Joyner v. State, 20S00-9804-CR-225.

• Decision Date: 04 October 2000
• Docket Number: No. 20S00-9804-CR-225.,20S00-9804-CR-225.
• Citation: 736 N.E.2d 232
• Parties: Ricky JOYNER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

736 N.E.2d 232

Ricky JOYNER, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 20S00-9804-CR-225.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

October 4, 2000.

Cecelia J. McGregor, Goshen, Indiana, David Hoffman, South Bend, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellant.

Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, James A. Garrard, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee. RUCKER, Justice.

After a trial by jury Ricky Joyner was convicted of murder in the strangulation death of co-worker Sandra Hernandez. In this direct appeal Joyner contends his jury was biased, his consent to search his home and car was invalid, he was denied the opportunity to present a meaningful defense, and the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the conviction. We disagree with each contention and therefore affirm.¹

Facts

On March 2, 1992, Sandra Hernandez left her three and a half-year-old son with her parents and met Joyner for dinner. Hernandez never returned for her son and was never seen alive by her parents again. The following day Hernandez' parents filed a missing persons report with the Elkhart Police Department. In response to a request by an Elkhart police officer, Joyner drove to police headquarters and spoke with investigating officer Steve Ambrose. After Joyner signed a consent form, officers searched his apartment and car seizing a black plastic trash bag among other things.

Over a month later a farmer discovered Hernandez' decomposed body in a hay field in LaGrange County. The body was partially clothed lying face down on the ground, and a plastic trash bag which was tied in a knot around the neck covered the body's head. Expert testimony revealed that the trash bag was cut from the same roll of polyethylene film as a trash bag seized from Joyner's apartment. A later autopsy revealed that Hernandez died as a result of either strangulation, choking, or suffocation. Approximately a year later Joyner was arrested and charged with murder. Thereafter a jury convicted him as charged. This direct appeal followed. Additional facts are set forth below where relevant.

Discussion

I.

Joyner contends the trial court failed to ensure an unbiased jury. This contention is based on Joyner's claim that (a) the trial court allowed several references to race throughout the trial, (b) the trial court failed to excuse a juror and grant a mistrial when the juror informed the court that she had been threatened by a co-worker concerning her jury service, and (c) the trial court failed to interrogate the jury collectively to determine if any juror had discussed the case with third parties.

A. References to race

Joyner is African-American and Hernandez is Hispanic-American. Although the record is not altogether clear, apparently the jury pool was composed solely of members who were white with the exception of one African-American woman.² During voir dire both the prosecutor and defense counsel questioned jurors individually and collectively concerning their views on race. For example, asking if anyone had a problem with the fact that Joyner was African-American, the prosecutor commented:

He has every right you and I have as Caucasians; every right that a Hispanic American has; every right that the Chinese Americans have; every right the Japanese Americans have. Every right the American citizen has the Defendant has. And you have no right to hold it against him because of his race, color or creed. As I said before, his rights are your rights [sic].

R. at 605. In a colloquy between defense counsel and one potential juror the following exchange took place:

Q. [Defense counsel] The Defendant in this case, as you can see, is an African-American gentleman; is that a problem for you?

A. [Juror] That's fine.

Q. [Defense counsel] is that a problem for you at all?

A. [Juror] I have African-American students. I have Spanish American students. I found them to all be children and unique, and I don't care what color they are.

R. at 832-33.³ In like fashion the prosecutor as well as defense counsel asked potential jurors about their views on the legal system, and high profile cases, including the widely publicized O.J. Simpson trial. The record also shows that the State called Hernandez' mother to testify. During cross examination defense counsel asked if she would have been happy knowing her daughter had gone to dinner with a black man, to which she responded "no." R. at 922.⁴

Characterizing this case as "racially charged" Joyner complains that the foregoing references tainted the jury. Concerning the cross-examination testimony of Hernandez' mother, the error if any was of Joyner's own making. It was Joyner who posed a question about the mother's views on her daughter's dating habits. A defendant may not invite error and then complain on review. Roach v. State, 695 N.E.2d 934, 941 (Ind.1998). This issue is waived. In like fashion Joyner has waived any alleged error concerning comments made during voir dire. Defense counsel as well as the State questioned prospective jurors concerning their views about Joyner's race and the race of the victim.

Waiver notwithstanding, Joyner's claims fail on their merits. First, we disagree with Joyner's assertion that this case was "racially charged" or that references to race were made throughout the trial. Other than making the bald assertion, Joyner does not direct our attention to any portion of the record supporting the notion that the issue of race or ethnicity permeated the trial. Our independent review of the record fails to disclose any such notion as well. Second, it is clear to this Court that the references to race were essentially confined to voir dire examination. The purpose of voir dire is to determine whether a prospective juror can render a fair and impartial verdict in accordance with the law and the evidence. Bradley v. State, 649 N.E.2d 100, 106 (Ind. 1995). In this case, the references to race were obviously designed to gauge the impartiality of potential jurors and ensure that if selected the jurors would base their verdict on the evidence presented at trial and not be persuaded one way or the other by the race of the victim or the defendant. We find no error here.

B. Refusal to discharge a juror and declare a mistrial

The record shows that in an in camera proceeding on a Monday morning before trial resumed, a juror informed the judge that she had been threatened over the weekend. Specifically, the juror recounted that while at work on the preceding Saturday she was approached by two male co-workers. One of the co-workers told the juror that unless she voted not guilty, he would tell the judge that the juror had been discussing the case. Apparently the co-workers were acquaintances of Joyner. The juror advised the judge that she in fact had not been discussing the case, and after speaking with her supervisor she decided to report the incident to the court. The juror assured the court that the comments of her co-worker did not in any way affect her ability to serve on the jury, and despite the comments she could still be fair and impartial to both the State and the defendant. R. at 1469. The juror also commented that other jurors may have been approached over the weekend as well.

Joyner moved to excuse the juror and moved for mistrial. His mistrial motion was premised on the fact that once the juror was excused there would exist an eleven person jury,⁵ and that he was not inclined to agree to a trial of less than twelve jurors. See Ind.Code 35-37-1-1(b) (providing for a trial of less than twelve jurors where the defendant and prosecutor so agree). The trial court refused to excuse the juror and denied Joyner's motion for mistrial. The trial resumed, and at the end of the day Joyner moved the court to question each juror to determine whether anyone had discussed the case over the weekend. The trial court granted the motion and conducted an in camera interview with the individual jurors. Each juror assured the court that he or she had not discussed the case with anyone.

Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution guarantees to a defendant the right to an impartial jury. Thus, a biased juror must be dismissed. Harris v. State, 659 N.E.2d 522, 525 (Ind.1995). Joyner acknowledges the juror's statement that despite her co-worker's comments she could still be impartial. Nonetheless he contends bias can be inferred from the circumstances.

Although not making the specific claim, Joyner's argument implicates a challenge for cause. See Ind.Code § 35-37-1-5(a)(11) (a person called as a juror may be challenged for cause for, among other things "bias[ ] or prejudice[ ] for or against the defendant."). Whether to excuse a juror for cause rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Wisehart v. State, 693 N.E.2d 23, 55 (Ind.1998). We will sustain the trial court's decision unless it is illogical or arbitrary. Id. A juror's bias may be actual or implied. McCants v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (Ind.1997); Block v. State, 100 Ind. 357, 362 (1885). "Implied bias," which also allows removal of a juror for cause, is attributed to a juror upon a finding of a relationship between the juror and one of the parties, regardless of actual partiality. See, e.g., Haak v. State, 275 Ind. 415, 417 N.E.2d 321, 323 (1981) (bias implied where juror's spouse was hired as a deputy prosecutor on the first day of trial by the office that was prosecuting the case despite juror's statement that she did not think the relationship would make it difficult for her to render an impartial verdict).

Joyner does not allege actual bias on the part of the juror, and his reliance on implied bias is misplaced. The relationship here was not between the juror and anyone involved in this action. See, e.g., McCants, 686 N.E.2d at 1284 (no bias where one of State's witnesses worked at the same university as one of the jurors); compare Mooberry v. State, 157 Ind.App. 354, 358, 300 N.E.2d 125, 128,...