Joseph v. United Workers Ass'n
Citation | 23 A.2d 470,343 Pa. 636 |
Decision Date | 06 January 1942 |
Docket Number | 247 |
Parties | Joseph v. United Workers Association, Appellant |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania |
Argued December 3, 1941.
Appeal, No. 247, Jan. T., 1941, from judgment of C.P. No. 5 (tried in C.P. No. 4), Phila. Co., Sept. T., 1939, No. 3865 in case of Philip Joseph v. United Workers Association. Judgment affirmed.
Trespass for personal injuries. Before BROWN, J.
Verdict and judgment for plaintiff in sum of $3,125. Defendant appealed.
Judgment affirmed.
Thomas E. Comber, Jr., for appellant.
John J McDevitt, 3rd, with him Joseph M. Leib and John J. McDevitt, Jr., for appellee.
Before SCHAFFER, C.J.; MAXEY, DREW, LINN, STERN, PATTERSON and PARKER, JJ.
Philip Joseph, appellee, brought this action in trespass against the United Workers Association, appellant, to recover for personal injuries allegedly sustained by him on August 15, 1939, while he was a paying guest at a summer camp operated by the Association near Sumneytown, Pennsylvania, as the result of his stepping into a hole in the floor of a "hayrack" wagon from which he was alighting following a "hay ride" conducted by the Association as part of the regular activities provided by it, without extra charge, for the diversion of its guests. The trial before the court below and a jury terminated in a verdict for the appellee in the sum of $3,125, whereupon the Association, having requested binding instructions in its favor, which were refused, filed a motion for judgment non obstante verdicto, on the single ground that the driver of the team of horses and wagon used in conducting the ride, one Sopel, who was also owner, was not its servant or agent, but an independent contractor. The court below dismissed the motion, concluding the evidence warranted a finding that Sopel was the Association's servant and not an independent contractor. This appeal, taken from the judgment entered in accordance with the verdict, is to review that conclusion only.
The rules applicable in determining whether, in a given case, the relationship of master and servant or that arising from an independent contract exists have been broadly stated, as follows: : McColligan v. Penna. R.R. Co., 214 Pa. 229, 232. "" : Eckert v. Merchants Shipbuilding Corp., 280 Pa. 340, 349. See also Cox v. Roehler, 316 Pa. 417, 419; Tyler v. McFadden Newspr. Corp., 107 Pa.Super. 166, 171; Restatement, Agency, Section 220. : Long v. Eastern Paving Co., 295 Pa. 163, 166. "The very phrase 'independent contractor' implies that the contractor is independent in the manner of doing the work contracted for": Silveus v. Grossman, 307 Pa. 272, 278. See also Colleoni v. D. & H. Co., 274 Pa. 319, 323; Fuller v. Palazzolo, 329 Pa. 93, 105; Tyler v. McFadden Newspr. Corp., supra, 172; Restatement, Agency, Section 2.
Under all the decisions, the basic inquiry, in ascertaining the character of the relationship, is as to whether the alleged servant is subject to the alleged master's control or right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the services for which he was employed. As was said in Eckert v. Merchants Shipbuilding Corp., supra (p. 349): "All other elements, 'even those which are normal and customary incidents of contracts of service, are, in an evidential point of view, material only insofar as they may tend more or less strongly, under the given circumstances, to show that the alleged master exercised control over the alleged servant'". The precise nature of the relationship, under the evidence, presents a question of fact which it is the exclusive function of the jury to determine, after proper instructions by the court as to the matters of fact to be considered, except where the facts are not in dispute and the evidence is direct and certain, presenting no question of credibility and leaving no sufficient ground for inconsistent inferences of fact. See Eckert v. Shipbuilding Corp., supra, 351; Campagna v. Ziskind, 287 Pa. 403, 408; Burns v. Elliott-Lewis Elec. Co., 118 Pa.Super. 243, 249.
In the present case, the evidence is that either the camp manager or one Rotstein, a paid employee in charge of recreational activities, arranged with Sopel, a nearby farmer, to have the wagon at the camp, loaded with hay, at a...
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