Joseph v. Patterson

• Decision Date: 19 August 1986
• Docket Number: No. 84-1332,84-1332
• Citation: 795 F.2d 549
• Parties: Lawrence E. JOSEPH and R. Frank Joseph, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. L. Brooks PATTERSON, Richard Thompson, David Case, individually and in their capacities as Oakland County Prosecutors; James A'Hearn and Robert Leon, individually and in their capacities as members of the Oakland County Prosecutor Office Investigation Division and/or of the Oakland County Organized Crime Strike Force; Jointly and Severally, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 549

795 F.2d 549

Lawrence E. JOSEPH and R. Frank Joseph, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. L. Brooks PATTERSON, Richard Thompson, David Case individually and in their capacities as Oakland County Prosecutors; James A'Hearn and Robert Leon, individually and in their capacities as members of the Oakland County Prosecutor Office Investigation Division and/or of the Oakland County Organized Crime Strike Force; Jointly and Severally, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 84-1332.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued Jan. 16, 1986.

Decided July 2, 1986.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Aug. 19, 1986.

Hugh M. Davis, Jr. (argued), Detroit, Mich., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Janice G. Hildenbrand (argued), Southfield, Mich., Ronald Holton, Troy, Mich., for defendants-appellees.

Before JONES and NELSON, Circuit Judges and PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.

JOHN W. PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.

Lawrence and R. Frank Joseph appeal the district court's dismissal of their complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Josephs brought this action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against three county prosecutors and two investigators employed by the county prosecutor's office for alleged civil rights violations. ¹ The issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in finding that dismissal was required by Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), in which the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor is immune from a Sec. 1983 damages suit for alleged civil rights violations committed "in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case." Id. at 431, 96 S.Ct. at 995. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the district court's judgment and remand this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

For purposes of evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we must regard the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174-75, 86 S.Ct. 347, 348-49, 15 L.Ed.2d 247 (1965); Windsor v. The Tennessean, 719 F.2d 155, 158 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 105, 83 L.Ed.2d 50 (1984). The claim should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Windsor, 719 F.2d at 158. The Josephs allege the following material facts derived from the joint pre-trial statement and certain paragraphs of their complaint expressly incorporated into the pre-trial statement. These facts are not well developed in the record, and are disputed by appellees, who include the Oakland County (Michigan) Prosecuting Attorney, Brooks Patterson; his chief assistant Richard Thompson; assistant prosecuting attorney, David Case; Chief of the Prosecuting Attorney's Investigative Division, James A'Hearn; and A'Hearn's investigator, Robert Leon.

Starting as early as 1978, A'Hearn and Thompson expressed the belief that the Josephs were allied with organized crime and wanted to "get" them. As a result, appellees entered into a concerted action with the police to bring false criminal charges against the Josephs, as evidenced by a series of events all of which occurred March 14, 1980. George Joseph, a younger brother, was involved in an altercation during the early morning hours of March 14 with an acquaintance, Hal Morrow. Morrow filed a complaint against George Joseph alleging felonious assault and extortion. Morrow was contacted by Lawrence Joseph regarding payment for the damages he had suffered from George Joseph's acts. At the behest of the police, Morrow secretly taped the telephone conversation with Lawrence Joseph and "played along" with Joseph in an attempt to entrap him into a criminal act. Morrow later met with Lawrence Joseph, accepted $800.00 as restitution and damages, and signed a release from claims for civil liability. Morrow then attempted to withdraw his complaint against George Joseph and initially concealed from the police his acceptance of the $800.00. The police arrested Morrow and telephoned A'Hearn, who contacted Thompson. Thompson and A'Hearn, in conjunction with the police, interrogated, intimidated, and coerced Morrow into filing false criminal charges against both Lawrence and Frank Joseph for obstructing justice and compounding a felony. Further, although a writ of habeas corpus had been issued by the 48th District Court of Michigan for George Joseph, who was still in custody, appellees ignored the writ and transferred George Joseph to the Oakland County Circuit Court for arraignment. The appellees used this opportunity to have the Circuit Court sign complaints and arrest warrants against Lawrence and Frank Joseph based on Morrow's coerced statements. These were immediately executed against the Josephs at the 48th District Court where they were waiting with George's counsel for his expected appearance on the writ of habeas corpus. The appellees had also obtained a search warrant from the Circuit Court allowing them to search Lawrence Joseph's business premises for the release executed by Morrow, the evidence of the alleged attempt to obstruct justice. However, the search, which was conducted simultaneously with the Josephs' arrests and which shut down the store during business hours, was unlawfully expanded to include a search of the entire premises for business records, contraband liquor and cigarettes which were never found. The release was, however, recovered. Appellees A'Hearn, Leon and one prosecutor were present at the search.

All charges against Lawrence and Frank Joseph were dismissed upon preliminary examination by the 48th District Court. The appellees, with knowledge of the falsity of the charges, nonetheless appealed the dismissal to the Oakland County Circuit Court, which affirmed the dismissal, and the Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. Thereafter, appellees opposed the Josephs' efforts to have their records expunged and certain properties returned to them. Further, appellees released or caused to be released to the media derogatory information about the Josephs. Finally Chief Assistant Prosecutor Richard Thompson influenced Assistant Prosecutor Case, a permanent member of the Oakland County Concealed Weapons Licensing Board, to "flag" Lawrence Joseph's concealed weapons licensing file and to reduce his long-standing general permit to a restricted permit. ²

Based on these alleged events, the Josephs filed the complaint in the present action on August 2, 1982, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983, 1985, and 1986, as well as pendent state claims for intentional infliction of mental distress, intentional interference with business relations, malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, and illegal search and seizure. The appellees raised absolute immunity in their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, which was granted by the district court on February 2, 1984, the morning of trial. In making its decision, the district court did not require an evidentiary hearing or affidavits. The district court found that the prosecuting attorneys were entitled to absolute immunity under Imbler. Although not specifying the type of immunity to be accorded investigators A'Hearn and Leon, the district court found that they too had immunity. Having thus dispensed with the federal claims, the district court also dismissed the pendent state claims. This appeal ensued.

II.

The parties agree that Imbler controls this case, and the proper interpretation of Imbler is at the core of this dispute. In Imbler the Supreme Court extended absolute or quasi-judicial immunity to prosecutors when their "activities were intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S.Ct at 994. In that case absolute immunity applied to a state prosecutor who had been accused in a Sec. 1983 action with knowing use of perjured testimony. The Supreme Court narrowly held that "in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under Sec. 1983." Id. at 431, 98 S.Ct. at 995. The Court expressly reserved the issue of whether "similar reasons require immunity for those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer rather than that of an advocate." Id. at 430-31, 98 S.Ct. at 994-95. ³ Notably, the Supreme Court cited and left standing several appellate court decisions which had extended only qualified or good-faith immunity to prosecutors who engaged in investigative or administrative activities. Id. at 430 n. 31, 98 S.Ct. at 995 n. 31. ⁴ The court further recognized: that the duties of the prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom. A prosecuting attorney is required constantly, in the course of his duty as such, to make decisions on a wide variety of sensitive issues. These include questions of whether to present a case to a grand jury, whether to file an information, whether and when to prosecute, whether to dismiss an indictment against particular defendants, which witnesses to call, and what other evidence to present. Preparation, both for the initiation of the criminal process and for a trial, may require the obtaining, reviewing, and evaluating of evidence. At some point, and with respect to some decisions, the prosecutor no doubt functions as an administrator rather than as an officer of the court. Drawing a proper line between these functions may present difficult questions, but this case does not require us to anticipate them.

Id. at 431 n. 33, 98 S.Ct. at 995 n. 33.

The Josephs assert that the prosecutors'...