Joseph v. LaPorte County
Decision Date | 20 June 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 64A03-9501-CV-6,64A03-9501-CV-6 |
Parties | Cynthia JOSEPH; Justin Joseph, by Next Friend Gregory Joseph; Julia Joseph, by Next Friend Gregory Joseph and Gregory Joseph, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. LaPORTE COUNTY, Indiana, a Municipal Corporation; Board of Commissioners of LaPorte County, Indiana; Highway Department of LaPorte County, Indiana; State of Indiana; Department of Highways, State of Indiana, Appellees-Defendants. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Cynthia Joseph, Justin Joseph, Julia Joseph, and Gregory Joseph (collectively "Joseph") appeal the grant of summary judgment in favor of LaPorte County, the Board of Commissioners of LaPorte County ("Board"), and the Highway Department of LaPorte County (collectively "LaPorte"). 1 Joseph claims injuries from the negligent posting of a forty-five mile per hour speed limit and the failure to erect warning signs near a dangerous intersection. Joseph raises three issues on appeal which we restate as follows:
I. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to LaPorte because the Board's decision to post the speed limit was an operational function.
II. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to LaPorte because the failure to post the established speed limit was an operational omission.
III. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to LaPorte because the failure to place warning signs at the intersection was an operational omission.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The facts most favorable to the non-movant, Joseph, are as follows. Cynthia Joseph and her two children suffered severe, permanent injuries from an automobile accident at the intersection of Johnson Road and County Road 400 West in LaPorte County, Indiana. The speed limit for westbound traffic approaching the intersection was posted at forty-five m.p.h., which exceeds accepted standards. Further, based upon the applicable ordinances, the speed limit was incorrectly posted; it should have been thirty-five m.p.h. Finally, no warning signs were posted at the intersection, contrary to acceptable standards. These factors combined to make the intersection inherently dangerous and caused Joseph's injuries. 2
LaPorte moved for summary judgment based upon governmental immunity for performance of a discretionary function. The trial court granted the motion and Joseph appeals.
Joseph first argues that the trial court erred in holding that the Board exercised a discretionary function when posting the speed limit. Joseph argues that the posted forty-five m.p.h. speed limit was excessive for Johnson road.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party proves there is no genuine issue of material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Once the movant has sustained this burden, the opponent must respond by setting forth facts showing a genuine issue for trial; they may not simply rest on the allegations of their pleadings. Stephenson v. Ledbetter (1992), Ind., 596 N.E.2d 1369, 1371. At the time of filing the motion or response, a party shall designate to the court all parts of pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and any other matters on which they rely for purposes of the motion. T.R. 56(C).
When reviewing an entry of summary judgment, we stand in the shoes of the trial court. We do not weigh the evidence but will consider the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Collins v. Covenant Mut. Ins. Co. (1992), Ind.App., 604 N.E.2d 1190, 1194. We may sustain a summary judgment upon any theory supported by the designated materials. T.R. 56(C).
The Indiana Tort Claims Act ("ITCA") allows suit against government entities for torts committed by their agencies or employees. Ind.Code §§ 34-4-16.5-1 to 20. The ITCA grants government entities immunity under specific circumstances. Among those circumstances, "[a] governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment is not liable if a loss results from ... [t]he performance of a discretionary function[.]" I.C. § 34-4-16.5-3(6). 3
The Indiana Supreme Court has offered guidance as to what constitutes discretionary functions under the ITCA. Discretionary-function immunity shields only those policy decisions which cannot be assessed by tort standards. Peavler v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs (1988), Ind., 528 N.E.2d 40, 45. In making this determination, we apply the planning/operation test. Id, at 46. Planning functions are discretionary and therefore shielded by immunity, while operational functions are not. Planning functions involve the "formulation of basic policy characterized by official judgment, discretion, weighing of alternatives, and public policy choices." Voit v. Allen County (1994), Ind.App., 634 N.E.2d 767, 770, trans. pending. Operational functions involve the "execution or implementation of already formulated policy." Id.
Whether an act is discretionary and therefore shielded by immunity is a question of law for the court. Peavler, supra, at 46. The essential inquiry is whether the legislature intended acts such as those challenged to enjoy immunity. Id. We narrowly construe immunity because it provides an exception to the general rule of liability. Id. If the establishment of a particular speed limit arises from an affirmative policy decision, tort standards provide an inadequate basis for evaluating the decision. However, if a speed limit is established based upon professional judgment, tort standards for professional negligence form an adequate basis for evaluation. Thus, we conclude that setting speed limits does not so clearly implicate government policy that all such decisions are discretionary as a matter of law. See Peavler, supra, at 47.
Accordingly, LaPorte bears the burden of proving that the challenged act or omission was a policy decision made after consciously balancing risks and benefits. Id. LaPorte may do so by proving that the Board consciously considered the Johnson road speed limit. Id., at 48. This proof might take the form of Board meeting minutes, comprehensive ordinances, or any other method which shows the Board made an affirmative policy decision. Id.
To carry their burden, LaPorte introduced several ordinances which set the speed limit for Johnson road. Most revealing is the ordinance from 1982 ("1982 ordinance") which set speed and load restrictions and included this preamble:
WHEREAS, the [Board] desire[s] to reduce the road damage and destruction, to reduce the inconvenience to the traveling public, and to conserve the repair and maintenance funds for the general improvement of the county highway system for the benefit of the traveling public;
IT IS THEREFORE ORDAINED: .
Record, p. 108 (emphasis added).
We conclude that the Board made a policy decision to set the speed limit at forty-five m.p.h. after consciously weighing risks and benefits. The preamble illustrates the Board's attempt to balance safety interests against the interest of smooth traffic flow. This is a policy decision reserved for the popularly-elected executive branch and not subject to judicial review. See Peavler, supra, at 44. This is a planning function because the issue is "not negligence but social wisdom, not due care but political practicability, not unreasonableness but economic expediency." Id., at 45 (quoting Blessing v. United States (1978), E.D.Penn., 447 F.Supp. 1160, 1172). To require more than the preamble's statement of concerns and competing interests would bind government entities to memorialize in exhausting detail the reasons for every decision they render. We believe this is more than Peavler requires.
Joseph argues the establishment of the speed limit was an operational function for two reasons: (1) the ordinance only reiterated prior speed limits, and (2) the Board was required by statute to set speed limits. Both arguments fail. First, we conceive of no requirement that a government entity must change prior law to render a discretionary decision. Second, the crucial question is not whether LaPorte had to post a speed limit, but did they have to post the particular speed limit which Joseph alleges was excessive. The Board was not required to establish this speed limit, but acted in their discretion after demonstrably balancing factors to arrive at this conclusion.
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