Joseph E. Jackson & W. Va. Dep't of Transp. v. Belcher

• Citation: 753 S.E.2d 11,232 W.Va. 513
• Decision Date: 27 December 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–0632.,12–0632.
• Parties: Joseph E. JACKSON and West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways, Defendants Below, Petitioners v. Joseph Wayne BELCHER, Plaintiff Below, Respondent.
• Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

232 W.Va. 513

753 S.E.2d 11

Joseph E. JACKSON and West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways, Defendants Below, Petitioners

v.Joseph Wayne BELCHER, Plaintiff Below, Respondent.

No. 12–0632.

Supreme Court of Appeals of

West Virginia.

Submitted Sept. 10, 2013.

Decided Sept. 26, 2013.

Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Benjamin

Dec. 27, 2013.

Syllabus by the Court

1. “A circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.” Syllabus point 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).

2. “The standard of review applicable to an appeal from a motion to alter or amend a judgment, made pursuant to W. Va. R. Civ. P. 59(e), is the same standard that would apply to the underlying judgment upon which the motion is based and from which the appeal to this Court is filed.” Syllabus point 1, Wickland v. American Travellers Life Insurance Co., 204 W.Va. 430, 513 S.E.2d 657 (1998).

3. “A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that significance and effect must, if possible, be given to every section, clause, word or part of the statute.” Syllabus point 3, Meadows v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 207 W.Va. 203, 530 S.E.2d 676 (1999).

4. “In the absence of any definition of the intended meaning of words or terms used in a legislative enactment, they will, in the interpretation of the act, be given their common, ordinary and accepted meaning in the connection in which they are used.” Syllabus point 1, Miners in General Group v. Hix, 123 W.Va. 637, 17 S.E.2d 810 (1941), overruled on other grounds by Lee–Norse Co. v. Rutledge, 170 W.Va. 162, 291 S.E.2d 477 (1982).

5. Judicial decisions rendered by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia are laws of this State.

6. The preservation of an individual's “right ... to receive benefits or compensation to which he or she would otherwise be entitled under ... any other law” set forth in W. Va.Code § 15–5–11(a) (2006) (Repl.Vol.2009) encompasses an individual's right of recovery recognized by a decision of this Court.

7. “Suits which seek no recovery from state funds, but rather allege that recovery is sought under and up to the limits of the State's liability insurance coverage, fall outside the traditional constitutional bar to suits against the State.” Syllabus point 2, Pittsburgh Elevator Co. v. West Virginia Board of Regents, 172 W.Va. 743, 310 S.E.2d 675 (1983).

8. W. Va.Code § 15–5–11(a) (2006) (Repl.Vol.2009) expressly preserves an individual's right “to receive benefits or compensation to which he or she would otherwise be entitled under ... any other law” and operates to permit an individual to maintain a cause of action against the State and/or its employee(s) to recover for injuries allegedly caused by the provision of emergency services where the emergency services are provided by the State or by an emergency service worker who is an employee of the State and the recovery sought is confined to the limits of the State's liability insurance coverage.

Gary E. Pullin, Nathan J. Chill, Pullin, Fowler, Flanagan, Brown & Poe, PLLC, Charleston, WV, for the Petitioners.

Stephen P. New, Amanda J. Gardner, The Law Office of Stephen P. New, Beckley, WV, for the Respondent.

DAVIS, Justice:

The petitioners herein and defendants below, Joseph E. Jackson (hereinafter “Mr. Jackson”) and the West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways (hereinafter “DOH”), appeal from two orders entered by the Circuit Court of Mingo County. By its first order, entered March 7, 2012, the circuit court denied the motion for summary judgment filed by Mr. Jackson and the DOH, concluding that the language of W. Va.Code § 15–5–11(a) (2006) (Repl.Vol.2009) ¹ contemplates exceptions to the immunity that the statute provides to emergency service workers. In its second order, entered April 13, 2012, the circuit court denied the joint motion filed by Mr. Jackson and the DOH to alter or amend the court's previous summary judgment ruling. On appeal to this Court, Mr. Jackson and the DOH contend that the circuit court erred because Mr. Jackson was working as an emergency service worker at the time of the subject motor vehicle accident, and, as an emergency service worker, Mr. Jackson is entitled to immunity under W. Va.Code § 15–5–11(a). Upon a review of the parties' arguments, the appendix record, and the pertinent authorities, we affirm the circuit court's orders. In summary, we conclude that W. Va.Code § 15–5–11(a) expressly preserves an individual's right “to receive benefits or compensation to which he or she would otherwise be entitled under ... any other law” and operates to provide a limited waiver of the emergency service worker immunity provided by W. Va.Code § 15–5–11(a) where the emergency service worker is an employee of this State and the recovery sought is confined “to the limits of the State's liability insurance coverage.” Syl. pt. 2, in part, Pittsburgh Elevator Co. v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 172 W.Va. 743, 310 S.E.2d 675 (1983).

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The underlying facts giving rise to the instant appeal are not disputed by the parties. In early May 2009, Mingo County, West Virginia, experienced severe storms that caused devastating flooding, mudslides, landslides, and stream blockages. Afterwards, then-Governor Joe Manchin, III, declared a State of Emergency encompassing Mingo County and other similarly-affected counties in the region. Ultimately, the State of Emergency was in place through July 10, 2009, to permit clean-up and repairs to damaged property and roadways.

On June 23, 2009, Mr. Jackson, an employee of the DOH, was operating a dump truck in Gilbert, West Virginia, and performing clean-up work pursuant to the existing State of Emergency declaration.² At the time of his accident with the respondent herein and plaintiff below, Joseph Wayne Belcher (hereinafter “Mr. Belcher”), Mr. Jackson was backing up his dump truck when he struck the front and side of Mr. Belcher's automobile. Mr. Jackson alleges that he did not see Mr. Belcher's vehicle because it was in his blind spot. Mr. Belcher claims that, as a result of the accident, he suffered neck and back injuries, and his car was totaled.

Mr. Belcher filed the instant civil action against Mr. Jackson and the DOH on June 21, 2011, alleging negligence and vicarious liability. After they answered Mr. Belcher's complaint, Mr. Jackson and the DOH then moved for summary judgment ³ claiming that they were entitled to immunity because the subject accident occurred while Mr. Jackson was serving as an emergency service worker, and W. Va.Code § 15–5–11(a) (2006) (Repl.Vol.2009) ⁴ provides immunity to emergency service workers. The circuit court held a hearing on the summary judgment motion and initially contemplated certifying the immunity question to this Court. However, the circuit court ultimately determined certification to be unnecessary, and, in its March 7, 2012, summary judgment order, the court ruled as follows:

The Court FINDS that the decision in Pittsburgh Elevator [ Co. v. West Virginia Board of Regents, 172 W.Va. 743, 310 S.E.2d 675 (1983),] would qualify as an exception to the statutory immunity of the above-cited statute [W. Va.Code § 15–5–11] under the “any other law” exception. While the case of Pittsburgh Elevator dealt with constitutional immunity, it is logical to assume that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeal[s] would extend it to statutory immunity. Additionally, by the language of West Virginia Code § 15–5–11, in which it carves out the possibility of exceptions, it does not appear that the statute intended to close the door on all suits against the State.

(Emphasis added).

After this ruling, Mr. Jackson and the DOH timely filed a motion to alter or amend the circuit court's judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure.⁵ Thereafter, the circuit court, by order entered April 13, 2012, denied the motion to alter or amend judgment filed by Mr. Jackson and the DOH, reiterating its prior ruling in its summary judgment order and stating that “[t]he Court stands b[y] the aforementioned language in its decision to deny the Motion For Summary Judgment[.]”

Following these adverse rulings, Mr. Jackson and the DOH appeal to this Court.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

The case sub judice comes to this Court on appeal from the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to Mr. Belcher and from the circuit court's order denying the joint motion of Mr. Jackson and the DOH to alter or amend the court's summary judgment ruling. We previously have held that “[a] motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law.” Syl. pt. 3, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Federal Ins. Co. of New York, 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963). When a lower court has entered an order awarding summary judgment, we accord a plenary review to the court's ruling: “[a] circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.” Syl. pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).

We likewise will review the circuit court's ruling denying the motion to alter or amend its judgment de novo because

[t]he standard of review applicable to an appeal from a motion to alter or amend a judgment, made pursuant to W. Va. R. Civ. P. 59(e), is the same standard that would apply to the underlying judgment upon which the motion is based and from which the appeal to this Court is filed.

Syl. pt. 1, Wickland v. American Travellers Life Ins. Co., 204 W.Va. 430, 513 S.E.2d 657 (1998).

Mindful of these standards, we proceed to consider the parties' arguments.

III.DISCUSSION

On appeal to this Court, Mr. Jackson and the DOH contend that Mr. Belcher's suit against them is barred by the immunity granted to emergency service workers by W. Va.Code § 15–5–11(a) insofar as Mr. Jackson was working as an emergency...