Jorgenson v. Dronebarger, 10238

• Decision Date: 08 July 1966
• Docket Number: No. 10238,10238
• Citation: 143 N.W.2d 869,82 S.D. 213
• Parties: Jan JORGENSON, a Minor, by Pearl Shoemaker, Her Guardian ad litem, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Warren DRONEBARGER, Sr., Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 869

143 N.W.2d 869

82 S.D. 213

Jan JORGENSON, a Minor, by Pearl Shoemaker, Her Guardian ad

litem, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Warren DRONEBARGER, Sr., Defendant and Appellant.

No. 10238.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

July 8, 1966.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 9, 1966.

Bangs, McCullen, Butler & Foye, Thomas E. Simmons, Rapid City, for defendant and appellant.

Whiting, Lynn, Freiberg & Shultz, Kelton S. Lynn, Rapid City, for plaintiff and respondent.

HOMEYER, Judge (on re-assignment).

This is an action for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident. A jury awarded plaintiff $18,000 in damages and judgment for that amount was entered in her favor and against the defendant. Defendant's application for a new trial was denied and he appeals from the judgment.

The accident occurred shortly after 4:00 p.m. on October 12, 1963, on Interstate 90 about 1 1/2 miles east of Rapid City. At this point Interstate 90 is a limited access four-lane concrete highway with two lanes separated by a median ditch carrying eastbound traffic and two lanes for westbound traffic. The lanes are each 12 feet wide with an asphalt strip about 4 feet wide adjacent to the inside lane and another asphalt strip about 7 1/2 feet wide on the outside lane. The roadway is on a slight downgrade from a point 1/4 mile west to the place of the accident.

Defendant testified that he was on a vacation trip and had arrived in Rapid City the morning of the accident; that he was driving a pickup truck and pulling a house trailer which was 28 feet long and 8 feet wide. When leaving Rapid City he mistakenly took the Interstate going east instead of west to Wyoming, his planned destination, and after discovering the error intended to go to a turnaround which he remembered near the Air Base. He said he was traveling about 40 to 50 miles per hour in the right lane and fishtailed his trailer, a right to left movement, to observe traffic in the rear. He saw two cars coming abreast about a quarter mile behind him, and wanting to get into the left lane as he thought he was nearing the turnaround, he put on his left turn signal and gradually angled into that lane. When the truck and trailer were in the left lane, he heard a scraping noise, looked in his mirror, saw a car alongside, tried to turn away from it and about the same time heard the sound of a horn. A collision followed in which the pickup was thrust forward and loosened from the trailer and both vehicles and the colliding car went into the median ditch. The pickup was upset and on the left, the trailer on the right, and the colliding car between the pickup and the trailer. Defendant's version of what happened was substantially corroborated by his wife.

Plaintiff is a seven-year-old girl and was riding in the back seat of a 1955 Cadillac driven by her sixteen-year-old half sister, Toni Horvath. The car belonged to her stepfather who was stationed at Ellsworth Air Force Base and they were returning to their home at the Base by driving in an easterly direction on Interstate 90.

Miss Horvath testified that she was driving at a speed of about 50 to 55 miles per hour in the left lane, and as she came over a small knoll saw the pickup and trailer either stopped or moving very slowly on the outside asphalt strip. As she approached to pass she sounded her horn and the defendant without signalling made a left-hand turn at a rather sharp angle into the left lane and towards a gravel crossover of the median which separated the eastbound from the westbound traffic. She said she slowed down as she observed the turning movement, applied her brakes, and turned left in an attempt to avoid a collision, but was unable to do so. The collision occurred on the shoulder of the left lane. Two motorists proceeding in the same direction rection as Miss Horvath witnessed the accident and in essence substantiated her version of what happened.

Defendant assigns as error (1) the court's refusal to give certain requested instructions, (2) the receipt of certain medical testimony, and (3) the denial of a new trial on the ground the damages awarded were excessive and apparently given under the influence of passion or prejudice.

The trial court gave the following instruction:

'The law of the State of South Dakota provides that the driver of any vehicle upon a highway before starting, stopping, or turning from a direct line shall first see that such movement can be made in safety, and whenever the operation of any other vehicle may be affected by such movement, shall give a signal by means of hand and arm, or by an approved mechanical or electrical signal device, and whenever the signal is given by means of hand and arm the driver shall indicate his intention to start, stop, or turn, by the hand and arm extended horizontally to indicate a left turn, the hand and arm extended upward to indicate a right turn, and the hand and arm extended downward to indicate a stop or decrease in speed.'

This instruction is substantially in the language of SDC 1960 Supp. 44.0317, but defendant strenuously argues that the court erred in giving the instruction and refusing his requested instruction which included what he claims was certain qualifying language used by this court in the case of Barnhart v. Ahlers, 79 S.D. 186, 110 N.W.2d 125. We do not believe the court erred either in giving the quoted instruction or in refusing defendant's requested instruction. In our opinion the statute is neither involved nor so worded that it cannot be readily understood by a jury of laymen.

In 53 Am.Jur., Trial, § 542, it is said:

'As a general rule where the law governing a case is expressed in a statute, the court in its charge not only may, but should, use the language of the statute, and may, indeed, be guilty of error if it employs language which constitutes a departure in an essential respect from the statute. However, it is not error to qualify the wording of the statute so as to conform it to construction given by the reviewing courts.' See annotation 87 A.L.R.2d p. 544.

Contentions similar to those made by the defendant were advanced in Field v. Gregory, 230 S.C. 39, 94 S.E.2d 15, an intersection case, where the court instructed in the language of the statute and refused to instruct as to the relative duties of the drivers under decisions of the court. The South Carolina court said: 'The particular complaint of the appellants is that the Court failed to explain as to what 'entering an intersection at approximately the same time' meant. It is well settled that words used in a statute must be given their ordinary and popular signification, unless there is something in the statute requiring a different interpretation. There are no words used in the statute that have any unusual legal meaning. When the Judge charged the jury in the language of the statute, this was sufficient in this particular case.'

We have carefully reviewed the Barnhart case on which defendant relies. We do not believe what was there said mandates the qualifying language contained in defendant's requested instruction or makes its omission from an instruction in the language of the statute fatal so as to necessitate a reversal. Correct legal principles are stated in Barnhart and had the trial court so chosen, it might have amplified the statutory language by adverting to such principles, but we are satisfied the court committed no error when it refused to do so. It is not error to refuse to amplify the instructions given which substantially cover the principle embodied in requested instructions. Peters v. Hoisington, 72 S.D. 542, 37 N.W.2d 410.

In Barnhart plaintiff made a lefthand turn in the middle of a block on a city street towards a private driveway into a cemetery in the face of an oncoming automobile driven by the defendant. The case was submitted to the jury on negligence and causation instructions with a verdict being rendered for plaintiff, which the trial court set aside on a motion for judgment n.o.v. The majority of the court concluded the verdict could be sustained under the comparative negligence statute and reinstated the verdict. Significantly, the court conceded plaintiff's contributory negligence when he made the lefthand turn under the circumstances there present.

We are unable to read into the words of the statute, i.e., 'shall first see that such movement can be made in safety', a connotation that a lefthand turn is 'prohibited unless it can be made in absolute safety and free from all danger'. Still, it is a 'dangerous movement'. Flanagan v. Slattery, 74 S.D. 92, 49 N.W.2d 27. Both of these statements appear in the Barnhart case. The trial court may well have felt that simply instructing in the words of the statute was the least likely to confuse. There is always the chance of a trial court committing error through overemphasis because instructions should not give undue emphasis to any phase of the case favorable to either side and even correct statements of law if unduly emphasized may constitute reversible error. Miller v. Town of Ankeny, 253 Iowa 1055, 114 N.W.2d 910.

In Mills v. Southwest Builders, Inc., 70 N.M. 407, 374 P.2d 289, under facts quite similar to the present case, the court instructed:

'16. I further instruct you that it was the duty of the driver of the truck in this case before turning such vehicle from Solano Drive to the left, to first see that such movement could be made in safety and, if it could not be made in safety, then it was his duty to wait until he could make such turn in safety.'

New Mexico has a statute, N.M.S.A., 1953, § 64--18--24(a) which provides: 'No person shall * * * turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety. * * *' The court said: 'Except for the omission of the word 'reasonable' before the word 'safety' we see nothing wrong in the law as set forth in this instruction, when considered along with...