Joshi v. Nair
| Decision Date | 10 September 1992 |
| Citation | 418 Pa.Super. 448,614 A.2d 722 |
| Parties | Kirit K. JOSHI, v. Mohan NAIR, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
George Baillie, Burgettstown, for appellant.
Cary D. Jones, Washington, for appellee.
Before CAVANAUGH, DEL SOLE and BROSKY, JJ.
This is an appeal from the order denying appellant's petition to strike a foreign judgment that was transferred to and duly entered in Pennsylvania.
Appellant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether Alabama properly exercised in personam jurisdiction over appellant; (2) whether the ex parte amendment of the judgment without notice to appellant violated appellant's right to due process; (3) whether enforcement of the judgment against appellant is fundamentally unfair; and (4) whether the foreign judgment is entitled to full faith and credit in the Pennsylvania courts. 1 For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. Before discussing these issues, we will briefly recount the relevant facts of this case. Appellant, Mohan Nair 2 was an employee of M-R Labs, Research & Development, Inc. (M-R Labs). 3 Appellant contacted appellee, Kirit Joshi, 4 seeking to interest him in the purchase of investment securities in M-R Labs. In response to the information supplied by appellant, appellee agreed to invest in the corporation. Appellant subsequently traveled to Alabama to meet with appellee and to accept appellee's investment of $10,000.00. 5
After relinquishing his funds to appellant, appellee entertained doubts as to the wisdom of his investment and asked appellant for a guarantee of the debt. To appease appellee, a promissory note signed by Frank Ramesh, in his capacity as president of M-R Labs, was sent to appellee. The note, which was executed on January 17, 1989, promised to repay appellee the sum of $10,000.00 with an interest rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum. See Motion for Rule to Show Cause why Judgment Should not be Stricken, Exhibit B (copy of promissory note). The note was not due until January 15, 1992. See id. Appellee was dissatisfied with the form of the promissory note and requested that appellant execute a new note as well as a personal guarantee by appellant and his partners. In addition, appellee asked appellant to supply him with the names and addresses of other individuals who had invested in the corporation. Appellee also advised appellant that the investment would be withdrawn if appellant did not send the requested documentation. Although appellant promised to send his personal guarantee to appellee, appellee never received anything further from appellant and accordingly demanded a return of his funds. Neither appellant nor the corporation ever refunded appellee's money.
In an attempt to recoup his investment, appellee tried to contact the corporation, Frank Ramesh and appellant at the address and telephone number identified on the corporate letterhead which appellant had utilized in his communications with appellee. Appellee was not successful as telephone service had been disconnected and he was unable to obtain a forwarding address. Appellee then contacted the appropriate New Jersey authorities who advised him that M-R Labs was not in operation. See Reply to Motion for Rule to Show Cause Why Judgment Should not be Stricken, at section IIC paragraph 35A. Appellee subsequently discovered that appellant had moved to Pennsylvania and traced appellant to his Pennsylvania address. Appellee then contacted appellant, who again agreed to return appellee's funds. Appellant did not perform as promised.
On March 2, 1990 appellee instituted suit in Alabama against M-R Labs, Frank Ramesh and appellant. 6 Because neither M-R Labs nor Frank Ramesh could be located, service could not be made on either of these defendants. However, appellant was served with and personally accepted a copy of the complaint. See Nair v. Joshi, 578 So.2d 1296, 1298 (Ala.1991). Appellant elected not to appear and defend the Alabama litigation, allegedly due to the receipt of improper legal advice from Pennsylvania counsel. See id. Because a response to the complaint was not filed within the requisite time period specified by the Alabama procedural rules, appellee obtained a default judgment against all of the defendants. See Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure (Ala. R.C.P.), Rule 12(a), Code of Alabama 1975 (); Ala. R.C.P., Rules 55(a) and (b), Code of Alabama 1975 (). Judgment was then formally entered by the Alabama lower court on May 18, 1990. See Ala. R.C.P., Rules 55 and 58, Code of Alabama 1975.
In entering judgment, the Alabama trial court did not address appellee's claim for punitive damages even though such damages had been specifically requested by appellee in his complaint. Consequently, appellee filed a timely petition to amend the judgment as authorized by Ala. R.C.P., Rule 59(e), Code of Alabama 1975. Due to the lack of service on M-R Labs and Frank Ramesh, appellee also requested that the judgment be set aside as to these defendants. The Alabama trial court granted appellee's motion and awarded appellee $75,000.00 in punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages of $10,000, plus interest in the sum of $1,600.00, costs and attorneys' fees in the amount of $2,000.00. The award was then entered as a final judgment in the sum of $88,600.00 on May 30, 1990. See Ala. R.C.P., Rule 58, Code of Alabama 1975.
Appellee duly transferred to and entered the judgment in Washington County, Pennsylvania, pursuant to the requirements of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA), codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4306. See Praecipe for Entry of Judgment, filed August 14, 1990. Appellant was notified of the entry of the judgment in Pennsylvania. In response to the entry of judgment, appellant filed a timely motion in Alabama to have the judgment set aside. See Ala. R.C.P., Rule 60(b), Code of Alabama 1975 (). The Alabama trial court denied appellant's motion on the basis that appellant had not satisfied the requisites set forth in subsection (b)(1) of the rule. 7 This ruling was ultimately affirmed by the Alabama Supreme Court. See Nair v. Joshi, 578 So.2d at 1298.
After his lack of success in Alabama, appellant sought to attack the transferred judgment by filing a motion to strike on May 28, 1991. The trial court denied appellant's request on August 5, 1991. This timely appeal followed.
As a preliminary matter, we observe that appellant has failed to include in his brief a statement of jurisdiction and a table of citations in contravention of Pa. R.A.P., Rules 2111(a) and 2114, 42 Pa.C.S.A. (requiring a statement of jurisdiction in an appellant's brief) and Pa. R.A.P., Rule 2174(b), 42 Pa.C.S.A. (mandating the inclusion of a table of citations in all briefs). Appellant's failure to include a table of citations is a relatively minor deficiency which does not substantially impinge upon our ability to engage in effective and meaningful appellate review. We may therefore disregard this irregularity. See Pa. R.A.P., Rule 105(a), 42 Pa.C.S.A. However, the lack of a jurisdictional statement poses a more serious problem, since we cannot entertain this appeal if jurisdiction is found to be lacking. Although not discussed by either of the parties, we must ascertain whether we may exercise jurisdiction over this appeal. See Motheral v. Burkhart, 400 Pa.Super. 408, 414, 583 A.2d 1180, 1184 (1990) (en banc) ().
In reviewing the certified record, it appears that this is an appeal from an order refusing to vacate or strike off a judgment. Such orders are appealable as of right pursuant to Pa. R.A.P., Rule 311(a)(1), 42 Pa.C.S.A. See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(a) and § 5105(c) (). Jurisdiction over this appeal is thus vested in this court and we will proceed to review the merits of appellant's claims.
In evaluating the trial court's refusal to strike, or more properly, vacate 8 the judgment, our scope of review is limited to ascertaining whether the trial court manifestly abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Tandy Computer Leasing v. DeMarco, 388 Pa.Super. 128, 132, 564 A.2d 1299, 1301 (1989). We will scrutinize the trial court's decision and appellant's arguments in accordance with this standard.
Before addressing the issues posed by appellant, it is necessary to consider the context in which they arise and the relevant principles relating thereto. Tandy Computer Leasing v. DeMarco, supra. The judgment at issue in this case was transferred to Pennsylvania and entered as a judgment here pursuant to the UEFJA. As recognized by this court, the UEFJA [ ] ..." Tandy Computer Leasing v. DeMarco, supra (). "The provisions of the [UEFJA] have been interpreted to mean that any foreign judgment properly filed in Pennsylvania must be accorded full faith and credit unless there is a particular overriding reason that requires us to deny full faith and credit to the judgment." First Fidelity Bank v. Standard Machine & Equipment Co., 398 Pa.Super. 607, 611, 581 A.2d 629, 631 (1990), allocatur denied, 527 Pa. 593, 588 A.2d 914 (1991), citing Tandy Computer Leasing v. DeMarco, 388 Pa.Super. at 133, 564...
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