Joslin v. Mitchell
| Citation | 213 W.Va. 771,584 S.E.2d 913 |
| Decision Date | 03 July 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 31035.,31035. |
| Court | Supreme Court of West Virginia |
| Parties | Frances A. Horton JOSLIN, Administratrix of the Estate of Albert H. Horton, deceased, Plaintiff Below, Appellee, and Catherine Wilkinson, Administratrix of the Estate of Mary Horton, deceased, Intervening Plaintiff Below, Appellee, v. Thomas MITCHELL and Yurway Transportation Services, Inc., Defendants Below, Appellees, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Appellant. |
Lester C. Hess, Esq., Anthony I. Werner, Esq., Bachmann, Hess, Bachmann & Garden, PLLC, Wheeling, for Appellee Frances A. Horton Joslin.
Jeffrey A. Holmstrand, Esq., McDermott & Bonenberger, PLLC, Wheeling, for appellant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
James G. Bordas, Jr., Esq., Scott S. Blass, Esq., James B. Stoneking, Esq., Bordas & Bordas, PLLC, Wheeling, for Appellee Catherine Wilkinson. STARCHER, Chief Justice.
In this appeal from the Circuit Court of Ohio County, we are asked to review several orders where a circuit court allowed two insureds to aggregate or "stack" underinsured motorist coverage under five insurance policies, despite anti-stacking language in the policies. The circuit court also allowed the insureds to recover the "per accident" limits of coverage rather than the "per person" limits, after finding the policy language ambiguous.
After careful consideration of the briefs, the arguments of the parties, and all other matters of record, we reverse the circuit court's orders.
The instant case involves a dispute over underinsured motorist coverage between the appellees, the administrators of the estates of Albert and Mary Horton, and the appellant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm").
The underlying facts of the case are undisputed. On November 10, 1996, Albert and Mary Horton were sitting in their vehicle, stopped in traffic on an interstate highway. A fully loaded tractor-trailer driven by defendant-below Thomas Mitchell, and owned by defendant-below Yurway Transportation Services, Inc., plowed at high speed into the Hortons' vehicle, killing both Mr. and Mrs. Horton.
At the time of the accident, Albert was forty-four years old, and Mary was fifty-three, and both had been employed for many years at Wheeling Hospital. They had been married for thirteen years, and were survived by Mary's three children from a prior marriage (including appellee Catherine Wilkinson), and Albert's mother (appellee Frances A. Horton Joslin).
The appellees initiated the instant lawsuit against the defendants, Mr. Mitchell and Yurway Transportation, and subsequently settled the action for the limits of the defendants' insurance coverage. The appellees, contending that they had not been fully compensated for their losses, then sought underinsured motorist benefits from several policies issued by the appellant, State Farm. For purposes of this case, the appellees and State Farm have stipulated that the appellees losses are at least $1.3 million in excess of the amounts the appellees have already collected.
The parties agree that the Horton household had five different automobile insurance policies issued by State Farm covering five different vehicles. These policies were purchased at various times between 1986 and 1996. The policies also had different "named insureds:" three of the policies listed Albert Horton as the named insured; one policy was issued to Mary Horton and her son, John C. Wilkinson; and the last policy was issued solely to Mary's son, James Wilkinson, Jr. The parties agree that John and Mary Horton are "insureds" under these policies.1
Each of the five policies contained underinsured motorist coverage, with limits of $100,000.00 coverage for each person who was injured or died, up to $300,000.00 per accident. The appellees demanded that State Farm "stack" the policies, and thereby provide the "per person" limits of coverage for all five policies; in other words, the appellees asserted that they were entitled to $200,000.00 from each policy, for a total of$1 million in coverage. Furthermore, the appellees contended that the "per accident" limitation in the policy was ambiguous, and that they were therefore entitled to $300,000.00 from each policy, for a total of $1.5 million in available coverage.
State Farm, however, refused the appellees' demands. First, State Farm pointed to "anti-stacking" language in each policy. That language stated:
If any other underinsured motor vehicle coverage issued by us to you, your spouse, or any relative applies, the total limits of liability under all such policies shall not exceed that of the policy with the highest limit of liability.
Furthermore, State Farm stated, and the parties have stipulated for purposes of this appeal, that it gave a multi-car discount for underinsured motorist coverage on each of the five policies, a discount which State Farm argues that it gives whenever two or more private passenger vehicles used by persons residing in the same household are insured by State Farm.
In Russell v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 188 W.Va. 81, 422 S.E.2d 803 (1992), this Court concluded that anti-stacking language in an insurance policy is enforceable where the insurance company gives the policyholder a multi-car discount. We stated that when a "multi-car discount [is] given, it is obvious that the insured appellee bargained for only one policy and only one underinsurance motorist coverage endorsement." 188 W.Va. at 85, 422 S.E.2d at 807. On the basis of Russell and its progeny, State Farm asserted that the five policies could not be "stacked."
Furthermore, State Farm argued that the language regarding the policy limits was not ambiguous. Accordingly, in 1997 State Farm paid the appellees $100,000.00 for the claims of Mr. Horton, and $100,000.00 for the claims of Mrs. Horton.
State Farm filed a declaratory judgment action in the circuit court, and the appellees filed motions for summary judgment. In an order dated October 3, 2000, the circuit court concluded that the appellees could "stack" the available coverage under the five underinsured motorist policies at issue.
The circuit court examined a 1995 amendment to W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(b) which stated (with emphasis added):
Regardless of whether motor vehicle coverage is offered and provided to an insured through a multiple vehicle insurance policy or contract, or in separate single vehicle insurance policies or contracts, no insurer or insurance company providing a bargained for discount for multiple motor vehicles with respect to underinsured motor vehicle coverage shall be treated differently from any other insurer or insurance company utilizing a single insurance policy or contract for multiple covered vehicles for purposes of determining the total amount of coverage available to an insured.
The circuit court found this statutory language was designed to specify the circumstances where an insurer covering multiple vehicles with multiple policies—such as State Farm in this case—could preclude the stacking of coverage under those policies. The circuit court concluded that the statute required any multi-car discount to be "`bargained for' and not unilaterally imposed."
The circuit court found that State Farm never provided any of the named insureds on the five policies "the option to reject and/or waive the multi-vehicle discount in return for the availability of stacked underinsured motorist bodily injury coverage benefits from State Farm or from another insurance company." The circuit court therefore held that the "multi-vehicle discount was not `bargained for' by the deceased Plaintiffs" as required by W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(b), and that State Farm could not enforce the anti-stacking language in the five policies.
After additional briefing by the parties, on April 4, 2002, the circuit court entered an order finding the policy language concerning the "each person" and "each accident" limits of the five policies to be ambiguous. The court construed the ambiguity against State Farm and ruled, in essence, that the appellees were entitled to recover the $300,000.00 "each accident" limits rather than the $100,000.00 "each person" limits. The circuit court then entered a "judgment order" on May 13, 2002, ordering State Farm to pay to the appellees the agreed-upon amount of damages, $1.3 million.
State Farm now appeals the circuit court's orders.
This Court reviews a circuit court's entry of a declaratory judgment de novo, because the principal purpose of a declaratory judgment action is to resolve legal questions. Syllabus Point 3, Cox v. Amick, 195 W.Va. 608, 466 S.E.2d 459 (1995). When a declaratory judgment proceeding involves the determination of an issue of fact, that issue may be tried and determined by a judge or a jury, just as issues of fact are tried and determined in other civil actions. W.Va.Code, 55-13-9 [1941].2 See also, Syllabus Point 16, Mountain Lodge Ass'n v. Crum & Forster Indem. Co., 210 W.Va. 536, 558 S.E.2d 336 (2001) (). Any determinations of fact made by the circuit court or jury in reaching its ultimate judgment are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Cox, 195 W.Va. at 612, 466 S.E.2d at 463.
In this case we are asked to review the circuit court's interpretation of an insurance contract. In Syllabus Point 2 of Riffe v. Home Finders Associates, Inc., 205 W.Va. 216, 517 S.E.2d 313 (1999), we stated that "[t]he interpretation of an insurance contract, including the question of whether the contract is ambiguous, is a legal determination that,...
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