Joritz v. Univ. of Kan.
| Decision Date | 03 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 17-4002-SAC-JPO |
| Parties | CATHERINE A. JORITZ, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
This case arises from plaintiff's employment as an instructor at the University of Kansas ("KU"). KU decided not to renew plaintiff's contract prior to plaintiff gaining tenure. Plaintiff, who proceeds pro se, has alleged employment discrimination and illegal retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1
This case is before the court upon KU's motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). KU contends that plaintiff's claims in this case are barred by the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion. Generally speaking, "[c]laim preclusion prohibits a party from asserting in a second lawsuit any matter that might have been asserted in the first lawsuit." Stanfield v. Osborne Industries, Inc., 949 P.2d 602, 612 (Kan. 1997).
It is undisputed that plaintiff filed suit against KU in the state district court for Douglas County, Kansas in June 2016. This was also a pro se action. In the state court suit, plaintiff alleged sex discrimination, national origin discrimination and retaliation and other wrongful conduct in violation of Title VII. Plaintiff also asked for review under the Kansas Judicial Review Act (KJRA). On October 17, 2016, plaintiff and KU entered into a stipulation to dismiss her Title VII claims. Plaintiff has stated that the stipulation was motivated by her failure to receive a right-to-sue letter. The stipulation was drafted by KU's counsel and signed by plaintiff and counsel for KU. The stipulation stated that the parties requested the dismissal of Count VI (which contained plaintiff's Title VII claims) "with prejudice." The state court judge entered a stipulated order of partial dismissal with prejudice approved by both sides on October 18, 2016. No separate judgment was entered upon the partial dismissal order.
The state court case continued upon plaintiff's KJRA claims. A memorandum decision finding in favor of KU was entered on March 6, 2020. The decision states that it "constitutes the journal entry in this case and judgment is entered in accordance with the findings herein made." Doc. No. 115-5, p. 2. Plaintiff has appealed that decision and the appeal is currently pending.
The court applies the same standards to a motion for judgment on the pleadings as the standards applied to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). BV Jordanelle, LLC v. Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 830 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2016). The court accepts as true all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint, resolves all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor, and decides whether it is plausible that plaintiff is entitled to relief. Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2013)(reviewing Rule 12(b)(6) standards). The court also liberally construes plaintiff's pro se pleadings (see id.) and may take judicial notice of federal and state court documents. See Johnson v. Spencer, 950 F.3d 680, 705-06 (10th Cir. 2020); Pace v. Swerdlow, 519 F.3d 1067, 1072-73 (10th Cir. 2008).
In general, the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents a party from litigating a claim that was or could have been the subject of the prior final judgment. MACTEC, Inc. v. Gorelick, 427 F.3d 821, 831 (10th Cir. 2005). The underlying principle of claim preclusion is "that a party who once has had a chance to litigate a claim before an appropriate tribunal usually ought not have another chance to do so." Stone v. Dept. of Aviation, 453 F.3d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir. 2006)(citation omitted).
Columbian Financial Corporation v. Bowman, 768 Fed.Appx. 847, 851 (10th Cir. 2019). The Tenth Circuit has stated that "the absence of a full and fair opportunity to litigate is more appropriately treated as an exception to the application of claim preclusion when the [other] requirements are met." MACTEC, 427 F.3d at 831 n.6. It is considered a "narrow exception" applying "only where the requirements of due process were not afforded . . . where a party shows 'a deficiency that would undermine the fundamental fairness of the original proceedings.'" Lenox v. MacLaren Survical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 847 F.3d 1221, 124339 (10th Cir. 2017)(quoting Nwosun v. General Mills Restaurants, Inc., 124 F.3d1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 1997)); see also Zafer v. Hermann, 2018 WL 2374619 *4 (Kan.App. 2018)(exception is "exceedingly narrow"). Plaintiff has burden of showing the absence of a full and fair opportunity to litigate against defendant's claim preclusion motion.2 Sullivan v. DaVita Healthcare Partners, Inc., 780 Fed.Appx. 612, 615-16 (10th Cir. 2019). "The fairness of the prior proceeding 'is determined by examining any procedural limitations, the party's incentive to fully litigate the claim, and whether effective litigation was limited by the nature or relationship of the parties.'" Lenox, 847 F.3d at 1239 (quoting Nwosun, 124 F.3d at 1257-58); see also Rhoten v. Dickson, 223 P.3d 786, 799 (2010)(citing Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1172 (10th Cir. 2006))(reciting same factors).
The same parties are involved in this litigation and the state court action. The same claims are involved in the two cases as well. The Title VII claims plaintiff raised against KU in state court are the same as or similar to the Title VII claims plaintiff raised against KU in this court. Exact similarity is not required for claim preclusion. The Kansas Supreme Court in Stanfield, 949 P.2d at 611 stated: "The current meaning of the term 'claim,' within the context of claim preclusion, is defined in factual termsso that the same factual 'transactions' or 'series of connected transactions' is one claim, regardless of the number of substantive legal theories that may be available to the plaintiff based on those facts."3 There can be no dispute that plaintiff's claims in the state court case and in this case arise from the same factual transactions or series of transactions.
The court further finds that plaintiff could and did raise the same Title VII claims against KU in state and federal court. On June 13, 2016, when plaintiff filed her petition in state court, she had not received a right-to-sue letter as required to successfully bring a Title VII action in court.4 This opened the way for an administrative exhaustion defense, not a subject matter jurisdiction defense. See Lincoln v. BNSF Railway Company, 900 F.3d 1166, 1185-86 (10th Cir. 2018)(overriding prior Tenth Circuit rulings that the failure to exhaust in this kind of situation was a jurisdictional defense). Plaintiff, however, could have added her Title VII claim to her state court action after receiving her right to sue letter or sought a stay of her state court action until she received a right-to-sue letter. See Wilkes v. Wyoming Dept. of Employment Division of Labor Standards, 314 F.3d 501, 506(10th Cir. 2002); see also Yung-Kai Lu v. University of Utah, 790 Fed.Appx. 933, 936 (10th Cir. 2019) cert. denied 2020 WL 1496787 (3/30/2020)(sustaining a similar claim preclusion defense against a pro se plaintiff stating that a right-to-sue letter "does not affect the rules of claim preclusion").
The state court issued a memorandum decision expressly resolving the KJRA claims in plaintiff's petition. The court called the decision "the journal entry in this case" and "judgment." Doc. No. 115-5, p. 2. Under K.S.A. 60-254(a), a "judgment" is "the final determination of the parties' rights in an action."5 "The archetypal final decision is 'one[] that trigger[s] the entry of judgment.'" Hall v. Hall, 138 S.Ct. 1118, 1124 (2018)(quoting Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 103 (2009)). "An appeal would normally lie from that judgment." Id. Here, an appeal has proceeded withoutcertification of a final judgment by the district court on any separate or individual claim under K.S.A. 60-254(b).6
These circumstances show that a final judgment on the merits has been made by the state court. The final judgment has a claim preclusive impact upon plaintiff's Title VII claims for two independent reasons. First, in effect, the stipulation of partial dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's Title VII claims was incorporated in the final decision. See McBride v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 281 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2002)( general rule that all earlier interlocutory orders merge into final orders and judgments except when the final order is a dismissal for failure to prosecute). Thus, the stipulation of the parties as approved by the state district court is a part of the judgment on the merits which is res judicata and bars a later lawsuit on the same claims. Honeycutt, 836 P.2d at 1133-34...
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