Joubert-Vazquez v. Alvarez-Rubio

Decision Date24 October 2011
Docket NumberCivil No. 11–1194 (SEC).
Citation820 F.Supp.2d 289
PartiesAdela JOUBERT–VAZQUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Zoime ALVAREZ–RUBIO, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Jorge Martinez–Luciano, M.L. & R.E. Law Firm, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Angel E. Rotger–Sabat, Ivonne Cruz–Serrano, Maymi, Rivera & Rotger, PSC, Jorge L. Capo–Matos, O'Neill & Borges, Yadhira M. Rodriguez–Quinones, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION and ORDER

SALVADOR E. CASELLAS, Senior District Judge.

Before the Court are defendants' motion to dismiss (Docket # 58), and plaintiffs' opposition thereto (Dockets # 19 and 60). For the reasons discussed below, defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Factual and Procedural Background 1

According to the complaint, plaintiffs (Plaintiffs) are employees of the Puerto Rico State Insurance Fund Corporation (“SIFC”) who were demoted from career managerial positions. Docket # 51. Plaintiffs were appointed to these positions between 2003 and 2008 pursuant to an internal job announcement procedure (so-called closed job announcements) whereby only SIFC employees qualified to compete for the vacancies. Id. Prior to their internal appointments, Plaintiffs had held career positions at the SIFC—some managerial, some not. Id.

Defendants are the SIFC itself; the SIFC Administrator, Zoimé Alvarez–Rubio (Alvarez); and the SIFC Director of Human Resources, Saúl Rivera–Rivera, (“Rivera”) (collectively Defendants). Id. Shortly after taking office, Alvarez ordered an audit of the appointments made at the SIFC between January 2001 and December 2008. Id. Allegedly, she commissioned some of her most trusted lieutenants to gather information about the political affiliations of SIFC managerial employees appointed during the previous Popular Democratic Party Administrations (“PDP”). Id. Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that the period from 2001 to 2008 was chosen for the audit to spare employees appointed by New Progressive Party (“NPP”) Administrations. Id. Plaintiffs also aver that the goal of this scheme, shared by Alvarez and Rivera, was to replace employees loyal to the PDP with employees loyal to the NPP and Governor Luis Fortuño. Id.

To that end, Plaintiffs were served with “letters of intent to demote,” stating that their appointments were legal nullities, because the vacancies had not been publicly announced, as purportedly required under SIFC regulations and state law. Id. The letters also informed Plaintiffs that they had the right to request pretermination hearings and explained to them the process that would follow if such hearings were requested. Docket # 20–1, p. 6. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs contend that the hearings were a sham and served merely to rubber-stamp Alvarez's decision to demote them. Id. In fact, despite the hearings, Plaintiffs were demoted to their previous positions. Docket # 51.

Plaintiffs appealed the demotions to the SIFC Board of Appeals (the “Board”). Docket # 20–1. But while the appeals were pending, they filed the instant case, seeking damages, attorney's fees, and injunctive relief “in the form of reinstatement to their former managerial career positions” and an order “for defendants to certify to the retirement system the correct information as per the actual salaries and contributions made ... during the time that [Plaintiffs] held the annulled appointments and up to the date of their reinstatement.” Docket # 51, ¶¶ 3.44–.45, respectively. Their claims are predicated on the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution as well as on the Constitution and laws of Puerto Rico.

Three months into the case, Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Docket # 58. Id. Plaintiffs timely opposed each of Defendants' contentions. Dockets # 19 and 60.

Standard of Review

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs' “well-pleaded facts must possess enough heft to show that [they are] entitled to relief.” Clark v. Boscher, 514 F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir.2008).2 In evaluating whether Plaintiffs are entitled to relief, the court must accept as true all “well-pleaded facts [and indulge] all reasonable inferences” in plaintiff's favor. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The First Circuit has held that “dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate if the complaint fails to set forth factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory.” Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir.2008). Courts “may augment the facts in the complaint by reference to documents annexed to the complaint or fairly incorporated into it, and matters susceptible to judicial notice.” Id. at 305–306. Nevertheless, in judging the sufficiency of a complaint, courts must “differentiate between well-pleaded facts, on the one hand, and ‘bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocution, and the like,’ on the other hand; the former must be credited, but the latter can safely be ignored.” LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins., 142 F.3d 507, 508 (1st Cir.1998) ( quoting Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996)); Buck v. American Airlines, Inc., 476 F.3d 29, 33 (1st Cir.2007); see also Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir.1999). Thus, Plaintiffs must rely on more than unsupported conclusions or interpretations of law, as these will be rejected. Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir.1997) (citing Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir.1988)).

Moreover, “even under the liberal pleading standards of Fed R. Civ. P. 8, the Supreme Court has recently held that to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege ‘a plausible entitlement to relief.’ Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955, cited in Rodríguez–Ortíz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92 (1st Cir.2007). Although complaints do not need detailed factual allegations, the plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), the Supreme Court reaffirmed Twombly and clarified that two underlying principles must guide a court's assessment of the adequacy of pleadings when evaluating whether a complaint can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949–50. First, the court must identify any conclusory allegations in the complaint as such allegations are not entitled to an assumption of truth. Id. at 1949. Specifically, the court is not obligated to accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations in the complaint. Moreover, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955); see also Peñalbert–Rosa v. Fortuño–Burset, 631 F.3d 592, 595 (1st Cir.2011) ([S]ome allegations, while not stating ultimate legal conclusions, are nevertheless so threadbare or speculative that they fail to cross the line between the conclusory to the factual.”). In other words, [a] plaintiff is not entitled to ‘proceed perforce’ by virtue of allegations that merely parrot the elements of the cause of action.” Ocasio–Hernandez v. Fortuño–Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2011).

Second, a complaint survives only if it states a plausible claim for relief. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Thus, any nonconclusory factual allegations in the complaint, accepted as true, must be sufficient to give the claim facial plausibility. Id. A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded facts allow the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the specific misconduct alleged. Id. at 1949, 1952. Such inferences must amount to more than a sheer possibility and be as plausible as any obvious alternative explanation. Id. at 1949, 1951. Plausibility is a context-specific determination that requires the court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 1950.

In sum, a plaintiff's obligation to “provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle [ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). [F]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all allegations in the complaint are true.” Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 95 (1st Cir.2008).

Applicable Law and Analysis

Plaintiffs' claims under the U.S. Constitution are premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). To withstand dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1983, a complaint must allege (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that such conduct deprived the plaintiff of his rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Gutierrez–Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 559 (1st Cir.1989). The second prong of the inquiry is in turn two-folded: (1) there must be an actual deprivation of a federally protected right, and (2) the conduct complained of must have been causally connected to the deprivation. Id.

In this case, Plaintiffs' complaint easily satisfies the first prong of the foregoing requirements. Their complaint alleges that co-defendants Alvarez and Rivera, acting as SIFC officials, devised and carried out the actions giving rise to this suit. Likewise, these...

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