Jordan v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 86-1154.

• Decision Date: 13 October 1988
• Docket Number: No. 86-1154.,86-1154.
• Citation: 548 A.2d 792
• Parties: Gregory L. JORDAN, Appellant, v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY and Local 689, Amalgamated Transit Union, Appellees.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

548 A.2d 792

Gregory L. JORDAN, Appellant, v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY and Local 689, Amalgamated Transit Union, Appellees.

No. 86-1154.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued January 7, 1988.

Decided October 13, 1988.

Edward DeV. Bunn, Bailey's Crossroads, Va., for appellant.

Gerard J. Stief, Asst. Gen. Counsel, with whom Sara E. Lister, Gen. Counsel, John G. Elligers, Associate Gen. Counsel, Robert J. Kniaz, and David G. Dulansey, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellee Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.

Isadore J. Gromfine, Washington, D.C., for appellee Local 689, Amalgamated Transit Union.

Before FERREN, BELSON, and TERRY, Associate Judges.

TERRY, Associate Judge:

Appellant Jordan brought this action against both his employer and his union. He sued his employer, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), for wrongful discharge, alleging that he had been fired in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim, and he sued his union, Local 689 of the Amalgamated Transit Union, for an alleged breach of its duty of fair representation. The union moved for summary judgment on the ground that Jordan had failed to exhaust his internal union remedies, and WMATA moved for summary judgment on the ground that Jordan's claim against it was barred by collateral estoppel, in that the administrative decision on his workers' compensation claim expressly resolved the retaliation issue against him. Both motions were granted by the trial court. We hold that Jordan was collaterally estopped from suing on his wrongful discharge claim against WMATA. We also hold that the trial court erred in granting the union's motion for summary judgment, but that the error was rendered harmless when the court later granted WMATA's motion, because the failure of Jordan's claim against WMATA bars him from pursuing his fair representation claim against the union.

I

Jordan worked as a bus driver for WMATA. On March 8, 1980, he was involved in a collision when a car suddenly cut in front of his bus and hooked its right rear bumper onto the left front bumper of the bus. As Jordan attempted to catch a falling passenger, his left arm and shoulder were jammed into the steering wheel, and his right arm was pushed against the fare box.

For several weeks thereafter Jordan was unable to work. Then on April 25 a WMATA physician, Dr. Robert Gordon, examined him and determined that he was fit to resume his job on a full-time basis. Jordan's treating physician, Dr. Gerald Schuster, did not agree. Schuster told Jordan that he could go back to work, but only part-time. However, when Jordan asked WMATA to provide part-time work for him, WMATA would not do so because Dr. Gordon had certified him for full-time work.

Dr. Schuster had asked Jordan to return in two weeks for a further examination, but Jordan did not go back to the doctor until early October, at which time he still complained of stiffness in his right shoulder. When he saw Dr. Schuster again in late November, Schuster told him he could return to full-time work. At that time, however, WMATA would not take him back. Because Jordan did not produce medical records to excuse his absence after April 25, he was fired.

Jordan then filed a formal written grievance against WMATA, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement between WMATA and his union, Local 689 of the Amalgamated Transit Union. The collective bargaining agreement sets forth detailed procedures for the processing of such grievances by the union, but in this case the union did not follow those procedures. According to Jordan, the union would not process the grievance in good faith because of the animosity generated by his use of a lawyer in its preparation. According to the union, Jordan's grievance was not vigorously pursued because Jordan delayed turning over necessary documents and, in the end, because the grievance was found to be without merit.

In an affidavit filed in support of the union's summary judgment motion, the first vice president and assistant business agent of the union, Jlynn Knight, stated that Jordan failed to appeal the Executive Board's decision not to arbitrate his grievance with WMATA. Jordan stated in an opposing affidavit that although Knight told him his appeal would be presented to the union membership at its next meeting, it was not in fact presented at that meeting. In a supplemental affidavit Jordan added that at the membership meeting he asked Knight for a chance to put his case before the members, but that Knight would not allow him to do so.¹

A Superior Court judge granted the union's motion for summary judgment on the ground that Jordan had failed to exhaust his internal union remedies, specifically by failing to appeal to the membership the decision of the union's Executive Board to not take Jordan's grievance to arbitration.

Proceedings were then stayed for about a year, pending a determination by this court of whether WMATA could be sued at all in the Superior Court. That jurisdictional issue was resolved in Qasim v. WMATA, 455 A.2d 904 (D.C.) (en banc), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929, 103 S.Ct. 2090, 77 L.Ed.2d 300 (1983), and accordingly the stay was lifted. A second Superior Court judge thereupon granted WMATA's motion for summary judgment in this case. The judge ruled that the central issue raised in Jordan's complaint, namely, whether he had been fired in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim, had been decided against him when the Department of Labor adjudicated that claim, which alleged inter alia the same retaliatory discharge. Jordan now brings this appeal, challenging the decisions of both judges.

II

Jordan filed a workers' compensation claim with the United States Department of Labor,² seeking disability benefits for the period beginning April 29, 1980, four days after Dr. Gordon had certified him as fit to return to full-time work.³ As the case wended its way through the administrative process, Jordan asserted in addition that WMATA had unlawfully fired him in retaliation for filing the compensation claim. The administrative law judge (ALJ) who heard Jordan's case rejected his claim for benefits, and also found that "[t]he weight of the credible and probative evidence fails to establish that [Jordan] was terminated because he filed compensation claims."

In his complaint in the instant case, Jordan alleged that WMATA had wrongfully terminated him, breached its employment contract with him, and violated its labor agreement with the union, and that "the wrongful acts of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority were directed toward the plaintiff because of a [Workers'] Compensation injury claim filed by the plaintiff." The trial court ruled that Jordan's claim of wrongful discharge raised "the same issue he litigated and lost in the Department of Labor. As a result, he is collaterally estopped from re-asserting that issue here."

Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of issues actually litigated, and necessarily decided, in previous suits between the same parties. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649 n. 5, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979); Goldkind v. Snider Brothers, Inc., 467 A.2d 468, 473 & n. 9 (D.C. 1983). Jordan does not contest that a decision by an administrative agency may have collateral estoppel effect in a suit in the District of Columbia courts. See Decius v. Marriott Corp., 402 A.2d 841, 843 (D.C. 1979).⁴ Rather, he contends that the issues decided in the workers' compensation hearing were different and distinct from those presented in this case. We cannot agree.

In the complaint which Jordan filed in the Superior Court, the count against WMATA reads in its entirety as follows:

COUNT I

1. That on or about December 16, 1980, the defendant, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, wrongfully and maliciously terminated the employment of the plaintiff.

2. That the said wrongful termination of the employment of the plaintiff with Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority was in breach of its agreement and contract with the plaintiff and a violation of the duties owed to the plaintiff.

3. That the plaintiff filed the appropriate grievance and complaint with the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority for the wrongful termination of his employment and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority wrongfully failed to act timely and in accordance with its rules, practices and customs in dealing with and resolving the complaint and grievance.

4. That the wrongful acts of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority were directed toward the plaintiff because of a Workmen's Compensation injury claim filed by the plaintiff, and such wrongful acts and discrimination are in violation of the Long Shoremen's [sic] and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.

5. That as a result of the wrongful acts the plaintiff has lost income, incurred nervousness, humiliation and loss of sleep.

The complaint was never amended.

Obviously, paragraph 4 of Jordan's complaint, stating that WMATA wrongfully fired him because he filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits, is barred by the ALJ's finding that WMATA did not fire him for that reason. Before us Jordan asserts that he was fired for relying on the advice of his treating physician, but as far as the record discloses, he made no such argument to the trial court, and his complaint contained no such assertion. Jordan also seeks to isolate the allegation of retaliatory firing in paragraph 4 from paragraphs 1-3, which allege wrongful termination, breach of employment contract, and breach of grievance rules. These paragraphs, in our view, cannot be separated from paragraph 4. Although Jordan alleged the wrongs in the first three paragraphs, he alleged only one motive for them in paragraph 4: retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim.⁵ He cannot reformulate his complaint...