Joseph v. Hospital Service District No. 2 of the Parish of St. Mary, No. 2004 CA 2761 (La. App. 10/25/2006)
| Decision Date | 25 October 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 2004 CA 2761.,2004 CA 2761. |
| Parties | DR. WILLIE JOHN JOSEPH, III, DR. MICHELLE T. BRUMFIELD AND ST. MARY ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES, INC. v. HOSPITAL SERVICE DISTRICT NO. 2 OF THE PARISH OF ST. MARY, STATE OF LOUISIANA, OUR LADY OF THE LAKE HOSPITAL, INC., MELVIN BOURGEOIS, M.D., JAMES BROUSSARD, JOHN GUARISCO, SHARON HOWELL, Y. GEORGE RAMIREZ, CLIFFORD M. BROUSSARD, NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF LOUISIANA, AND LOUISIANA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION MALPRACTICE AND GENERAL LIABILITY TRUST |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
CHRISTINE LIPSEY, SCOTT N. HENSGENS, LAUREN S. COENEN, Attorney for Defendants-Appellees Our Lady of the Lake Hospital and Clifford M. Broussard.
GEORGE D. FAGAN, PEIRCE A. HAMMOND, II, Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant National Union Fire Insurance Company of Louisiana.
NICHOLAS F. LAROCCA, JR. and RANDALL L. CHAMPAGNE, Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees Hospital Service District No. 2, Melvin Bourgeois, M.D., James Broussard, John Guarisco, Sharon Howell, and Y. George Ramirez.
BENJAMIN L. GUELFO, Attorney for Defendants-Appellees Louisiana Hospital Association Malpractice and General Liability Trust.
Before: KUHN, GUIDRY, and PETTIGREW, JJ.
In this case, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Louisiana ("National Union") appeals from an adverse summary judgment rendered against it on the thirdparty demands/cross claims filed against it for indemnity coverage and defense costs by defendants, Hospital Service District No. 2 of the Parish of St. Mary, State of Louisiana, d/b/a Lakewood ("Hospital District"); its former administrator, Clifford Broussard ("Broussard"); and certain members of its board of commissioners: Melvin Bourgeois, M.D., James Broussard, John Guarisco, Sharon Howell, and Y. George Ramirez ("commissioners"). National Union also challenges the trial court's granting of the Hospital District's motion for summary judgment dismissing National Union's reconventional and/or third-party claim against the Hospital District for full defense and indemnity.
The litigation between these parties is long and complex, involving numerous trials, appeals, and supervisory writ applications.1 The instant suit alleges, among other things, that on December 13, 1990, St. Mary Anesthesia Associates, Inc. ("St. Mary Anesthesia") and the Hospital District entered into an anesthesia service contract. St. Mary Anesthesia agreed to provide anesthesia and other services on a 24-hour/7-day a week basis at Lakewood Hospital, and the Hospital District agreed that St. Mary Anesthesia would have the exclusive right to provide anesthesia services, with said contract being automatically renewed annually unless terminated by St. Mary Anesthesia or for cause, as limited and described in the contract.
It was further alleged that the contract expressed the intent of the parties to stipulate a benefit to Dr. Willie Joseph, III ("Dr. Joseph"), and Dr. Michelle T. Brumfield ("Dr. Brumfield"), in effect making them third-party beneficiaries to the contract dated December 13, 1990, between St. Mary Anesthesia and the Hospital District — this being commonly known in Louisiana as a stipulation "pour autrui".
Defendants filed exceptions raising the objection of no right of action as to the claims of Dr. Joseph and Dr. Brumfield as third-party beneficiaries. The trial court granted the exceptions, dismissing the claims by Dr. Joseph and Dr. Brumfield with prejudice. On appeal, we reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the contract dated December 13, 1990, between St. Mary Anesthesia and the Hospital District intended Dr. Joseph and Dr. Brumfield to be third-party beneficiaries. Joseph v. Hospital Service Dist. No. 2 of Parish of St. Mary, 2004-0781 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/3/05), 923 So.2d 27, rev'd, 2005-2364 (La. 10/17/06), ___ So.2d ___.
During this time, the Hospital District and the commissioners filed a third-party petition against National Union, claiming that the lawsuit filed by plaintiffs (Dr. Joseph, Dr. Brumfield, and St. Mary Anesthesia) alleged damages for breach of contract and that National Union had in full force and effect a policy of insurance that afforded insurance coverage for the claims made by the plaintiffs, including the cost of defending the suit. This petition was later amended to allege an arbitrary and capricious claim against National Union.
Broussard also filed a third-party claim against National Union, claiming that National Union had in full force and effect a policy that afforded him coverage for the claims for damages made by the plaintiffs, including costs of defending the suit. Broussard further alleged damages and penalties for National Union's arbitrary and capricious conduct and bad faith dealing.
National Union answered the third-party demands by the Hospital District, the commissioners, and Broussard, raising the defenses of res judicata, accord and satisfaction, and compromise and settlement. National Union further challenged the third-party claims, alleging that the third-party plaintiffs had no cause or right of action.
National Union subsequently filed a reconventional third-party demand and/or cross claim against the Hospital District. Citing a "Receipt and Release With Indemnity" signed by the Hospital District and Broussard on June 16, 2003, National Union claimed it was entitled to full defense and indemnity by the Hospital District for any and all claims asserted against National Union in this litigation.
Ultimately, defendants moved for summary judgments on their third-party demands against National Union. The defendants further moved for summary judgment against National Union on the reconventional third-party demand and/or cross claim filed on behalf of National Union seeking indemnity from the Hospital District. On August 10, 2004, the trial court signed a judgment in favor of defendants.2
It is from this judgment that National Union now appeals, assigning the following specifications of error:
1. The trial judge erred by granting Appellees' motion for summary judgment on their third-party demands and cross claims against National Union for coverage because the release executed between National Union and the Appellees released those claims and the release and dismissals have res judicata effect.
2. The trial court erred by granting Hospital Service District's motion for summary judgment dismissing National Union's third-party demand and cross claim against HSD for indemnity.
3. The granting of the Appellees' motions for summary judgment was erroneous because National Union's policy is a claims made policy and excludes claims made outside the policy period.
4. The trial judge was in error for granting Appellees' motions for summary judgment on their third-party demand because National Union's policy excludes coverage, in whole or in part, for the claims asserted by Plaintiffs against Appellees.
Before we may proceed to the merits of this appeal, we must first determine if the trial court properly designated the judgment as final pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 1915(B). The trial court's designation is not determinative of this court's jurisdiction. Van ex. rel. White v. Davis, 2000-0206, p. 2 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/16/01), 808 So.2d 478, 480. In order to assist the appellate court in its review of designated final judgments, the trial court should give explicit reasons, either oral or written, for its determination that there is no just reason for delay. However, if the trial court fails to do so, an appellate court cannot summarily dismiss the appeal. For purposes of judicial efficiency and economy, the proper standard of review for an order designating a judgment as final for appeal purposes when accompanied by explicit reasons is whether the trial court abused its discretion. R.J. Messinger, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 2004-1664, p. 13 (La. 3/2/05), 894 So.2d 1113, 1122.
In the instant case, the trial court gave the following reasons for designating the judgment as final: "[T]here is no just reason for delay of an appeal, because the Court's ruling is dispositive of the coverage issues pertaining to National Union and other rulings of this Court are currently pending on appeal before the First Circuit of Appeal." Thus, the trial court gave "explicit reasons" why there was no just reason for delay. After a thorough review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in designating the August 10, 2004 judgment as final and appealable. Therefore, the designation is proper, and our jurisdiction has been properly invoked.
Further, insofar as the August 10, 2004 judgment dismisses all of National Union's third-party/cross claims against the Hospital District, it would be a final judgment as to National Union's third-party claims and, under La. Code Civ. P. art. 1915(A), would be a final appealable judgment without the designation by the trial court.
A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used to avoid a full-scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact. Johnson v. Evan Hall Sugar Coop., Inc., 2001-2956, p. 3 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/30/02), 836 So.2d 484, 486. Summary judgment is properly granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(B). Summary judgment is favored and is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(A)(2); Thomas v. Fina Oil and...
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