Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Flakt, Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 March 1993
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 89-533-JJF.
• Citation: 820 F. Supp. 802
• Parties: JOY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Plaintiff, and A/S Niro Atomizer, Involuntary Plaintiff, v. FLAKT, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

820 F. Supp. 802

JOY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Plaintiff, and A/S Niro Atomizer, Involuntary Plaintiff, v. FLAKT, INC., Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 89-533-JJF.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

March 31, 1993.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Collins J. Seitz, Jr., of Connolly Bove Lodge & Hutz, Wilmington, DE, Robert A. Schroeder, Edward G. Poplawski, and Joseph T. Jakubek, of Pretty Schroeder Brueggemann & Clark, Los Angeles, CA, for plaintiff.

Allen M. Terrell, Jr., and Frederick L. Cottrell, III, of Richards Layton & Finger, Wilmington, DE, Paul Lempel, and Lynne Darcy, of Kenyon & Kenyon, New York City, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FARNAN, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Flakt, Inc.'s ("Flakt") Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b) and, in the alternative, Flakt's Motion for a New Trial pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. Flakt contends that the jury verdict in this patent infringement action cannot be justified based on the evidence adduced at trial and, therefore, Flakt argues it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.

I. BACKGROUND

Joy Technologies, Inc. ("Joy") filed this action against Flakt in 1989 alleging that Flakt was infringing U.S. Patent No. 4,279,873 (the "'873 patent"). The case was tried to a jury and on January 24, 1992 the jury returned a verdict in favor of Joy on all issues. Further, the jury responded favorably for Joy to all written interrogatories submitted to them. In so doing, the jury found that Flakt's dry flue gas desulfurization (FGD) processes carried out in plants built by Flakt infringed the '873 patent, which covers a process for removing sulfur dioxide from the flue gas that results from the combustion of sulfur-containing fuel such as coal. The jury also found that Flakt induced and contributed to the infringement of the '873 patent.

For the reasons stated below, Flakt's Motion for a Judgment as a Matter of Law will be denied, as will its Motion for a New Trial.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

The applicable legal standards for the two post trial motions are as provided below.

A. Judgment as a Matter of Law

Recently, in Walter v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 985 F.2d 1232, 1237 (3d Cir.1993) the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit set out the following standard to be used in determining if a judgment as a matter of law should be granted:

Such a motion should be granted only if, "viewing all the evidence which has been tendered and should have been admitted in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, no jury could decide in that party's favor." Indian Coffee Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 752 F.2d 891, 894 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 863, 106 S.Ct. 180, 88 L.Ed.2d 150 (1985).

Although judgment as a matter of law should be granted sparingly, "federal courts do not follow the rule that a scintilla of evidence is enough. The question is not whether there is literally no evidence supporting the party against whom the motion is directed but whether there is evidence upon which the jury could properly find a verdict for that party." Patzig v. O'Neil, 577 F.2d 841, 846 (3d Cir.1978) (citation omitted) (quotation omitted).

Id.

Further, in Williamson v. Consolidated Rail, 926 F.2d 1344 (3d Cir.1991) the following guidance was provided:

we examine the record to determine whether the evidence presented was sufficient to permit the jury to find ... for the plaintiff ... When reviewing the jury's finding for the plaintiff on a factual issue, we give him, as the verdict winner, the benefit of all logical inferences that could be drawn from the evidence presented, resolve all conflicts in the evidence in his favor and, in general, view the record in the light most favorable to him. (citations omitted).

Id. at 1347.

Therefore, the Court is required to determine if the verdict, when all evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Joy, is supported by substantial evidence. Schering Corp. v. Precision-Cosmet Co., Inc., 614 F.Supp. 1368, 1371 (D.Del.1985); Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1571 (Fed.Cir.1986) citing Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Fork Co., 758 F.2d 613, 619 (Fed.Cir.) cert. dismissed 474 U.S. 976, 106 S.Ct. 340, 88 L.Ed.2d 326 (1985). "Substantial evidence" has been defined as relevant evidence from the record which, when reviewed as a whole, would reasonably support the jury's finding under review. Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 827, 108 S.Ct. 95, 98 L.Ed.2d 56 (1987) Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 893 (Fed.Cir.) cert. denied 469 U.S. 857, 105 S.Ct. 187, 83 L.Ed.2d 120 (1984). Further, substantial evidence does not refer to the amount of evidence proffered but rather to the substance or nature of the evidence and whether that evidence would reasonably support the jury's verdict. Id. Finally, the court is not in a position on a post trial motion to weigh evidence, pass on credibility issues or substitute its judgment for that of the jury, rather the task is merely to determine if the evidence reasonably supports the verdict. Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equipment Co., 816 F.2d 110, 113 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853, 108 S.Ct. 156, 98 L.Ed.2d 111 (1987).

B. Motion for a New Trial Pursuant to Rule 59

The decision to grant a new trial is in the discretion of the Court, Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36, 101 S.Ct. 188, 190, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980); Gumbs v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc., 823 F.2d 768, 771 (3d Cir.1987). A jury verdict is not to be set aside merely on the basis of the Court substituting its judgment for that of the jury. Belardinelli v. Carroll, 773 F.Supp. 657, 659 (D.Del.1991) citing, Carpenter v. Koehring Co., 391 F.Supp. 206 (E.D.Pa.1975), aff'd, 527 F.2d 644 (3d Cir.1976). Rather, the verdict must be permitted to stand if it is supported by evidence so long as nothing suggests that the decision was guided by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption. Id. Only if the verdict is so unreasonable as to offend the conscience of the Court should the Court disturb the verdict. Motter v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 883 F.2d 1223, 1230 (3d Cir. 1989). As previously stated by a court in this district:

The trial judge, exercising a mature judicial discretion, should view the verdict in the overall setting of the trial; consider the character of the evidence and the complexity or simplicity of the legal principles which the jury was bound to apply to the facts, and abstain from interfering with the verdict unless it is quite clear that the jury reached a seriously erroneous result. The judge's duty is essentially to see that there is no miscarriage of justice. If convinced that there has been then it is his duty to set the verdict aside; otherwise not. quoting Lind v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 89 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 81 S.Ct. 58, 5 L.Ed.2d 60 (1960) (quoting, 6 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, (2d ed.) p. 3819).

Rose Hall, Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Overseas Banking Corp., 576 F.Supp. 107, 124 (D.Del.1983), aff'd, Appeal of Chase Manhattan Overseas Banking Corp., 740 F.2d 956 (3d Cir.1984); Appeal of Holiday Inns, Inc., 740 F.2d 957 (3d Cir.1984), and Appeal of Rose Hall Ltd., 740 F.2d 958 (3d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159, 105 S.Ct. 909, 83 L.Ed.2d 923 (1985).

More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in EEOC v. State of Del. Dept. of Health and Social Services, 865 F.2d 1408, 1413 (3d Cir.1989) stated that for the motion to be properly granted it

"must ensure that the trial court has not simply substituted its judgment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses for those of the jury; in other words, the new trial must be necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice" (quoting Shanno v. Magee Indus. Enterprises, Inc., 856 F.2d 562, 567 (3d Cir.1988) (citations omitted)).

Thus, only if a new trial is required to assure that justice is served should a court grant a motion for a new trial. Otherwise, a verdict must stand.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED

As a general supposition, Flakt asserts that they are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because the record reflects a legally insufficient basis from which a reasonable jury could have concluded that Flakt was infringing the '873 patent or that the patent was valid. With respect to a new trial, Flakt argues manifest injustice has resulted because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. On its behalf, Joy contends that the record is sufficient for the verdict to be upheld against all the grounds asserted by Flakt. The Court will separately review each ground asserted by Flakt and Joy's response.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Infringement: Literal and Doctrine of Equivalents

Flakt claims that the jury's verdict of infringement under either literal infringement or the doctrine of equivalents must be set aside and judgment entered in Flakt's favor with respect to both claim 1 and claim 2 of the '873 patent. According to Flakt:

In finding that certain Flakt dry FGD processes infringe claims 1 and 2 of the '873 patent, the jury either misinterpreted those claims with respect to the crucial temperature control limitations, or misunderstood the undisputed evidence of how the Flakt processes work.

(Docket Item 362, p. 9).

With respect to claim 1, Flakt argues that where there is no dispute as to facts, the Court must construe the claims to insure that the law is correctly applied. According to Flakt, there was no factual dispute to be resolved by the jury in this case and the undisputed evidence at trial provided the only possible interpretation of the claim. Further, according to Flakt, even if Joy's interpretation of the claims is credited, Flakt's process cannot be found to infringe.

Joy agrees that the construction of a patent claim is a question of law, but argues that the decision of whether the...