Joyce v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.

• Decision Date: 22 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. 1098,D,CURTISS-WRIGHT,1098
• Citation: 171 F.3d 130
• Parties: 22 Employee Benefits Cas. 2755 Charles A. JOYCE, Joseph C. Matesic, Richard A. Samer and Vernon P. Taylor, for themselves and all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. ocket 98-7723.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 130

171 F.3d 130

22 Employee Benefits Cas. 2755

Charles A. JOYCE, Joseph C. Matesic, Richard A. Samer and

Vernon P. Taylor, for themselves and all other

persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CURTISS-WRIGHT CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 1098, Docket 98-7723.

United States Court of Appeals,

Second Circuit.

Argued March 4, 1999.

Decided March 22, 1999.

David I. Goldman, Pittsburgh, PA (Joseph P. Stuligross, Pittsburgh, PA; E. Joseph Giroux, Jr., Buffalo, N.Y., on the brief) for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Robert N. Eccles, Washington, D.C. (Karen M. Wahle, Gregory Y. Porter, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, on the brief) for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: JACOBS and SOTOMAYOR, Circuit Judges, and SAND, District Judge. ^*

SAND, District Judge:

Plaintiffs appeal from a final judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, John T. Curtin, Judge. The district court granted summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) in favor of defendant Curtiss-Wright Corporation ("Curtiss-Wright") and dismissed plaintiffs' claims, which were brought under Section 502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132, and Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185.

The district court correctly applied the standard set forth in American Federation of Grain Millers v. International Multifoods Corp., 116 F.3d 976 (2d Cir.1997) ("Multifoods "), and we affirm.

Background

Plaintiffs are a class of retired former Curtiss-Wright employees (collectively "Joyce" or "retirees"), each of whom worked at the company's plant in Buffalo, New York. Curtiss-Wright entered into a series of collective bargaining agreements ("CBAs") with a Buffalo local of the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO/CLC (the "Union"), beginning in 1965 and continuing in 1968, 1971, 1974, 1977, 1981, and 1984. Under the terms of these CBAs, retirees were eligible for health insurance benefits.

Each CBA provided that the terms of the health coverage were contained in a separate, concurrently entered into, Group Insurance Agreement ("GIA"). Both the CBAs and the GIAs contained express language stating that the terms and conditions "shall continue in effect until" a particular date. The 1984 GIA was to continue in effect "until midnight May 1, 1987."

Curtiss-Wright also prepared and distributed other documents in its capacity as administrator of the Curtiss-Wright Employee Benefit Plan. One such document was the Summary Plan Description ("SPD"), successive versions of which contained identical language: "Plan Continuation--The Company expects and intends to continue this Plan indefinitely but reserves the right to end or amend it. The benefits in this booklet are of a contractual nature, and they may be modified from time to time or terminated as a result of contractual negotiations."

In addition, beginning in 1979, Curtiss-Wright prepared and distributed Summary Annual Reports ("SARs"), successive versions of which contained the following statements: "The medical benefits plan under which you are now covered is provided to you under the terms of a Collective Bargaining Agreement. Accordingly, termination of the Collective Bargaining Agreement for any reason, shall result in termination of the medical coverage provided by such agreement."

On May 1, 1987, the existing CBA between Curtiss-Wright and the Union expired. ¹ Curtiss-Wright terminated benefits to active employees and retirees as of that date. The parties were unable to complete a new agreement until July 27, 1987, at which point Curtiss-Wright reinstated benefits.

In August 1987, the Union filed a grievance protesting the termination of the retirees' health insurance during the period from May 1 to July 27. When Curtiss-Wright rejected that grievance, Joyce filed the present suit.

Proceedings Below

By Decision and Order dated December 17, 1992, the district court denied the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. The court correctly framed the question as being whether the retirees' health insurance benefits had vested. As of that time, however, the Second Circuit had not yet specified what language might be sufficient to support a claim of vesting in a collective bargaining agreement. The court therefore relied on a flexible standard and permitted the parties to submit extrinsic evidence as to their intentions under the agreements. Because that evidence demonstrated a genuine factual dispute as to whether the parties meant for retirement benefits to vest, the court denied both motions.

In April and May 1996, the court held a jury trial on the issue of liability. The jury concluded that the parties intended for the health benefits to vest and that Curtiss-Wright breached its contract with the Union. ² In June 1996, Joyce moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Curtiss-Wright from any future termination of the retirees' benefits, and for other relief. The court heard oral argument on the motions in July 1997, one month after we issued our opinion in Multifoods.

In a Decision and Order dated December 30, 1997, see Joyce v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 992 F.Supp. 259 (W.D.N.Y.1997), the court concluded that under the framework established in Multifoods, and contrary to the court's December 1992 decision, the language contained in the CBA and the insurance plan (1) is unambiguous, and (2) does not operate to vest the retirees' benefits. See id. at 269. The court thereafter granted Curtiss-Wright's motions for reconsideration of the 1992 decision, judgment as a matter of law, and summary judgment, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b), 50(b), and 56, respectively. The court entered a final judgment on April 22, 1998, and this timely appeal followed.

Discussion

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving papers and affidavits submitted by the parties show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court "is not to weigh the evidence but is instead required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and to eschew credibility assessments." Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 854 (2d Cir.1996). We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment. See L.B. Foster Co. v. America Piles, Inc., 138 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir.1998).

Neither party disputes that the health coverage offered by Curtiss-Wright to its retired employees is a welfare benefit plan for purposes of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(1), (3) (West 1999). Nor does either party dispute that "the general rule" under ERISA is "that an employee welfare benefit plan is not vested and that an employer has the right to terminate or unilaterally to amend the plan at any time." Schonholz v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 87 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir.1996); accord Multifoods, 116 F.3d. at 979-80. The parties disagree, however, as to whether Curtiss-Wright promised, either intentionally or inadvertently, through language contained in the CBAs, GIAs, SPDs, SARs, or other plan documents, to vest the retiree's benefits. See Schonholz, 87 F.3d at 77 ("Nothing in ERISA ... forbids or prevents an employer from agreeing to vest employee welfare benefits or from waiving its ability to terminate or amend unilaterally a plan ...."); see also Multifoods, 116 F.3d at 980.

Our recent decision in Multifoods provides the appropriate framework for resolving this controversy. Multifoods involved a suit brought by retirees against their former employer, International Multifoods Corp., alleging violations of, inter alia, ERISA and the LMRA. International Multifoods had, for a number of years, paid the entirety of its retirees' medical insurance premiums. In 1992, the company announced that its retirees would be responsible for supplementing future premium payments to the extent that they increased faster than inflation. The retirees objected, claiming that the benefits had vested. As in this case, all CBAs had expired. See Multifoods, at 977-78. We held that the retirees' claim failed because they were unable to point to language that could reasonably be interpreted as constituting a promise to vest.

Even prior to Multifoods, "[a]ll courts agree[d] that if a document unambiguously indicates whether retiree medical benefits are vested, the unambiguous language should be enforced." Id. at 980 (citing cases). The courts of appeals disagreed, however, regarding the presumptions to employ when the documents are less clear. See id. (citing cases). We explained our resolution of that question as follows:

In this Circuit, to reach a trier of fact, an employee does not have to "point to unambiguous language to support [a] claim. It is enough [to] point to written language capable of reasonably being interpreted as creating a promise on the part of [the employer] to vest [the recipient's] ... benefits." Schonholz, 87 F.3d at 78 (2d Cir.) (emphasis added and citation omitted)....

Multifoods, 116 F.3d at 980 (alterations in original).

We find no reason to depart from this recently-articulated standard. Accordingly, we must determine whether the retirees have identified specific written language that is reasonably susceptible to interpretation as a promise, by Curtiss-Wright, to vest the retirees' health benefits.

Group Insurance Agreements

Joyce cites nine purported sources of ambiguity, the first eight of which allegedly emanate from the text of the GIAs. The burden Multifoods imposes is ultimately one of identification: a single sentence can suffice to raise a question that requires resolution by a trier of fact. Referring to several statements that become ambiguous...