Joslin Mfg Co v. City of Providence Scituate Light Power Co v. Same Joslin v. Same
| Decision Date | 11 June 1923 |
| Docket Number | No. 221,No. 220,No. 219,219,220,221 |
| Parties | JOSLIN MFG. CO. v. CITY OF PROVIDENCE et al. SCITUATE LIGHT & POWER CO. v. SAME. JOSLIN v. SAME |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
[Syllabus from 668-669 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Robert H. McCarter, of Newark, N. J., and Francis I. McCanna and Alfred G. Chaffee, both of Providence, R. I., for plaintiffs in error.
Mr. Albert H. McCarter, for defendants in error.
These are suits in equity brought by the several plaintiffs in error in the superior court of Rhode Island, to enjoin the defendants in error from taking possession of or interfering with their property. The proceedings complained of, were taken under an act of the state Legislature, purporting to authorize the city of Providence to obtain a supply of pure water. Public Laws, chapter 1278, approved April 21, 1915. The water supply board, whose members are made parties defendant, is directed by the act to investigate and determine whether a part of the north branch of the Pawtuxet river and the tributary watershed would be the most available and desirable source of water supply for the city of Providence and for any territories now supplied or hereafter supplied, under the provisions of the act by means of the waterworks of said city. The board, if it approve the source, is to make a plan, location storage reservoirs and an aqueduct to carry water therefrom to the city waterworks. Section 3.
Thereupon the board is authorized to purchase for and in the name of the city such lands and interests and water rights as may be necessary, when the city council shall have made provision for the necessary funds. Section 4.
The city is authorized to acquire by condemnation any lands and interests included within a definitely limited area, which the city council shall deem necessary for the purposes stated in he act. Section 5.
The city if further authorized by condemnation to acquire the waters or any part thereof, included within the area, and any water or flowage rights or privileges appurtenant thereto. Section 6.
The owner of any mill upon land taken, may surrender the machinery therein to the city within six months after the taking, whereupon the city shall become liable to pay its fair value at the time of delivery as part of the damages for such taking; or such special damages as may be suffered as a result of a compulsory removal before the expiration of a reasonable time. If the machinery be not surrendered, the reasonable cost of removing it to a new location within the New England States and setting it up is to be paid by the city as part of t e damages. Section 12.
The city is also required to pay the fair market value of furniture and building equipment, contained in any building belonging to the town of Scituate, which may be surrendered (section 11); the cost of additional police protection in any town or city in consequence of carrying on construction work (section 14); damages for decrease in value of lands not taken but contiguous to lands which are taken section 15); and limited damages in certain cases for loss of employment due to the taking of the manufacturing establishment in which claimant is employed (section 17).
The owner of any business, on lands within certain localities, established prior to the passage of the act is given the right to recover for injury thereto. Section 16.
Certain municipalities and districts within the drainage areas described, when necessary are allowed to take and receive water from the city waterworks for domestic and municipal purposes upon payment therefor at fair wholesale rates or charges, which, in case of disagreement, are to be determined by arbitration. The city is also authorized, under specified limitations, to furnish water to any incorporated water company, for use in any territory included within the drainage areas where there is no public water supply. Section 18.
In case any lands purchased or condemned are not required for waterworks purposes, but are held to protect and preserve the waters from pollution, the city is authorized to lease them under specified restrictions. Section 21.
Whenever the city council shall resolve to condemn any property it is required to have filed, in the office of the clerk of the town or city where any of the lands lie, a statement giving a description of the property taken. Thereupon the title shall vest in the city in fee simple, except where a less estate is specified. The city is authorized to take possession, but not to do so without the consent of the owner, until after the expiration of a year from the date of filing such statement. Payment for the property taken is to be made forthwith if the city and the owner agree upon the price. If not, the owner is authorized within one year after notice of the taking, or, if not notified, within two years from the date of filing the statement, to have an assessment of damages by a jury, or at his option, by a commission, upon petition to the superior court. Upon the entry of judgment the owner may have execution issued against the city. Section 23.
Buildings or improvements on lands actually taken may be sold, disposed of or removed when necessary to prevent obstruction to the work. Section 25.
The city is given power to borrow all money necessary to secure such water supply, including lands, etc., either by purchase or condemnation and to issue bonds and notes therefor. Section 26.
The plaintiff in error in No. 219 has a number of cotton mills and other property interests within the area sought to be condemned, and is taxpayer in the city of Providence. The plaintiff in error in No. 220 has, within the same area, water powers and privileges, and numerous parcels of land, upon which are power plants, transmission lines, fixtures, and machinery, used in the business of generating and distributing electricity for light, heat, and power. Plaintiff in error in No. 221 has a residence and numerous buildings and improvements, together with water rights and privileges connected therewith, situated in the same area, and is a taxpayer in the city of Providence.
The water supply board, acting under this statute, prepared a description and plat of the lands proposed to be taken, which was submitted to the city council for action. The council adopted a resolution asserting a taking of lands and interests within the defined area, including property of the plaintiffs in error, the title so taken, so far as material here, being in fee simple.
Plaintiffs in error having challenged the constitutionality of the act the superior court certified he three cases to the state Supreme Court for a determination of the questions, in accordance with the provisions of the state statute. General Laws, c. 298, § 1. The Supreme Court decided that the statute was not in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, and thereupon the record, with its decision certified thereon, was sent back to the superior court for further proceedings. The last-named court dismissed the bills, and from its decree the case comes here on writ of error.
The legislation is assailed as contravening the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution.
First. It is contended that the statute imposes a burden upon the taxpayers of the city of Providence by authorizing an expenditure, which in part is for the benefit of other municipalities or of companies outside the city, that are either not required to contribute to such expenditure or whose contributions do not constitute just compensation. The basis of this complaint, in so far as it relates to other municipalities and districts is that they are giving the right to take water upon payment of fair wholesale rates therefor, and that these rates need bear no relation to the additional cost incident to the contingency of their coming in.
That the taxpayers of one municipality may not be taxed arbitrarily for the benefit of another may be assumed; but that is not the case here presented. The communities to be supplied are those within the drainage area of the waters authorized to be taken. These waters are under the primary control of the state and in allowing the city of Providence to appropriate them, it was entirely just and proper for the Legislature to safeguard the necessities of other communities who might be dependent thereon, and to that end to impose upon the city of Providence such reasonable conditions as might be necessary and appropriate. Municipalities are political subdivisions of the state, and are subject to the will of the Legislature (Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, 43 Sup. Ct. 534, 67 L. Ed. ——, May 7, 1923), and may be compelled not only to recognize their legal obligations but to discharge obligations of an equitable and moral nature as well (Guthrie National Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U. S. 528, 537, 19 Sup. Ct. 513, 43 L. Ed. 796). The requirement here in question is one well within the rule. Specifically, it is objected that the act does not require these other communities to bear a proportionate part of the cost of acquisition, construction and maintenance. The special facts which led the Legislature to direct payment at wholesale rates, instead of upon the basis of sharing in the cost of the enterprise, or of some other, we need not consider. It may have been, as suggested, that there were inherent difficulties in the way of making such an apportionment. But it is enough to say that the method selected is one within the scope of legislative discretion and not obnoxious to the federal Constitution. See County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 703-704, 26 L. Ed. 238; Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U. S. 304, 18 Sup. Ct. 617, 42 L. Ed. 1047; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 106, 24 L. Ed. 616. The Legislature is not precluded...
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