Jorge v. Galarza-Soto

• Decision Date: 31 August 2015
• Docket Number: Civil No. 14–1590 (GAG).
• Parties: Emmanuel Fernández JORGE and Carmen Lidia Jorge, Plaintiffs v. Sergeant Julio GALARZA–SOTO and Juan Carlos Ortiz–Cruz, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

124 F.Supp.3d 57

Emmanuel Fernández JORGE and Carmen Lidia Jorge, Plaintiffs

v.Sergeant Julio GALARZA–SOTO and Juan Carlos Ortiz–Cruz, Defendants.

Civil No. 14–1590 (GAG).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed Aug. 31, 2015.

Eileen Landron–Guardiola, Luis A. Rodriguez–Munoz, Eduardo A. Vera–Ramirez, Landron & Vera LLC, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Jaime J. Zampierollo–Vila, Puerto Rico Department of Justice, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

GUSTAVO A. GELPI, District Judge.

The above-captioned case arises from the damages Emmanuel Fernández Jorge ("Fernández") and Carmen Lidia Jorge ("Lidia") (collectively referred to as "Plaintiffs") allegedly suffered as a result of Fernández being shot by a member of the Puerto Rico Police Department ("PRPD") following a pursuit of the vehicle of which Fernández was a passenger. Plaintiffs filed the present complaint against police officers Julio Galarza–Soto ("Galarza") and Juan Ortiz–Cruz ("Ortiz") in their individual capacities (collectively referred to as "Defendants"), alleging violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, pursuant to section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docket No. 1.) Plaintiffs also seek this court's supplemental jurisdiction for alleged violations of Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, §§ 5141 –42, and Article II of the Constitution of Puerto Rico.¹ (Id. )

Presently before the court is Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), in which they argue that Plaintiffs fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted with the exception of Fernández's excessive use of force claim under the Fourth Amendment against Ortiz and Plaintiffs' state law claims under Article 1802 of Civil Code of Puerto Rico and Article II of the Constitution of Puerto Rico. (Docket No. 15.) Plaintiffs opposed said motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 16.)

After reviewing the pleadings and pertinent law, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' motion to dismiss at Docket No. 16.

I. Relevant Factual and Procedural Background

In articulating the following facts of this case, the court recites such facts as alleged in the complaint, resolving any ambiguities in Plaintiffs' favor. See Ocasio–Hernández v. Fortuño–Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2011). Fernández was a seventeen year old minor at all times relevant to the complaint and Lidia is his mother. (Docket No. 1 ¶¶ 1–2, 5.) Sergeant Galarza was the sergeant on duty for the PRPD and was in charge of the officers on scene during the relevant time pertaining to the incident with Fernández. (Id. ¶ 3.) Ortiz is an officer of the Puerto Rico Police Department. (Id. ¶ 4.)

In December, 2010, Fernández lived with his mother, Lidia, at the Alturas de Cupey Housing Project. (Id. ¶ 5.) On December 31, 2010, Fernández decided to go to the El Señorial shopping mall to buy a shirt. (Id. ¶ 6.) To get to the mall, Fernández rode with two acquaintances nicknamed Goty and Rafo, in an automobile. (Id. ) Goty was driving, Rafo was sitting in the front passenger's seat, and Fernández was in the back seat. (Id. ¶ 7.) When getting into the vehicle, Fernández noticed that Rafo had a firearm on his waist. (Id. ¶ 8.) This was the first and last time that Fernández saw the firearm. (Id. )

Instead of going directly to the shopping mall, Goty and Rafo deviated toward a recycle center in Trujillo Alto, Puerto Rico. (Id. ¶ 9.) Goty and Rafo told Emmanuel "that they just were going to collect some money there." (Id. ) Emmanuel was unaware of the intent of Goty and Rafo, who when arriving at the center, exited the vehicle and then suddenly rushed back to the same. (Id. ¶ 10.) Goty drove the vehicle away from the scene while being pursued by police officers of the PRPD and local municipal department. (Id. ¶ 11.) The vehicle drove to a nearby housing development, known as Los Claveles. (Id. ¶ 12.) After approximately five minutes, and under the belief that the chase had ended, Goty drove the vehicle out of the development toward the Alturas de Cupey Housing Project. (Id. ) The chase, however, continued once outside of the development. (Id. ¶ 13.) The police ordered the vehicle to stop, but Goty continued to attempt to evade them, at which time the police discharged their weapons at the fleeing vehicle. (Id. ¶ 14.) The pursuit ended when the vehicle lost control and crashed into a guardrail. (Id. ¶ 15.)

After the vehicle crashed, Rafo fled on foot and Fernández, fearing the police, followed into the nearby brush. (Id. ) Several officers arrived, including defendant Ortiz and Ivan Lebrón–Lebrón. (Id. ¶ 17.) At an undisclosed time, Galarza arrived to the scene along with municipal police officers. (Id. ¶¶ 17–18.) The municipal police officers immediately detained Goty and realized that there was no threat to any officer. (Id. ¶ 19.) Despite the fact that Fernández posed no threat to the officers nor did he brandish a firearm, he was seized with deadly force by being shot in the back while he was lying face down in the ground, subdued. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 22.)

Plaintiff alleged that "Galarza acquiesced to the firearms discharge or at the very best was deliberately indifferent to his fellow officers actions, knowing that [Fernández] was unarmed and no police officer was in danger." (Id. ¶ 21.) Ortiz admitted to having discharged his firearm at Fernández, but a lack of an adequate investigation by Galarza resulted in it being unknown as to whether the bullets in Fernández's back was from Ortiz's firearm or the firearm of another police officer on scene. (Id. ¶ 22.) As a result of being shot, Fernández was bleeding, in pain, and praying for assistance. (Id. ¶ 26.) After over an hour, Defendants and other officers at the scene took Fernández through the brush and placed him into a municipal pickup truck. (Id. ¶ 27.) No officer administered any medical assistance or bothered to wait for proper emergency services. (Id. ) Defendants on scene saw what happened to Fernández, yet they did nothing to intervene. (Id. ¶ 30.) Indeed, an injured municipal officer was placed in a police car and taken to emergency medical services prior to Fernández. (Id. ¶ 28.)

Fernández was then taken in the municipal pickup truck to Auxilio Mutuo Expreso Hospital, where he was treated for the gun shots, but the medical personnel was unable to remove one bullet, and, as such, it remains lodged in his body for the rest of his life. (Id. ¶ 29.) As a result of being shot, Fernández was paralyzed and has thus lost his ability to walk for the rest of his life. (Id. ¶ 30.) Fernández's mother, Lidia, arrived to the hospital despite never being contacted by the PRPD because a friend who worked at the hospital contacted her. (Id. ¶ 31.) When she arrived, she suffered emotional and mental anguish at the plight to which Fernández had been subjected. (Id. ¶ 32.)

Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed suit in this court, claiming that the aforementioned acts amount to Ortiz and Galarza violating Fernández's Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and his rights under Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico and Article II of the Constitution of Puerto Rico. (Id. ¶¶ 38–41.) Plaintiffs further claim supervisory liability on part of Galarza in alleging that by authorizing the use of excessive force by certain police officers, Galarza engaged in inadequate training and supervision of the police force under his command. (Id. ¶ 34.) Defendants then moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). (Docket No. 15.) Plaintiffs opposed said motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 16.)

II. Standard of Review

When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, see FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6), the court analyzes the complaint in a two-step process under the current context-based "plausibility" standard established by the Supreme Court. See Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir.2012) (citing Ocasio–Hernández v. Fortuño–Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2011) which discusses Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). First, the court must "isolate and ignore statements in the complaint that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action elements." Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55. A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Second, the court must then "take the complaint's well-pled (i.e., non-conclusory, non-speculative) facts as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor, and see if they plausibly narrate a claim for relief." Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55. Plausible, means something more than merely possible, and gauging a pleaded situation's plausibility is a context-specific job that compels the court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). This "simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of" the necessary element. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

"[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ " Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2) ). If, however, the "factual content, so taken, ‘allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,’ the claim has facial plausibility." Ocasio–Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).

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