Jordet v. Just Energy Solutions, Inc., 18-CV-953S

• Decision Date: 07 December 2020
• Docket Number: 18-CV-953S
• Citation: 505 F.Supp.3d 214
• Parties: Trevor JORDET, Plaintiff, v. JUST ENERGY SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

505 F.Supp.3d 214

Trevor JORDET, Plaintiff,

v.JUST ENERGY SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant.

18-CV-953S

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed December 7, 2020

Jonathan Shub, Kohn Swift Graf P.C., Philadelphia, PA, Chantal Khalil, D. Gregory Blankinship, Todd S. Garber, Finkelstein Blankinship Frei-Pearson & Garber LLP, White Plains, NY, for Plaintiff.

Heath J. Szymczak, Sharon M. Porcellio, Bond, Schoeneck & King, PLLC, Buffalo, NY, Jason C. Cyrulnik, Roche Cyrulnik Freedman LLP, New York, NY, Motty Shulman, Boies Schiller & Flexner LLP, Armonk, NY, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

WILLIAM M. SKRETNY, United States District Judge

I. Introduction

This case alleges that Defendant imposed improper pricing for natural gas upon Plaintiff and the proposed class of Defendant's customers (Docket No. 1, Compl.). Before this Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 19)¹ the Complaint.

For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted in part, denied in part.

II. Background

This is a diversity jurisdiction class action under Pennsylvania common law and statute challenging terms of Defendant's utility supply contract (see Docket No. 1, Compl.). Plaintiff commenced the action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, but it was later transferred to this District (Docket No. 23). Plaintiff is a Pennsylvanian who was a customer of Defendant (incorporated in California with its principal place of business in Texas) from 2012 through February 2018 (Docket No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 6, 5).

Pennsylvania deregulated natural gas in 1999 (id., Compl. ¶ 11; see Docket No. 20, Def. Memo. at 2). The purpose for deregulation was to allow energy supply companies ("ESCOs") to use their natural gas facilities, purchased gas from wholesalers and brokers or purchasing futures contracts at set prices, and other innovations to reduce natural gas costs and pass the savings to consumers (Docket No. 1, Compl. ¶ 12).

Customers only select an ESCO for supplying natural gas while continuing to use the utility for delivery and billing (id. ¶ 13). The only difference from utility-furnished natural gas is the price of energy supply (id. ). ESCOs’ supply rates, including Defendant's, are not approved by the Pennsylvania public service commission (id. ¶ 14).

A. Pleadings

Plaintiff charges that Defendant entices customers with a low teaser rates and "false promises that it will offer market-based variable rates," then shifts the accounts to variable pricing that are "untethered from changes in wholesale rates" (id. ¶ 15).

In or around 2012, Defendant solicited Plaintiff to change natural gas supplier to Defendant, "representing that [Defendant] would charge a rate lower than the local utility, PECO" (id. ¶ 16). Defendant's agreement contained a rescissionary period when Plaintiff could change his mind and terminate without penalty (id. ¶ 17). Defendant charged Plaintiff a fixed, discounted introductory rate for a number of months then converted the account to a variable price (id. ¶ 18). The agreement represented that the variable price "would be set ‘according to business and market conditions, including but not limited to, the wholesale cost of natural gas supply, transportation, distribution and storage’ " (id. ¶ 19).

Plaintiff alleges that a reasonable consumer (like him) would conclude that business and market conditions were the vendor's wholesale costs and the amounts charged by competitors (id. ¶ 20). Instead, Defendant set the variable price higher than Plaintiff's utility (PECO) and Defendant's ESCO competitors (id. ¶¶ 21, 22). Plaintiff contends that Defendant's prices were not competitive market rates; for example, these prices did not fluctuate with changes in natural gas prices (id. ¶¶ 23, 24). Instead, Plaintiff believes that PECO's rates were indicators of the market since it includes supply costs, transportation, distribution, and storage costs (id. ¶ 25). Plaintiff, however, fails to acknowledge that PECO's rates are approved by the public service commission. Even with the advantage of purchasing natural gas from a highly competitive market, Defendant's prices were higher and were not commensurate with PECO's rates (id. ¶¶ 26-30). Plaintiff characterizes these prices as "wildly disparate" (id. ¶ 26). He concedes, however, that Defendant had discretion to set variable prices (id. ¶ 65).

As for market conditions, Plaintiff states that a reasonable customer recognizes the vendor should recoup a reasonable margin on sales of gas (id. ¶ 32), which Plaintiff contends should be the same as other ESCOs and the utility. Because other ESCOs’ rates are lower than Defendant's, Plaintiff claims that the profit margin sought by Defendant is in bad faith (id. ). Defendant's undisclosed costs in taxes, fees, and assessments Plaintiff deems to be insignificant and not a justification for the disparity in Defendant's pricing from its competitors or PECO (id. ¶ 33). Plaintiff, however, does not state the profit or profit margin of these ESCOs or of PECO.

Plaintiff alleges three causes of action. The First Cause of Action alleges violation of Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL") (id. ¶¶ 44-55), with this claim specifically addressed to a subclass of Pennsylvania residents (id. ). The Second Cause of Action alleges breach of contract (including breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, not distinct causes of action under Pennsylvania law) (id. ¶¶ 57-68). The Third Cause of Action alleges unjust enrichment, as alternative to the Second Cause of Action (id. ¶¶ 70-72).

Plaintiff alleges a class of Defendant's customers who also were charged variable rates for residential natural gas services from April 2012 to the present (id. ¶ 38; see also id. ¶ 39 (subclass of Pennsylvania customers so charged)). The Second and Third Causes of Action apply to the full class, while the First Cause of Action applies to the broader class and also the subclass of Pennsylvania customers.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on April 6, 2018 (Docket No. 1, Compl.).

With consent, Defendant moved to transfer venue to this District (Docket No. 17), see 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). There, Defendant argued that the interest of justice supported transfer, in part because of a similar case that then was pending in this Court (Docket No. 18, Def. Memo. at 3, 4-7), see Nieves v. Just Energy New York, No. 17CV561. The district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted the transfer (Docket No. 23; see Docket No. 24 (transmitted docket)).

On the same day Defendant moved to transfer, Defendant moved to dismiss (Docket No. 19). The parties stipulated to set Plaintiff's response to the Motion to Dismiss to twenty-one days from the adopting Order (Docket No. 22), or by September 4, 2018. Following transfer to this District and upon the parties’ stipulation to extend Defendant's time to reply (Docket No. 28), this Court set the deadline for Defendant's reply for October 5, 2018 (Docket No. 29). After filing a timely Reply (Docket No. 32), Sur-Reply (Docket No. 39), and supplemental authorities from Plaintiff (Docket Nos. 41, 42), the motion to dismiss was deemed submitted without oral argument.

In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant provides an example of an unexecuted contract (Docket No. 20, Def. Atty. Decl. Ex. 1). The definitional section there defined "Variable Price" as "the monthly rate that you will be charged per Ccf after expiration of the 12 month Intro Price. The Variable Price will not change more than once each billing cycle. Changes to the Variable Price will be determined by Just Energy according to business and market conditions." (Id. ) In Section 5.1, Natural Gas Charges, the contract provides that

"the Variable Price during the first billing cycle in which the Variable Price is in effect will be equal to the Intro Price. The Variable Price will not change more than once each monthly billing cycle. Changes to the Variable Price will be determined by Just Energy according to business and market conditions, including but not limited to, the wholesale cost of natural gas supply, transportation, distribution and storage, and will not increase more than 35% over the rate from the previous billing cycle."

(Id.; see also Docket No. 1, Compl. ¶ 19).

III. Discussion

A. Applicable Standards

1. Motion to Dismiss

Defendant has moved to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds that it states a claim for which relief cannot be granted (Docket No. 19). Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court cannot dismiss a Complaint unless it appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), a Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (rejecting longstanding precedent of Conley, supra, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99 ); Hicks v. Association of Am. Med. Colleges, 503 F.Supp.2d 48, 51 (D.D.C. 2007). To survive a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations in the Complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," Twombly, supra, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; Hicks, supra, 503 F.Supp.2d 48, 51. As reaffirmed by the Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009),

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ [ Twombly, supra, 550 U.S.] at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 .... A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

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