Joseph v. Beard, CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-2744

• Decision Date: 27 March 2015
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-2744
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
• Parties: ERIC JOSEPH Petitioner, Pro Se v. JEFFREY A. BEARD, et al. Respondents

ERIC JOSEPH Petitioner, Pro Se v. JEFFREY A. BEARD, et al. Respondents

CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-2744

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARCH 27, 2015

NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, J.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

INTRODUCTION

Eric Joseph ("Petitioner") is a state prisoner serving a life sentence and a consecutive cumulative 17-35 years for a conviction of first degree murder, robbery and related offenses. On December 15, 2014, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 60(b)(6) essentially requesting to reopen a judgment entered on August 20, 2012, to consider whether the holding in Cox v. Horn, 757 F. 3d 113 (3d Cir. 2014),¹ may be invoked as justification for this motion and, ultimately, for consideration of the merits of his underlying claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. [ECF 33].

This motion was referred to United States Magistrate Judge M. Faith Angell for a Report and Recommendation ("R&R"). On January 16, 2015, an R&R was issued recommending that Petitioner's Rule 60(b)(6) motion be deemed a successive habeas corpus petition and, as such,be denied and dismissed pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases,² without prejudice to seek authorization from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals to file a successive habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(4).³ [ECF 38]. On February 2, 2015, Petitioner filed Objections to the R&R. [ECF 40].

For the reasons stated herein, this Court overrules Petitioner's Objections, approves and adopts the R&R, and denies Petitioner's Rule 60(b)(6) motion.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

As in the Cox matter, more than 20 years of procedural history has transpired in the Petitioner's journey to arrive at this juncture and, thus, a brief recitation of its history and facts is needed.⁴ On October 4, 1984, following a jury trial in state court, Petitioner was convicted of the charges of first degree murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy, and possession of an instrument of crime. Subsequently, Petitioner was sentenced to a minimum life term of imprisonment. Following direct appeals, on January 7, 1987, Petitioner's conviction became final. On March 15, 1990, Petitioner, acting pro se, filed a petition for collateral relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa. C.S.A §9541 et seq. Counsel, appointed to assist Petitioner, filed an amended PCRA petition which asserted six claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (including claims Petitioner now asserts as new grounds). The PCRA court found the claims meritless and denied the PCRA petition. On April 19, 1996, an appeal of this denial washeard in Superior Court which raised numerous allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. On March 18, 1997, the Superior Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief. Petitioner sought review of the decision to the Supreme Court, which declined allocator review on October 17, 1997.

On November 5, 1997, Petitioner filed his first habeas petition,⁵ but Petitioner voluntarily withdrew it, without prejudice, to exhaust state remedies.⁶ Instead, Petitioner filed a second PCRA petition on October 15, 1998, and this judicial process culminated unfavorably for him in April 2002.

On May 7, 2002, Petitioner, acting pro se, filed a second habeas petition under the current docket number,⁷ which was dismissed as untimely by Order dated May 22, 2003, and signed by the Honorable Herbert J. Hutton,⁸ who relied on the March 27, 2003 Report and Recommendation submitted by Magistrate Judge M. Faith Angell.⁹ Petitioner appealed the dismissal and, on December 24, 2003, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals denied his motion for a certificate of appealability.¹⁰

Eleven years later, Petitioner, again acting pro se, filed the instant Rule 60(b)(6) motion which, as stated, seeks to:

[R]eopen judgment for the opportunity to consider whether in light of Cox v. Horn, at #13-2982 decided by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on August 7, 2014, recognizing an exception to the procedural-default rule in habeas corpus cases with respect to Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), and may be invoked as justification for reopening the instant judgment to consider the merits of Petitioner's underlying claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and whether the ensuing argument supports the existence of an extraordinary circumstance under Federal Rule 60(b)(6).¹¹

LEGAL STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 60 governs the relief from a judgment, order, or proceeding. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60. Specifically, Rule 60(b) is a catch-all provision that authorizes a court to grant relief from a final judgment upon limited grounds, including, inter alia, any reason that justifies relief.¹² See Rule 60(b)(6); see also Cox, 757 F.3d at 120. Courts are directed to dispense their broad powers under Rule 60(b)(6) only in "extraordinary circumstances where, without such relief, an extreme and unexpected hardship would occur." Cox, 757 F.3d at 120 (citing Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1993)). However, a motion labeled "Rule 60(b) motion," which contains one or more "claims" as used in §2244(b) of Title 28, "is in substance a successive habeas petition and should be treated accordingly."¹³ Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 531 (2005).

The grant or denial of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion is an equitable matter left to the discretion of the district court. Accordingly, as provided in Cox, a court must consider the full measure of any properly presented facts and circumstances attendant to the movant's request and employ a flexible, multifactor approach to Rule 60(b)(6) motions, including those built upon a post-judgment change in the law, that takes into account all the particulars of a movant's case. See Coltec Indus., Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 274 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting, in the context of a 60(b)(6) analysis, the propriety of "explicit[ly]" considering "equitable factors" in addition to a change in law); Lasky v. Cont'l Prods. Corp., 804 F.2d 250, 256 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing multiple factors a district court may consider in assessing a motion under 60(b)(6)). The fundamental point of Rule 60(b) is that it provides "a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case." Hall v. Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., 772 F.2d 42, 46 (3d Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). A movant, of course, bears the burden of establishing entitlement to such equitable relief, which will be granted only under extraordinary circumstances. Mayberry v. Maroney, 558 F.2d 1159, 1163 (3d Cir. 1977). The Cox Court, however, clearly held that "[i]ntervening developments in the law by themselves rarely constitute the extraordinary circumstances required for relief under Rule 60(b)(6)." Cox, 757 F.3d at 121 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 239 (1997) (emphasis added); Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 1999). Further, Rule 60(b) applies in habeas proceedings under §2254 only "to the extent that [it is] not inconsistent with" applicable federal statutory provisions and rules. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 529.

Statutory provisions that address the finality of determinations judicially made impose three requirements on second or successive habeas petitions. These requirements are: (1) any claim that has already been adjudicated in a previous petition must be dismissed; (2) any claimthat has not already been adjudicated must be dismissed unless it relies on either a new and retroactive rule of constitutional law or new facts showing a high probability of actual innocence; and (3) before the district court may accept a successive petition for filing, the court of appeals must determine that it presents a claim not previously raised that is sufficient to meet §2244(b)(2)'s new rule or actual innocence provisions. 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(1)-(3); Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 529-30. Thus, federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality of a state prisoner's conviction and sentence are guided by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments are accorded the finality and respect necessary to preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our system of federalism. These rules include the doctrine of procedural default, under which a federal court will not review the merits of claims, including constitutional claims which a state court declined to hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state procedural rule. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 747-748 (1991) (reaffirming that a state procedural default of any federal claim will bar federal habeas unless the petitioner demonstrates cause and actual prejudice) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982)); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84-85 (1977) ("'[t]here is no reason to ... give greater preclusive effect to procedural defaults by federal defendants than to similar defaults by state defendants.'") (quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 228 (1969)). However, the doctrine barring procedurally defaulted claims from being heard is not without exceptions. A prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of federal law. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises five Objections to the R&R, and in support, cites to portions of Martinez, Cox, and other case law. Specifically, Petitioner objects to the following portions of the R&R:

(1) that Petitioner's Rule 60(b)(6) motion be construed as a second or successive habeas petition;

(2) that Petitioner's previous habeas petition was considered and denied on the merits;

(3) that Petitioner does not meet the Cox v. Horn standard of relief;

(4) the erroneous implication that Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not sufficiently substantial to militate in favor of equitable relief; and

(5) that Petitioner failed to meet due diligence after the high Court's ruling of Martinez v. Ryan and Cox v. Horn.

Further, Peti...