Joseph v. Glunt
| Decision Date | 23 May 2014 |
| Citation | 2014 PA Super 107,96 A.3d 365 |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
| Parties | Woodens B. JOSEPH, a/k/a Joseph B. Woodens, Appellant v. Steven R. GLUNT, Superintendent, Appellee. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Woodens B. Joseph, appellant, pro se.
Debra S. Rand, Mechanicsburg, for appellee.
Joseph B. Woodens (“Woodens”) appeals from the May 14, 2013 order that dismissed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
On December 18, 2008, following a jury trial, Woodens was found guilty of first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, carrying a firearm without a license, and false identification to law enforcement.1See Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 12/18/2008, at 256–59. That same day, Woodens was sentenced to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment on the first-degree murder conviction. Id. at 265. On the criminal conspiracy conviction, Woodens was sentenced to a term of ten to twenty years' incarceration. Id. On the firearms charge, he was sentenced to a term of two to four years' incarceration. Id. There was no further penalty imposed for the false identification charge. All of Woodens' additional sentences were set to run concurrently with his life sentence. Id.
Following the trial court's denial of his post-sentence motions, on February 3, 2009, Woodens filed a notice of appeal from his judgment of sentence. On January20, 2010, Woodens filed a motion requesting that this Court remand his direct appeal for the appointment of counsel. On February 22, 2010, this Court remanded for the appointment of counsel. Two different counsels were appointed to represent Woodens on March 16 and July 12, 2010, respectively. Thereafter, on January 14, 2011, this Court ultimately affirmed Woodens' judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Woodens, 23 A.3d 1082 (Pa.Super.2011) (table).
On November 3, 2011, Woodens filed a petition for collateral relief pursuant to the Post–Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–46. On April 12, 2012, the PCRA court dismissed Woodens' PCRA petition. On April 24, 2012, Woodens filed a notice of appeal (967 MDA 2012). On May 3, 2013, this Court affirmed the dismissal of Woodens' PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Woodens, 81 A.3d 989 (Pa.Super.2013) (table). Woodens filed a petition for reargument, which this Court denied on June 27, 2013. On January 21, 2014, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Woodens' petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Woodens, ––– Pa. ––––, 83 A.3d 415 (2014) ( per curiam ).
Contemporaneously with his PCRA petition, Woodens filed the separate petition that is the subject of this appeal. On May 10, 2013, Woodens filed a petition in the Civil Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County that he styled as a “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum.” 2 Specifically, Woodens filed the instant lawsuit against Steven R. Glunt (“Glunt”) in his capacity as the Superintendent of SCI–Houtzdale, where Woodens then was incarcerated. In relevant part, Woodens asserted in his petition that his sentence is illegal, and that his rights under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions have been violated, because the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) “does not possess a lawful court order signed by [the sentencing court] authorizing any lawful restraint of [Woodens'] body.” Woodens' Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum, 5/10/2013, at 5. Thus, Woodens argues that his sentence violates 42 Pa.C.S. § 9764(A)(8). Id. at 6–10.
Attached to Woodens' petition were copies of his correspondence with the DOC documenting his efforts to obtain a copy of his written sentencing order. On or about December 13, 2012, Woodens submitted a request to the DOC pursuant to Pennsylvania's Right–to–Know Law.3 In a letter dated January 16, 2013, the DOC's Right–to–Know Office denied Woodens' request, stating that the DOC did not possess a copy of the sentencing order. On or about February 11, 2013, Woodens also submitted an “Inmate's Request to Staff Member” requesting a copy of the “written judgment of sentence order” in his case. On March 11, 2013, the Pennsylvania Office of Open Records (“OOR”) issued a “Final Determination” in Woodens' appeal from the DOC's conclusion that it did not have a written copy of Woodens' sentencing order. In that letter, the OOR concluded that an affidavit from the DOC affirming the “nonexistence” of the sentencing order was determinative: Final Determination, 3/11/2013.
On May 14, 2013, the trial court filed an order and opinion that dismissed Woodens' petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The trial court concluded, after reviewing the transcript of the sentencing hearing and the criminal docket in Woodens' case, that, even in the absence of a sentencing order, the existent record authorized Woodens' incarceration:
14. It is clear that either a transcript of the sentencing proceeding or a separate sentencing order constitute the necessary record. Here, [Woodens] does not plead that the [DOC] does not have a copy of the transcript of the sentencing proceedings, so the [trial court] presumes it was supplied by Dauphin County 4 at [the] time of state prison commitment. Accordingly, the Commonwealth and [the DOC] have complied with 42 Pa.C.S. § 9764(a)(8) and [Woodens' petition for a writ] is frivolous.
Order, 5/14/2013, at 3 (emphasis added).
On May 29, 2013, Woodens filed a timely notice of appeal. On May 30, 2013, the trial court directed Woodens to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On June 11, 2013, Woodens timely complied. On July 26, 2013, the trial court submitted a letter directing this Court's attention to the reasoning in the trial court's May 14, 2013 order, in lieu of a Rule 1925(a) opinion.
Woodens presents the following issues for our consideration:
1. Whether the [trial court] erred in dismissing [Woodens'] “Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum ” and “Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ”?
2. Whether [Woodens' c]onstitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment [to] the United States Constitution and Art. 1 § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution were violated by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Department of Corrections requiring discharge when they illegally detained [Woodens] and implemented [their] own procedures regarding cause and commitment of [Woodens]?
Woodens' Brief at 3 (citation modified). Although listed as two separate issues, Woodens' claims essentially encompass a single argument: His current sentence is illegal because the DOC does not have a written copy of the sentencing order in Woodens' case. Woodens contends that this alleged violation of his due process rights should compel his immediate release from prison. Thus, we will address Woodens' claims collectively.
Initially, we note that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, albeit in a per curiam opinion, has held that a claim that a defendant's sentence is illegal due to the inability of the DOC to “produce a written sentencing order related to [his] judgment of sentence” constitutes a claim legitimately sounding in habeas corpus. Brown v. Penna. Dept. of Corr., ––– Pa. ––––, 81 A.3d 814, 815 (2013) ( per curiam ) (). Accordingly, we will treat Woodens' submission as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus instead of a petition under the PCRA, which typically governs collateral claims implicating the legality of sentence. See42 Pa.C.S. 9542 ().
Our standard of review in this context is axiomatic:
The ancient writ of habeas corpus is inherited from the common law, referred to by Sir William Blackstone as the most celebrated writ in the English law. The writ lies to secure the immediate release of one who has been detained unlawfully, in violation of due process. [T]raditionally, the writ has functioned only to test the legality of the petitioner's detention.
Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 413 Pa.Super. 583, 605 A.2d 1271, 1272–73 (1992) (internal citations omitted). “Under Pennsylvania statute, habeas corpus is a civil remedy [that] lies solely for commitments under criminal process.” Commonwealth v. McNeil, 445 Pa.Super. 526, 665 A.2d 1247, 1249–50 (1995) (citing Wolfe, 605 A.2d at 1273). “ Habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy and may only be invoked when other remedies in the ordinary course have been exhausted or are not available.” Id. (citing Commonwealth ex rel. Kennedy v. Myers, 393 Pa. 535, 143 A.2d 660, 661 (1958)). “Our standard of review of a trial court's order denying a petition for [a] writ of habeas corpus is limited to [an] abuse of discretion.” Rivera v. Penna. Dep't of Corrs., 837 A.2d 525, 528 (Pa.Super.2003).
The statute cited by Woodens in support of his argument provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
§ 9764. Information required upon commitment and subsequent disposition
(a) General rule.—Upon commitment of an inmate to the custody of the [DOC], the sheriff or transporting official shall provide to the institution's records officer or duty officer, in addition to a copy of the court commitment form DC–300B generated from the Common Pleas Criminal Court Case Management System of the unified judicial system, the following information:
* * *
(8) A copy of the sentencing order and any detainers filed against the inmate which the county has notice.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9764. Although not mentioned explicitly in his brief before this...
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