Jordan v. Warehouse Services, Inc., Civ.A. 98-D-1001-N.

CourtUnited States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Middle District of Alabama
Citation81 F.Supp.2d 1257
Docket NumberNo. Civ.A. 98-D-1001-N.,Civ.A. 98-D-1001-N.
PartiesMark JORDAN, Plaintiff, v. WAREHOUSE SERVICES, INC., Defendant.
Decision Date18 January 2000

Thomas D. Simon, Montgomery, AL, Valerie M. Smedley, Montgomery, AL, for plaintiff.

Thomas S. Lawson, Jr., Barbara J. Gilbert, Montgomery, AL, Melvin R. Hutson, Greenville, SC, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DE MENT, District Judge.

Before the court is Defendant Warehouse Services, Inc.'s ("WSI") Motion For Summary Judgment ("Mot.") along with its Memorandum In Support ("Mem."), both filed November 17, 1999. On December 13, 1999, Plaintiff Mark Jordan ("Plaintiff") filed a Response To Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment ("Resp."). WSI filed a Reply Memorandum ("Reply") on December 20, 1999. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court finds that WSI's Motion For Summary Judgment is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court properly exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended) ("Title VII") and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended) (" § 1981"). The Parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). As the Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard:

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no `genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c)).

The trial court's function at this juncture is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989).

The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of establishing, based on relevant "portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,'" that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citing FED. R.CIV.P. 56(c)). The mechanics of satisfying the initial burden vary, however, depending upon which party, the movant or the nonmovant, bears the burden of proof at trial. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.1993) (detailing the nature of the parties' responsibilities when preparing or defending against a motion for summary judgment).

Once this initial demonstration under Rule 56(c) is made, the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his or] her own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citing FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e)). In meeting this burden, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). That party must demonstrate that there is a "genuine issue for trial." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. An action is void of a material issue for trial "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff, a black male, worked for WSI from August 16, 1996 until his termination on January 15, 1998. (Am.Compl. ¶¶ 5, 7; Combs Aff. ¶¶ 16, 18.1) WSI provides transportation services and operates warehouses for General Electric ("GE") at GE's facility in Burkville, Alabama. (Combs Aff. ¶ 4.) Among other things, GE ships plastic powder from its Burkville plant in "regular over-the-road trailers." (Id. ¶ 5.) WSI's employees line these trailers with plastic film to protect GE's product and the trailers during transportation. The employees who perform this function are referred to as the liner crew. (Id.)

WSI initially hired Plaintiff as a part-time employee to work on its liner crew. In January 1997, Plaintiff received a full-time position on the liner crew and was promoted to the position of "head liner." (Id. ¶ 16, Exs. 3, 42; Pl.'s Dep. at 16.) Plaintiff worked in this position until he was fired for allegedly violating WSI's policies. (Combs Aff. ¶¶ 16, 19, Ex. 12.)

WSI has promulgated written policies, which apply to all hourly employees, including Plaintiff. "Policy 6.01" is titled "Rules of Personal Conduct." (Id. ¶ 21, Ex. 30.) Pertinent to this action are the following two sections of Policy 6.01:(1) § 6.01-I-F, which provides that "[w]illful falsification of time card or other company documents" will result in "immediate termination" ("WSI Policy, § 6.01-I-F") (Id.); and (2) § 6.01-II-J, which provides that "[l]eaving the facility during working hours without permission" will "result in disciplinary action varying from oral warning to written warning to termination, depending upon the nature of the offense" ("WSI Policy, § 6.01-II-J"). (Id.)

To enforce its policies, WSI has a progressive discipline system, which is set forth in "Policy 6.03." (Mem. at 3; Combs Aff. ¶ 21, Ex. 32.) An infraction of WSI's policies ordinarily is met first with a verbal warning. Subsequent infractions generally result in a written warning. (Combs Aff. ¶ 21, Ex. 32.) However, no set number of verbal warnings mandates a written warning. At the supervisor's discretion, successive written warnings can result in "probation," "suspension" or "discharge."3 (Id.)

On September 16, 1997, Plaintiff received an oral warning regarding his attendance. The oral warning is memorialized in a "Conversation With Employee Form." (Id. ¶ 19, Ex. 9.) This document describes instances in which Plaintiff called in sick or left early without completing his work.4 (Id.) Plaintiff refused to sign the form. (Id.)

Subsequently, on November 7, 1997, Plaintiff received a written "First Warning," which states as follows:

On 9/16/97 [Plaintiff] was issued a conversation for the [number] of days he has called in or left w/out completing his job. On 11/6/97 [Plaintiff] left without completing his job. On 11/6/97, [Plaintiff] left work and had 9 more trailers to line. He also failed to notify anyone that he was leaving and his work was not done.

(Id. ¶ 19, Ex. 10.) Plaintiff also refused to sign this form. (Id.)

Subsequently, on or about December 12, 1997, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against WSI with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").5 (Am.Compl.¶ 10.) WSI received notice of Plaintiff's charge "a few days later." (Mem. at 12.)

Approximately one month after the EEOC notified WSI of Plaintiff's EEOC charge, WSI fired Plaintiff. (Combs Aff. ¶ 16; Brooks Aff. ¶ 4.6) The events surrounding Plaintiff's termination are as follows:7 Plaintiff was scheduled to work from 7:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. on Friday, January 2, 1998. (Pl.'s Dep. at 43; Brooks Aff. ¶¶ 7, 10.) When Plaintiff arrived at work on January 2, 1998, his supervisor told him to turn in his time card that morning, instead of the following Monday.8 Thus, Plaintiff had to estimate his hours to be worked that day and the following Saturday and Sunday. (Pl.'s Dep. at 40-41; Brooks Aff. ¶¶ 16, 18.) As instructed, Plaintiff completed and turned in his time card. (Id.) On his time card, Plaintiff recorded that he worked the 7:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. shift on January 2, 1998. (Brooks Aff. ¶ 18, Ex. 7 (attachment).) Later that day, however, Plaintiff saw a schedule "posted ... on the wall at gate nine," which reflected that his shift had been changed and ended at 5:00 p.m., not 8:00 p.m. (Pl.'s Dep. at 30, 41-42.) Upon seeing other employees leave at 5:00 p.m. and believing that the gates were being locked, Plaintiff also left. (Id. at 30.) Plaintiff's supervisor told him, that because he had changed the schedule "at the last minute," he, the supervisor, would "take care" of changing Plaintiff's time card. (Id. at 42.)

Based on Plaintiff's conduct above, Plaintiff was suspended on January 8, 1998, pending an investigation. (Brooks Aff. ¶ 4.) WSI suspended Plaintiff based on its preliminary assessment...

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