Joseph v. Wentworth Institute of Technology, No. CIV. A. 99-10989-MEL.

• Decision Date: 23 October 2000
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. 99-10989-MEL.
• Citation: 120 F.Supp.2d 134
• Parties: June JOSEPH, Plaintiff, v. WENTWORTH INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

120 F.Supp.2d 134

June JOSEPH, Plaintiff, v. WENTWORTH INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, Defendant.

No. CIV. A. 99-10989-MEL.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

October 23, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Winston Kendall, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff.

Paul G. Lannon, Jr., James D. Smeallie, Sheburne, Powers & Needmas, Boston, MA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LASKER, District Judge.

Joseph's ten count complaint alleges that she was discriminated against on the basis of her race, gender, color, national origin, and age during her longtime employment at Wentworth. She alleges that Wentworth's actions violated her rights under various federal laws; Title VI, Title VII, Title IX, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), the Civil Rights Act of 1991¹ and "breached [Wentworth's] contract with the United States." In addition, Joseph asserts that Wentworth's conduct violated Massachusetts' anti-discrimination law, M.G.L. ch. 151B and constituted a breach of contract. To prove these numerous alleged violations of state and federal law, Joseph has filed a far reaching motion to compel discovery. In opposition to Joseph's motion and in support of its own motion for summary judgment, Wentworth maintains that all of Joseph's claims are legally insufficient and that further discovery would be futile. Not surprisingly, Joseph has responded to Wentworth's summary judgment motion by moving under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f) to delay disposition of the summary judgment motion until its motion to compel has been decided. In addition, both parties have filed a motion to strike. Wentworth's summary judgment motion is granted in part and deferred in part. Joseph's Rule 56(f) motion and motion to compel are granted in part and denied in part. Joseph's motion to strike is denied. Decision on Wentworth's motion to strike is contained in a separate Order.

I.

Joseph is an African-American female of West Indian ancestry who was an at-will employee at Wentworth from 1979 until March 27, 1998. From 1979 until 1992, Joseph worked as an executive secretary in Wentworth Labs research department. According to all accounts, this period of Joseph's employment at Wentworth was relatively tranquil. Joseph received positive performance evaluations and does not allege that she was discriminated against during her time in the Wentworth Labs research department.

This period of tranquility came to an abrupt end when Joseph's position at Wentworth Labs was eliminated. On February 24, 1992, Wentworth transferred Joseph to a position as the Executive Secretary to the Vice President of Student Affairs. Joseph held this position until November 23, 1992, when she accepted a position as an administrative assistant in the Student Affairs Office. In June of 1993, Joseph was made an administrative assistant in the Student Activities Office, a job she held until her resignation.

Between 1992 and 1996, Joseph alleges that she applied for four other positions at Wentworth:² in 1992, the position of Program Coordinator; in 1993, the position of Assistant Director-Student Activities; in 1994, the position of Secretary to the Provost; and in 1996, the position of Assistant Director-Student Activities. Joseph contends that Wentworth's failure to hire her for any of these positions was caused by discriminatory animus.

While Joseph's disappointment at not being hired for any of these positions appears to be the central factor which led her to believe that she was being discriminated against, she also questions certain other actions taken by Wentworth. In 1995, Joseph received negative feedback on her performance evaluation from her supervisor. Specifically, her supervisor questioned Joseph's demeanor and her organizational skills. In addition to these issues, it appears that Joseph and her supervisor disagreed as to whether Joseph was entitled to overtime for certain work she was doing and her use of sick time.

Apparently, Joseph felt strongly that all of these criticisms were unwarranted. She filed a four-page written objection to the performance evaluation stating that her supervisor "nit-picked" her and was unreasonably hostile towards her. In December of 1995, Joseph filed a charge of discrimination with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD"). Her MCAD charge alleged that Wentworth discriminated against her on the basis of her race, color, sex, age, nation origin when it failed to promote her and gave her an unfavorable review. In filing her charge, Joseph was represented by the lawyer who represents her in the instant action. Both the MCAD and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") dismissed Joseph's claims for lack of evidence. Joseph did not appeal either ruling.

Joseph alleges that her workplace environment grew even more contentious after she filed her MCAD charge of discrimination. She claims that in December of 1995, her boss, without cause, accused her of stealing a cash box and generally harassed her. In March of 1996, Joseph complained about this harassment to Wentworth's affirmative action officer. In July of 1996, Joseph applied for, and was denied, the Assistant Director position.

After Wentworth refused to hire Joseph for the Assistant Director position, her workplace environment grew more stable. Joseph does not allege that any specific action taken by Wentworth was discriminatory between July of 1996 and February of 1998. In March of 1998, at the age of 45, Joseph resigned to take a position outside Wentworth. Joseph's letter of resignation makes no mention of intolerable work conditions or discrimination. After Joseph resigned, but before she had left work, her department was audited. Joseph claims that this audit was discriminatory. In addition, Joseph maintains that her work conditions at the time of her resignation constituted a constructive discharge. On August 5, 1998 Joseph filed her second complaint of discrimination against Wentworth with the MCAD. In February of 1999, based on this complaint, Joseph filed a state court action. In May of 1999, that action was removed by Wentworth.

* * * * * *

II. Joseph's Title VI Claim and Her Claim Based on Wentworth's Contract with the Government³ are Without Merit

The nondiscrimination provision of Title VI is § 601 which provides:

No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.

§ 601 of Title VI (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d).

The Supreme Court has recognized that a private person has an implied right of action for monetary damages under Title VI. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 630 & n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 1248, 79 L.Ed.2d 568 (1984). While private persons have this right, it is circumscribed by § 604 of Title VI. Section 604 provides:

Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize action under this subchapter by any department or agency with respect to any employment practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor organization except where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment.

§ 604 of Title VI (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3) (emphasis added).

Even though the words of § 604 only expressly curtail the actions of "any department or agency," its prohibitions have been interpreted as applying to private actions. See Consolidated, 465 U.S. at 632-633, 104 S.Ct. 1248.

This limitation contained in § 604 is fatal to Joseph's Title VI claim. Joseph has not alleged, much less proven, that a primary objective of the federal financial assistance received by Wentworth is to provide employment. One district court has held that a plaintiff's failure to allege in the complaint that the primary objective of the aid received was to provide employment warranted dismissal. Rosario-Olmedo v. Community School Bd. for Dist. 17, 756 F.Supp. 95, 97 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (dismissal without prejudice to replead).

However, putting aside this omission, Joseph has failed to provide any evidence to support the unlikely proposition that the aid which Wentworth, an educational institution, received from the federal government was designed to create jobs and not to aid education. Murphy v. Middletown Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 525 F.Supp. 678, 709 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (holding that the primary objective of federal funds to school was to aid education not employment). Accordingly, Wentworth is entitled to summary judgment on counts two and ten of the complaint.

III. Joseph's Title VII Claims are Barred

A. All of Joseph's Title VII Claims are Barred by Her Failure to Allege an Actionable Claim Within the Statutory Period

Wentworth argues that Joseph's failure to file a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC bars her Title VII claim. Section 706 of Title VII contains the applicable statutory period for filing a charge with the EEOC. It provides in pertinent part:

A charge under this section ... in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice ... such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

§ 706 of Title VII (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)) (emphasis added).

Although the literal language of § 706 appears to bar any employment discrimination claim which is over 300 days old at the time it is brought to the EEOC, this provision has been interpreted as allowing these claims when they are a part of a "continuing violation." DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 307 (1st Cir.1997). "Continuing violations may be serial or systematic." Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, Div. of Melville Corp., 145 F.3d 5, 14 (1st Cir.1998).

1. Joseph...