Joshua Park v. Tsiavos

• Decision Date: 09 February 2017
• Docket Number: No. 16-1532,16-1532
• Parties: JOSHUA PARK, Appellant v. DIMITRI TSIAVOS; LEONIDAS TSIAVOS, ELIZABETH TSIAVOS, CHODAE COMMUNITY CHURCH
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

JOSHUA PARK, Appellant v. DIMITRI TSIAVOS; LEONIDAS TSIAVOS,ELIZABETH TSIAVOS, CHODAE COMMUNITY CHURCH

No. 16-1532

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Submitted: January 12, 2017

February 9, 2017

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey

District Court No. 2-13-cv-00616

District Judge: The Honorable William J. Martini

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

January 12, 2017

Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, JORDAN, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges

OPINION^*

SMITH, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff Joshua Park regularly played recreational basketball in the gym of the Cho Dae Presbyterian Church of New Jersey ("the Church"). During one game on June 13, 2012, several members of an opposing team, including defendant Dimitri Tsaivos, engaged Park in a fight. According to Park, his attackers made several comments that referred to Park's Asian race. Park asserts the following claims: (1) premises liability against the Church; (2) conspiracy to interfere with his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), against Tsaivos and several John Doe defendants; (3) negligence, assault, and battery against Tsaivos; and (4) negligent supervision against Tsaivos's parents.

The District Court granted summary judgment on the state premises-liability claim and the federal conspiracy claim. It then declined supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. This timely appeal followed.¹ For the following reasons, we will affirm.

I

We begin with the District Court's decision to grant summary judgment on the claims for premises liability and civil rights conspiracy. We review de novo,applying the same standard as the District Court. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 1 v. City of Camden, 842 F.3d 231, 238 (3d Cir. 2016). We will affirm as to each claim.

A

The District Court held that the Church is immune from Park's claim of premises liability under the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act.² We agree.

The Charitable Immunity Act provides, inter alia, as follows:

No nonprofit corporation, society or association organized exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes . . . shall, except as is hereinafter set forth, be liable to respond in damages to any person who shall suffer damage from the negligence of any agent or servant of such corporation, society or association, where such person is a beneficiary, to whatever degree, of the works of such nonprofit corporation, society or association; provided, however, that such immunity from liability shall not extend to any person . . . [who is] unconcerned in and unrelated to and outside of the benefactions of such corporation, society or association.

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-7(a). Under this provision, "an entity qualifies for charitable immunity when it '(1) was formed for nonprofit purposes; (2) is organized exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes; and (3) was promoting such objectives and purposes at the time of the injury to plaintiff who was then a beneficiary of the charitable works.'" Hardwicke v. Am. Boychoir Sch., 902 A.2d 900, 916 (N.J. 2006) (quoting O'Connell v. State, 795 A.2d 857, 860 (N.J. 2002)).

The Charitable Immunity Act is supported by "strong" public policy considerations. P.V. ex rel. T.V. v. Camp Jaycee, 962 A.2d 453, 463 (N.J. 2008). "The Legislature has determined that the proper way to encourage charity in New Jersey and to guarantee continuance of the good works charities provide is to insure they will not have to expend their resources on litigation." Id. Thus, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has instructed that the statute be "liberally construed." Id. (quoting Monaghan v. Holy Trinity Church, 646 A.2d 1130, 1133 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994)).

In light of those policy considerations, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that charitable work includes providing "facilities for the social and recreational needs of organizations and individuals." Bieker v. Cmty. House of Moorestown, 777 A.2d 37, 43 (N.J. 2001). The Court recognized that principle in a case factually similar to this one: a young victim was injured when he fell off thefire escape of a nonprofit's gymnasium where his father was playing basketball. Id. at 40. The Supreme Court of New Jersey concluded that operating "a center of community life" serves "a recognized charitable purpose." Id. at 43. The Court also held that "[t]he child was plainly a recipient of [the organization's] 'benefactions,' even if only as a companion of his father and a spectator at his father's basketball game." Id. at 45.

In this case, the only question is whether Park was a beneficiary of the Church's charitable works at the time he was injured on the premises. In accordance with Bieker, we conclude that he was. If the spectator child in Bieker was a recipient of the defendant's benefactions, it follows that Park was even more directly a recipient by participating in a similar basketball game. See also Pomeroy v. Little League Baseball of Collingswood, 362 A.2d 39, 41 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) ("Clearly a spectator at a Little League baseball game is a beneficiary of defendant's works . . . ."); Anasiewicz v. Sacred Heart Church of New Brunswick, 181 A.2d 787, 790 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1962) (wedding guest is a beneficiary).

Park relies on several pre-Bieker cases where New Jersey's intermediate appellate court denied charitable immunity. See, e.g., Jerolamon v. Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 488 A.2d 1064 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); Book v. Aguth Achim Anchai of Freehold, 245 A.2d 51 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968). Thesecases are distinguishable because they involved for-profit activities, not benefactions. Jerolamon involved a social gathering at a university organized by a group that paid a fee to use certain property, 488 A.2d at 1066, and the plaintiff in Book paid an admission fee to attend a synagogue bingo game, 245 A.2d at 52. Likewise in Bieker, the Supreme Court of New Jersey noted that the defendant rented space to various groups and individuals. The Court remanded for further proceedings on the question of whether the "dominant motive [here] is charity or some other form of enterprise." 777 A.2d at 45 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Here, Park has not created a dispute of fact as to the Church's dominant motive. Park has not claimed that the Church rented the gymnasium, charged a fee to play recreational basketball, or otherwise had a profit motive in tension with its charitable purpose of providing a "center of community life." Id. at 43.

Park also argues that the Church is not immune because he was not invited onto the premises. However, Park has not identified any authority requiring him to be an invitee. If he were a "stranger" to the church, the Charitable Immunity Act might not apply. Cf. Brown v. St. Venantius Sch., 544 A.2d 842, 847 (N.J. 1988) (no immunity where charity failed to remove snow and ice from an abutting sidewalk, injuring a pedestrian); Mayer v. Fairlawn Jewish Ctr., 186 A.2d 274, 277 (N.J. 1962) (no immunity because the injured individual was on the religious organization's premises for the "fulfillment of his function and obligation as anemployee"). But Park is no stranger to the church. It is undisputed that his parents belonged to the congregation and Park played basketball in the gymnasium with his friends "at least once a week." PA0362. His use of the gymnasium was therefore in fulfillment of the church's recognized charitable purpose: providing for the "social and recreational needs" of the community. Bieker, 777 A.2d at 44.

We thus conclude that the Church is immune from Park's premises-liability claim pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-7.

B

Park's next claim is that his attackers conspired to interfere with his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Park argues that the District Court erred by granting summary judgment on the basis of the attackers' state of mind (i.e., the presence or absence of racial animus), which should have been a question reserved for the jury. But that is not what the District Court did. The District Court granted summary judgment "for a second, independent reason:" Park's failure to identify a "right guaranteed against private impairment." Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 274 (1993).

Section 1985(3) makes it unlawful for "two or more persons . . . [to] conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving . . . any person . . . of the equal protection of the laws, or the equal privileges and immunities under the laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The Supreme Court has held that the statute covers private conspiracies.Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101 (1971). But this Court has interpreted the statute to apply to private conspiracies in "rather limited circumstances" in order to avoid creating a "general federal tort law." Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 805 (3d Cir. 2001).

Because § 1985(3) "does not itself create any substantive rights," id., a private conspiracy claim must rely on the violation of a right "constitutionally protected against private interference," Bray, 506 U.S. at 274; cf. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983) ("[T]he right claimed to have been infringed has its source in the First Amendment. Because that Amendment restrains only official conduct, to make out their § 1985(3) case, it was necessary for respondents to prove that the state was somehow involved in or affected by the conspiracy."). Under those principles, the Supreme Court has recognized only two rights protected from private conspiracy under § 1985(3): "the right to be free from involuntary servitude and the right to interstate travel." Brown, 250 F.3d at 805.

In this case, Park has not alleged a violation of either. See id. at 806 ("The great weight of precedential authority . . . supports the traditional limitation of § 1985(3) to questions of interstate travel...