel a different conclusion. In Lake , the petitioner failed to allege "any actionable professional lapse on [his attorney's] part, such as a deficient investigation, a legal error, or a complete failure to render advice." Id. at 35. Instead, the petitioner's attorney had simply misapprehended the Government's willingness to negotiate a more favorable plea bargain. Id. Here, unlike in Lake , Petitioner's attorney is specifically alleged to have made a legal error with respect to the potential sentence faced by Petitioner upon conviction.

With respect to the second Strickland prong, Petitioner "must show that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of...

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