Jouras v. Allen

• Decision Date: 22 March 1915
• Docket Number: 4236.
• Citation: 222 F. 756
• Parties: JOURAS v. ALLEN, Immigration Inspector.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

222 F. 756

JOURAS v. ALLEN, Immigration Inspector.

No. 4236.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

March 22, 1915

Charles M. Blackmar, of Kansas City, Mo. (Henry A. Bundschu, of Kansas City, Mo., on the brief), for appellant.

Sam O Hargus, Asst. U.S. Atty., of Kansas City, Mo. (Francis M Wilson, U.S. Atty., of Kansas City, Mo., on the brief), for appellee.

Before SANBORN, ADAMS, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

SANBORN Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from an order denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to release Gust Jouras, a resident alien, from confinement under an order of deportation upon the charge that he had been found receiving, sharing, and deriving benefit from the earnings of a prostitute or prostitutes. The Acts of Congress, the principles of jurisprudence, and the rules of law and practice applicable to this case may be found in the opinion in Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 F 745, . . . C.C.A. . . ., filed herewith, and reference is made to that opinion for them.

Gust Jouras is a Greek. He entered the United States in accordance with its laws in 1903, when he was about 16 years of age, and has resided in it ever since. For 5 years prior to his arrest by the inspector he lived in Kansas City. He was, and long had been, engaged in operating restaurants and lunch wagons in that city, and at the time of his arrest he and his two partners were the owners of two restaurants worth $1,500 which they were operating. The record convinces that he was a quiet, peaceable business boy. There is no evidence that he was violent, passionate, or dangerous, or that he ever concealed, or intended to conceal, his whereabouts, or to flee or clandestinely escape from any charge or arrest. Prior to January 5, 1914, the inspector took the ex parte statements of Mrs. Brown and other prostitutes in reference to the charge subsequently made against Jouras, and on that day made a telegraphic application for a telegraphic warrant of arrest.

'Arrow Gust Jouras receiptor relay thirty.

W. B. Wilson, Secy.

'4:05 P.M.'

The meaning of this statement is said by the inspector to be:

'Arrest following named alien (Gust Jouras) and bring before yourself for hearing, forwarding record of proceedings to the department; alien found receiving, sharing in and deriving benefit from the earnings of a prostitute or prostitutes. Authority granted for release under bond in the sum of three thousand dollars.'

Rule 22b of the Department of Labor requires that during the hearing the alien shall be allowed to inspect the warrant. The purposes of that portion of that rule are to inform the accused of the genuineness of the signature to the warrant and of the charges against him. But such a telegraphic warrant in a code of which the alien is ignorant accomplishes neither of these objects. The signature to it is not the genuine signature of the Secretary, or any officer, and the telegram gives the accused no information. Hence rule 22, subdivision 2, requires that 'Telegraphic application may be resorted to only in case of necessity. ' There was neither necessity nor reason for a telegraphic application in this case. But the inspector having made a telegraphic application and procured the telegraphic warrant, at about 4 p.m. on Saturday, January 5, 1914, went to Jouras' restaurant, seized him, and caused him to be thrown into and kept in solitary confinement in a dark cell at police headquarters 'for investigation' during Saturday night, Sunday, Sunday night, and until Monday at 11 a.m., when he took him to his room, handcuffed him, and with a weapon at his command, gave him a hearing there without counsel or friend, which consisted of questioning him in an exceedingly threatening manner, and writing down what he succeeded in extracting from him. This course of action was arbitrary, contrary to the rule regarding telegraphic applications, a clear abuse of the discretion of the inspector, and a hearing thus conducted is unfair and contrary to the fundamental principles which inhere in due process of law. United States v. Ruiz, 203 F. 441, 443, 121 C.C.A. 551.

Before the arrest of Jouras the inspector examined Mrs. Brown, and in answer to her question whether or not she would have to come back at the hearing of Jouras, he replied: 'No, I have your statement. I don't need you any more. ' Mrs. Brown testified that he also said:

'Of course, if you want to take chances on coming here on cross-examination and you make one mistake in your statement, that for you (witness snapping her finger)-- over the road; and you know what that means. Furthermore, those lawyers that the Greeks have have no business to serve a subpoena on you-- have no right whatever, and if they serve it, you take it and bring it to me.'

She testified that she understood that 'over the road for you' meant 'you to the...