Jorgensen v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 9602
| Decision Date | 23 July 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 9602,9602 |
| Parties | d 303 P. Mart JORGENSEN and Marie A. Jorgensen, his wife, d/b/a Dimple Dell Floral Company, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Hanson, Baldwin & Allen, Merlin R. Lybbert, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Gustin, Richards & Mattsson, Salt Lake City, for respondents.
Plaintiffs suffered loss from the freezing of plants and bulbs in their greenhouse and sued to recover on the ground that this loss came within the terms of a fire insurance policy issued by the defendant. From a judgment by the court in favor of the plaintiffs, defendant appeals.
Plaintiffs operate the Dimple Dell Floral Company in the southern environs of Salt Lake City. Their greenhouse is heated by an oil furnace which is operated by an electric motor. The temperature is supposed to be maintained about 65 degrees and an alarm sounds when it drops below 53 degrees. On the occasion of interest to us, December 12, 1960, a below-freezing winter night, it sounded at about 11:30 p. m. When Mr. Jorgensen went to the furnace room he was 'greeted by smoke and a burnt smell.' He found that the furnace motor was not operating and was unable to get it to run. He called an electrician who found that it had 'burned out' a bearing, and removed it to be taken for repairs. To keep his plants from freezing Mr. Jorgensen resorted to some expedients by burning fuel oil and newspapers in improvised heaters. They nevertheless suffered damages of upwards of $8,000. The trial court found that this loss came within the provision of the policy protecting against 'all direct loss by fire' to plaintiffs' greenhouse, plants and bulbs; and awarded judgment up to the limits of the policy ($5,000).
In approaching the problem whether the judgment can be sustained, the correctness of certain principles advocated by plaintiffs as favorable to doing so is conceded: that in case of ambiguity, uncertainty or doubt the terms of the policy will be construed strictly against the company and in favor of the insured; 1 that the plaintiffs are thus entitled to the broadest protection that they could reasonably believe the commonly understood meaning of its terms afforded them; 2 and that upon this review we are obliged to analyze the evidence and every reasonable inference fairly to be derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. 3
The controversy between the parties focused principally upon the question whether there was a fire. But in order to see in clear perspective the problems presented by the charge that the evidence does not support the findings and judgment, it is essential to consider separately that question and the further one: was fire the proximate cause of the damage to the plaintiffs' plants?
To support its contention that the occurrence described was not a 'fire' and thus not covered by the policy, the defendant relies on certain cases which so hold with respect to electric motors which had 'burned out': Baron Corp. v. Piedmont Fire Ins. Co., 4 where the charring or burning of electric wires, without more, was held not to be a fire; and Bass v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, 5 where an overheated and smoldering electric motor, without proof of light or flame, resulted in a similar holding.
We regard the evidence here as significantly different from those cases in showing the existence of the essential components of fire, which are: fuel, oxygen and heat. When the fuel and oxygen are ignited by heat, they unite in the process of combustion, producing the properties by which fire is usually identified: light, heat and flame. It is common knowledge that fires vary in character: some having much flame and little heat, others having much heat and little flame. Some originate by a flame igniting fuel and producing heat; in others heat first develops sufficient to produce flame. 6 If the essentials to constitute a fire are present, neither the sequence in which they develop, nor the proportions in which they exist are of controlling importance in determining its identity as fire.
The testimony here shows that in addition to the smoke and burnt smell in connection with the burning out of this motor: that there had been sufficient heat to melt the copper wires and to produce a 'glow'; that the insulation on the wiring was charred and that there were ashes; and most important, the electrician, Darrel Maynes,...
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