Jordan v. La-Z-Boy East
| Citation | 644 F. Supp. 156 |
| Decision Date | 04 September 1986 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 86-0192-15. |
| Parties | Willie L. JORDAN, Plaintiff, v. LA-Z-BOY EAST and the United Furniture Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Stuart W. Snow, Law Office of Richard G. Dusenbury, Florence, S.C., for plaintiff.
E.N. Zeigler, Zeigler, McEachin & Graham, Florence, S.C., for United Furniture Workers.
Finley Clarke, Clarke & Johnson, Florence, S.C., Donald A. Van Suilichem, Clark, Klein & Beaumont, Detroit, Mich., for La-Z-Boy East.
This is an action brought against an employer under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, for an alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement. Additionally, plaintiff further alleges that the local union, the United Furniture Workers of America, AFL-CIO, breached its duty of fair representation by processing a grievance arising out of plaintiff's discharge in an arbitrary manner. The matter is now before the court on the joint motion of the defendants for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. Jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1337, and 29 U.S.C. §§ 159, 185.
Plaintiff was employed as a saw helper with the defendant La-Z-Boy East since August 6, 1981. After an initial 60 day waiting period, plaintiff became a member of the defendant union, the United Furniture Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 276. The terms and conditions of plaintiff's employment were governed by a collective bargaining agreement, most recently entered into on June 5, 1983. The agreement established a procedure for resolution of disputes and included a grievance procedure culminating in binding arbitration.
The instant dispute arises out of plaintiff's discharge on December 4, 1984 for an alleged violation of shop rule D(h) on four consecutive days. Shop rule D(h) provides that a "failure to notify Management when being absent from work (no later than first rest period on each shift unless employee has a reasonable excuse)" shall be subject to disciplinary action. See, Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Behalf of United Furniture Workers of America, Exhibit B. An exception to this daily call-in requirement is recognized, though, when an employee requests, and is granted, a medical or personal leave of absence. Thus, when an employee has been extended a leave of absence, he is excused from calling in each day.
It is agreed that plaintiff called the plant early in the morning of Monday, November 26, 1984 to report that he was ill and would not be in that day. It is also undisputed that plaintiff did not call in the next four days, November 27 to November 30, 1984. On Monday, December 3, 1984, plaintiff called to advise that he would return to work the next day, December 4. When plaintiff returned on December 4, 1984 he was promptly discharged for violation of the call-in rule.
The union thereafter filed a grievance protesting plaintiff's discharge. This grievance was processed by the union through the first four steps of the grievance procedure. Although the matter was set for an arbitration hearing in August, 1984, the union, upon the recommendation of the union's Executive Board and after the full vote of the entire union membership, withdrew its demand for arbitration. Under the terms of the grievance procedure the employer's denial of the grievance became final upon withdrawal of the arbitration demand.
Plaintiff's defense to the asserted violation of the call-in rule is that he called from his doctor's office a second time on Monday, November 26, 1984 shortly after 10:00 a.m. to advise that he was under a doctor's care and would be out the entire week. Plaintiff does not claim, though, that he actually requested a leave of absence from anyone in the Personnel Department who was authorized to grant such leaves. The employer disputes that plaintiff ever made a second call, and calls the court's attention to the absentee and tardiness log, See Defendants' Brief, Exhibit C, listing only one call from plaintiff.
The alleged breach of the duty of fair representation arises from the union's conduct during the course of the grievance investigation. At some period of time before the union finally voted on whether to take plaintiff's grievance to arbitration, the Chief Steward, Willie Walker, Jr., advised plaintiff he would require additional corroboration concerning the asserted "second phone call" on November 26, 1984. Walker suggested plaintiff attempt to secure a statement from the doctor indicating plaintiff had called his employer. On May 15, 1984, plaintiff got a statement from his doctor indicating that "this will verify that on 11-16 my record shows the above called his job that morning informing them of the situation." See Defendants' Brief, Exhibit D. Walker investigated the doctor's slip and discovered, by speaking personally with the doctor, that all the doctor could really say was that plaintiff had asked where the phone was located. The doctor in fact had no first hand knowledge whether plaintiff had even used the phone. Walker stated in his deposition that because the union considered that this slip would not stand up to the rigors of cross-examination at arbitration, and because the union was aware plaintiff had one year previously been discharged for the same offense and had been counseled at reinstatement concerning the application of the daily call-in rule, the union voted to abandon arbitration proceedings in plaintiff's case. Walker Deposition at 12-16.
In his complaint against the union filed on January 22, 1986 plaintiff alleges that the union's decision to abandon arbitration was not based on a good faith belief that plaintiff's grievance lacked merit, but rather, was made arbitrarily and with reckless disregard to the rights of plaintiff to fair representation. In its answer filed February 18, 1986, the union responds that it performed it duties fully, and that the withdrawal of the arbitration demand was done because plaintiff could not produce evidence of a substantial nature that he had complied with the shop rules. At oral argument of the instant motion, plaintiffs counsel abandoned the claim that the union's handling of the grievance had been done in bad faith or in a discriminatory fashion. Rather, plaintiff's sole contention is that the union's request that plaintiff furnish corroborating evidence of a second phone call required "super proof" of plaintiff, and is evidence of arbitrary treatment accorded plaintiff.
After examining the pleadings, answers to 16(b) interrogatories, and the memoranda of law submitted with the instant motion, including the supporting affidavits, depositions and exhibits, the court is compelled to conclude that plaintiff has failed to come forward with any evidence from which an inference of arbitrary conduct might be drawn. Accordingly, for the reasons set out below no genuine issue remains for trial and summary judgment shall be entered for the defendants.
The "function of a motion for summary judgment is to smoke out if there is any case, i.e., any genuine dispute as to any material fact, and, if there is no case, to conserve judicial time an energy by avoiding an unnecessary trial and by providing a speedy and efficient summary disposition." Bland v. Norfolk and Southern Railroad, 406 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir.1969). "Summary judgment may be granted only if it appears from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits, considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Galindo v. Precision American Corp., 754 F.2d 1212 (5th Cir.1985). Summary judgment procedures should be used judiciously, particularly in cases involving issues of motivation or intent. Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528 (9th Cir.1981). However, a party opposing a summary judgment motion cannot withhold his evidence until trial because of the speculative possibility that a material issue of fact may appear at that time. See Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 648 F.2d 97, 107 (2d Cir.1981); see also Atlantic States Construction Co. v. Robert E. Lee & Co., Inc. of S.C., 406 F.2d 827 (4th Cir.1969).
In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967), the leading case involving the union's duty of fair representation, the Court held that a wrongfully discharged employee may bring an action against his employer in the face of a defense of the employee's failure to exhaust contractual remedies, provided that the employee can meet the heavy burden of proving that the union, as bargaining agent, breached its duty of fair representation. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 186, 87 S.Ct. at 914. Thus, as was the case in Vaca, as a prerequisite to plaintiff's § 301(a) breach of collective bargaining suit against the employer, it is necessary that plaintiff first prove an unfair labor practice by the union, i.e., that the union breached its duty of fair representation.
In defining the parameters of the duty of fair representation the Court in Vaca established that a breach of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Id. at 190, 87 S.Ct. at 916. Rejecting the contention that an individual employee should have an absolute right to have his grievance taken to arbitration, the Court concluded that "a union does not breach its duty of fair representation, and thereby open up a suit by the employee for breach of contract, merely because it settled the grievance short of arbitration." Id. at 192, 87 S.Ct. at 918. Importantly, the Court in Vaca also made clear that a breach of the duty of fair representation is not established merely by providing proof that the underlying grievance was...
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