Joyce v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 02 April 1945
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 42723.
• Citation: 60 N.E.2d 431,325 Ill.App. 543
• Parties: JOYCE v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF CHICAGO.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

325 Ill.App. 543

60 N.E.2d 431

JOYCE

v.BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF CHICAGO.

Gen. No. 42723.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Second Division.

April 2, 1945.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; John Prystalski, Judge.

Certiorari proceeding by Rose K. Joyce to review an order of the Board of Education of the City of Chicago, a body politic and corporate, removing the plaintiff as a teacher in the public schools upon charges filed against her by the Superintendent of Schools. From an order of the circuit court dismissing the complaint, the plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.Maximilian J. St. George, of Chicago, for appellant.

Richard S. Folsom, of Chicago (Frank S. Righeimer and Frank R. Schneberger, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

FRIEND, Justice.

Mrs. Rose K. Joyce appeals from an order of the Circuit Court dismissing her complaint of August 14, 1942, wherein she sought a writ of certiorari to review an order of the Board of Education of Chicago removing her as a teacher in the public schools of this city upon charges filed against her by the superintendent of schools.

Plaintiff had taught history at the Hyde Park High School since 1933. February 28, 1942, the superintendent of schools suspended her on charges of conduct unbecoming a school teacher in the Chicago public schools. On that same date he reported his action to the board, and requested that the matter be referred to the general committee of the board to hear evidence and report its findings and conclusions to the board. March 4, 1942, his report and recommendations were adopted, and March 20, 1942, the secretary of the board notified plaintiff that charges had been preferred against her by the superintendent of schools, that the board at its meeting on March 4 had designated and empowered the general committee to act as a trial committee, and that hearing on the charges would take place April 22 at the board rooms. After two continuances, the trial began on May 14 and was concluded May 22. Plaintiff was present with counsel throughout the entire hearing and actively participated in the trial. The matter was then taken under advisement by the committee, and its written report was presented to the board on June 25, setting forth each step of the proceeding, making specific findings of fact, and containing a recommendation to the board that the superintendent's charges be sustained, that the findings and conclusions of the committee be approved, and that plaintiff be dismissed. The report was signed by the chairman and seven other members of the general committee. Subsequently, by a vote of nine yeas and no nays, the report of the committee was adopted by the board and plaintiff was dismissed as a teacher.

The charges lodged against plaintiff by the superintendent were twofold: (1) ‘that she made un-American statements in her classroom derogatory to the United States Government’; and (2) ‘that she wrote a letter to a former student of hers who failed to register in accordance with the Selective Service Proclamation of the President of the United States, congratulating him on his ‘courageous and idealistic stand.”

In its report the general committee set forth the charges preferred against plaintiff, found that due notice of the hearing, together with a copy of the charges, had been served on her April 1, 1942, more than 30 days prior to the hearing, that she appeared in person at the trial, together with counsel, and through the examination of witnesses and otherwise participated in the hearing and presented evidence in her own defense, that the charges and each of the specifications were proven at the hearing and were true, and that she was guilty of conduct unbecoming a teacher in the Chicago public schools (1) in ‘that she wrote a letter to a former student on February 17, 1942, the day following the former student's failure and refusal to register in accordance with the Selective Service Proclamation of the President of the United States and the provisions of the Selective Service Act, congratulating him on his ‘courageous and idealistic stand,’ wishing him success, and stating that ‘you and others who take the same stand are the hope of America,’ notwithstanding the fact that she knew that all made persons between the ages of 20-45 who had not previously registered were required under the law to register,' and (2) in ‘that she made un-American statements in her classroom derogatory to the United States Government; that she had stated in her classroom, among other things, the following: that the United States had the attack on Pearl Harbor coming to it; that Japan had every right to declare war on the United States; that the United States was wrong in limiting immigration of the Japanese; that the Japanese should be permitted to become American citizens; that the United States was wrong in declaring war on Japan; that the Government was wrong in its attitude toward Japan; that the Government was wrong in its attitude toward war; that Hitler was attempting to establish a democracy in Europe and that the United States and Great Britain were trying to prevent it; that the United States was always trying to put something over on other countries; that Stephen Decatur's toast-‘My country! in her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be right; but my country right or wrong,’ is wrong and dangerous and that the students should not believe in it or follow it.'

The authorities in this state are generally to the effect that the scope of review by the court on certiorari is whether the tribunal hearing charges has jurisdiction to act, whether there was cause for removal, and whether the tribunal proceeded in accordance with the essential requirements of the statute. People ex rel. Maloney v. Lindblom, 182 Ill. 241, 55 N.E. 358;Joyce v. City of Chicago, 216 Ill. 466, 75 N.E. 184;Funkhouser v. Coffin, 301 Ill. 257, 133 N.E. 649;McKeown v. Moore, 303 Ill. 448, 135 N.E. 747. The trial court in its examination of the record in this cause found that the board had jurisdiction, that its findings, based on the evidence, showed cause for removal, and that the board proceeded legally and in accordance with the essential requirements of the statute for the removal of teachers on charges preferred against them.

Although plaintiff urges nine separate grounds for reversal, the principal questions presented and stressed on oral argument were: (1) whether the statutory requirements for removal of a teacher were sufficiently followed and complied with; and (2) whether the findings of the general committee, that she was guilty of conduct unbecoming a teacher, were supported by the evidence and justified her dismissal for cause.

Section 161, paragraph 186, of chapter 122, Ill.Rev.Stat.1943, provides that no teacher or principal who has been appointed by the Board of Education, after serving the probationary period of three years, shall ‘be removed except for cause, and then only by a vote of not less than a majority of all members of the board, upon written charges presented by the superintendent of schools, to be heard by the board, or a duly authorized committee of the same, after thirty days' notice, with copy of the charges, is served upon the person against whom they are preferred, who shall have the privilege of being present, together with counsel, offering evidence and making defense thereto.’ The Board of Education consists of eleven members, nine of whom constituted the general committee to whom the hearing was committed. Plaintiff's counsel argues that since only four of the nine heard all the evidence, the finding and recommendation of the trial committee was invalid. Since the general jurisdictional requirements, provided by statute, were complied...