Jourdain v. Port Auth. of N.Y.
| Decision Date | 15 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | 19-cv-1168 (ARR) (JO) |
| Parties | Sodna Jourdain, Plaintiff, v. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Department ("PAPD"), PAPD Officer Frank Annunziata, PAPD Officer Donger Mei, and PAPD Sergeant Sean Spollen, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Not for print or electronic publication
The plaintiff, Sodna Jourdain, brings this action against defendants The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Department ("PAPD"), PAPD Officer Frank Annunziata, PAPD Officer Donger Mei, and PAPD Sergeant Sean Spollen, alleging various claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York state law. The defendants move for summary judgment, and the plaintiff opposes. For the reasons set forth below, the defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part. To the extent that the motion is denied, it is denied with leave to renew, as set forth in more detail below.
Plaintiff Sodna Jourdain works for Allied Universal Security Services ("Allied") as an Airport Security Agent at John F. Kennedy airport ("JFK"). Defs.' Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 8, ECF No. 34-1 ( ); Pl.'s Rule 56.1 Counterstatement ¶ 8, ECF No. 34-16 ("Pl.'s 56.1"). On September 17, 2018, during the 9:00 AM hour, Jourdain was working at JFK's "Guard Post V." Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 9, 11; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 9, 11. PAPD Officer Frank Annunziata approached Guard Post V in an unmarked PAPD vehicle. Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 5, 12; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 5, 12. He swiped his employee identification card (his "SIDA" card) and entered his security code. Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 13; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 13. Nonetheless, Jourdain would not lower the barrier at her post to allow Annunziata to drive into the area she was guarding. Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 15; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 15. She told Annunziata that she did not lower the barrier because his vehicle did not have a Port Authority license plate. Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 16; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 16. According to Jourdain, she had learned during her training that she was not supposed to grant access to vehicles that did not have Port Authority license plates and that she had to contact her supervisor if a person driving a vehicle without such a license plate sought access. See Jourdain Dep. Ex. F at 54:13-55:23, ECF No. 34-8.
PAPD Sergeant Sean Spollen then drove up to Guard Post V in his marked police vehicle, which had a Port Authority license plate. Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 7, 17-18; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 7, 17-18. When Annunziata informed Spollen that Jourdain would not lower the barrier for him, Spollen told Jourdain that he would escort Annunziata through the guard post. Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 19; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 19. According to the defendants, Jourdain refused to allow Spollen to escort Annunziata through the guard post. Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 20. According to Jourdain, she explained to Spollen that he could escort Annunziata through the guard post if Spollen turned on his vehicle's flashing lights and moved his vehicle so that he was driving in front of Annunziata; alternatively, Annunziata and Spollen could have waited for her to receive instructions from her supervisor. See Jourdain Dep. 90:25-91:20. Annunziata testified that it would have been compliant with Port Authority rules for Spollen to escort him by driving behind him. Annunziata Dep. Ex. E at 53:8-54:4, ECF No. 34-7.
Annunziata and Spollen decided to issue Jourdain a Breach of Rules ("BOR") for declining to lower the barrier for them. See Annunziata Dep. 54:5-11; Spollen Dep. Ex. H at 106:18-107:2, ECF No. 34-10. According to Christopher Kaddo, an Assistant Manager of JFK's Airport Operations Center, "[a] BOR is issued to airport workers who violate standard procedures andcommit serious infractions of JFK rules and regulations[.]" Kaddo Aff. Ex. I ¶ 4, ECF No. 34-11. Annunziata testified that he and Spollen asked to see Jourdain's identification card. Annunziata Dep. 60:15-61:18. Annunziata testified that Spollen took Jourdain's identification card from her, "and she grabbed his arm, and they got into a tug of war . . . over the [identification] card[.]" Id. 41:5-7, 44:10-13, 44:24-45:8. Spollen testified that he took Jourdain's identification card from her hand, and she grabbed his wrist and pulled the card back out of his hand. Spollen Dep. 120:12-20. Jourdain placed the card in a carrier around her neck, and Spollen then pulled it out of that carrier. Id. 120:22-121:5. Jourdain testified that she was calmly explaining that she was simply following protocol when Spollen "forcefully" tried to take her identification card from the carrier around her neck. Jourdain Dep. 106:18-107:24, 110:14-111:17. She acknowledged that Spollen first asked her to hand him the identification card and that in response she said that she did not want to get fired and begged him to be patient while she called her supervisor. Id. 107:25-108:10.
PAPD Officer Donger Mei then drove up to the guard post in a marked police car. Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 6, 24; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 6, 24. Spollen directed him to handcuff Jourdain. Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 24; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 24. Mei's deposition testimony indicates that he did, in fact, handcuff Jourdain. See Mei Dep. Ex. G at 76:7-13, ECF No. 34-9. Annunziata then issued Jourdain two BORs, with the stated bases for those BORs being that Jourdain failed to comply with the PAPD and failed to hand over her identification card. Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 25; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 25. The individual defendants removed Jourdain's handcuffs and handed her the BORs, and she gathered her belongings and left her post. Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 26; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 26.
Jourdain filed suit in Kings County Supreme Court. See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. The Port Authority removed the action to this court. See id. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Jourdain claimed that the individual defendants violated her due process, equal protection, and FirstAmendment rights, her right not to have cruel and unusual punishment inflicted on her, her right to a fair trial, and her right to be free from malicious criminal prosecution; she also claimed that the individual defendants falsely arrested her and subjected her to an "illegal search." Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22, 32, 33, 37, 46-48, 58, ECF No. 10. The amended complaint can also be read to raise a § 1983 claim for excessive force. See id. ¶¶ 22, 33, 37. In addition, the amended complaint can be read to assert state law claims for false arrest, assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. See id. ¶¶ 22, 33, 50. The amended complaint also raises claims against the Port Authority and the PAPD on a Monell theory, a negligent hiring, retention, and supervision theory, and a respondeat superior theory. See id. ¶¶ 49-62. The amended complaint indicates that Jourdain seeks punitive damages. See id. ¶ 62.
The defendants moved for summary judgment on the claims against the Port Authority; the due process, equal protection, First Amendment, malicious prosecution, and right to a fair trial claims; the § 1983 false arrest claim; and any duplicative causes of action raised in the amended complaint. See Defs.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 5-21, ECF No. 34-15 (" ").1 They also moved for summary judgment on the infliction of emotional distress claims. See id. at 17-18. In addition, they assert that Jourdain cannot seek punitive damages against the Port Authority. See id. at 21-23. Finally, they ask that I dismiss the Amended Complaint as against the PAPD. See id. at 6 n.1.
In response, Jourdain withdrew her claims for Monell liability; negligent hiring, retention, or supervision; violation of her due process and equal protection rights; malicious prosecution;denial of her right to a fair trial; and punitive damages as against the Port Authority. Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Opp. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. 4 n.1, ECF No. 34-19 ("Pl.'s Br."). Thus, those claims are dismissed.
The defendants have not moved for summary judgment on the state-law false arrest, assault, or battery claims, or on these claims on a respondeat superior theory against the Port Authority. They also have not moved for summary judgment on the excessive force claim. Thus, those claims survive.
I must address the following remaining claims: First Amendment retaliation pursuant to § 1983 against the individual defendants, false arrest pursuant to § 1983 against the individual defendants, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, cruel and unusual punishment, and illegal search. I must also address the propriety of maintaining this action against the PAPD as a defendant. As explained below, I deny summary judgment on the § 1983 First Amendment and false arrest claims as against the individual defendants. I grant summary judgment on the intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. I do not read the amended complaint as raising viable claims for cruel and unusual punishment or illegal search; to the extent that Jourdain intends to assert a claim for cruel and unusual punishment, it is dismissed. I dismiss all claims as against the PAPD, which is not a properly suable entity.
In addressing which claims survive and which do not, I will resolve the defendants' argument regarding duplicative causes of action.
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The function of the court is not to resolve disputed issues but rather to determinewhether there is a genuine issue to be tried. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). "While genuineness runs to whether disputed factual issues can 'reasonably be resolved in favor of either party,' . . . materiality runs to whether the dispute matters, i.e., whether it concerns facts that...
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