Joyner v. Town of Elberta
| Decision Date | 16 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:13–cv–067–CG–N. |
| Citation | 22 F.Supp.3d 1201 |
| Parties | Julie M. JOYNER, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF ELBERTA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
Charles Michael Quinn, H. Wallace Blizzard, Wiggins, Childs, Quinn, and Pantazis, LLC, Birmingham, AL, Utopia Conger Cassady, Cassady & Cassady, P.C., Fairhope, AL, for Plaintiff.
Melissa Gail Hunter, Thomas O. Gaillard, III, Galloway, Wettermark, Everest, Rutens & Gaillard, LLP, Mobile, AL, for Defendant.
CALLIE V.S. GRANADE, District Judge.
This is an Equal Pay Act1 (“EPA”) lawsuit brought by the former interim police chief of the Town of Elberta, Alabama, against the town. Now before the court are the defendant Town of Elberta's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 36), the plaintiff Julie M. Joyner's (“Joyner”) response (Doc. 40) and the Town of Elberta's reply (Doc. 42). For the reasons stated below, the Town's motion for summary judgment due to be granted.
On March 7, 2011, Joyner was appointed Interim Police Chief for the Town of Elberta, Alabama. (Doc. 37–1 at 15–16; Doc. 37–2 at 64–65). At the time she had 15 years law enforcement experience.
Joyner graduated from Fairhope High School in 1990. (Doc. 37–2 at 3). She obtained an associate degree in Criminal Justice from Faulkner State Community College. (Doc. 37–2 at 4). Joyner completed her minimum standards training at the Southwest Alabama Police Academy in 1993 (Doc. 37–2 at 5) and became employed as a patrol officer with the City of Foley Police Department in April 1994. (Doc. 37–2 at 6–7). In 1999, Plaintiff resigned her position with the City of Foley and became employed as a D.A.R.E. (Drug Abuse Resistance Education) Officer with the Town of Elberta. (Doc. 37–2 at 8).
Plaintiff served as a Patrol Officer with the D.A.R.E. program for five (5) or six (6) years. (Doc. 37–2 at 9). In 2004, Joyner was promoted to the rank of Sergeant. (Doc. 37–2 at 11). As a Sergeant, the Plaintiff supervised three (3) to five (5) officers. (Doc. 37–2 at 12).
While Plaintiff was employed as a Sergeant in the Police Department, Mickey Pledger was selected to serve as Police Chief for the Town of Elberta. (Doc. 37–2 at 25–26). There was no set salary for the position of Police Chief. (Doc. 37–1 at 14). While serving as Chief, Pledger was paid approximately $42,000 per year. (Doc. 37–1 at 15). On March 4, 2011, Pledger was arrested for discharging a firearm into the building housing the police department. (Doc. 37–2 at 26–27; Doc. 37–1 at 6). On March 7, 2011, the Mayor appointed Joyner to the position of Interim Police Chief. (Doc. 37–2 at 27–28; Doc. 37–1 at 7–8). At that time, Joyner was the most senior person in the department. (Doc. 37–1 at 8).
When she was appointed to serve as Interim Chief, Joyner's wages would remain as they were prior to the appointment. (Doc. 37–2 at 28–29). At that time, the Plaintiff was making close to $20.00 an hour. (Doc. 37–2, at 29).
On August 15, 2011, Plaintiff sent a letter to the Mayor and council members offering to become the permanent Police Chief. (Doc. 37–2 at 30–31). In the letter, Joyner stated that she would like a contract in writing stating that if the current mayor and council were not re-elected the next year and a new council and mayor came into office, she would retain her previous position and salary within the department. (Doc. 37–2 at 31). The Plaintiff requested a salary of $53,000, stating that it was $1,000 more per month than her current salary. (Doc. 37–2 at 31). The Town responded, stating that those funds were not available at that time. (Doc. 37–2, at 33). The Mayor also testified that the Town could not agree to a contract guaranteeing that Joyner could return to her former position. (Doc. 37–1 at 10, 18–19).
On October 20, 2011, Plaintiff sent a second letter to the Town, increasing her salary demand to $56,000. (Doc. 37–2 at 34). On October 24, 2011, Joyner submitted a letter to the council stating that she was willing to wait and let them re-evaluate the economic situation of the Town the next year. (Doc. 37–2 at 36 –38). Additionally, Joyner stated that she was willing to wait for the council to decide whether or not they wanted to appoint Joyner to a permanent position or wanted to bring in other applicants and appoint someone else as Police Chief. (Doc. 37–2 at 38).
At the October 24, 2011 council meeting, Joyner was given a two-dollar ($2.00) per-hour raise, increasing her pay to $21.65 per hour. (Doc. 37–2, pp. 39–41). She was also given a de facto one-dollar-per-hour raise in that she would be allowed take-home use of her Town-owned vehicle. (Doc. 37–2 at 41). The Plaintiff accepted the $2.00–per–hour raise as well as the benefit of being able to take her city vehicle home. (Doc. 37–2 at 42–43). After the two-dollar ($2.00) raise, Joyner was making approximately forty-five thousand dollars ($45,000.00) per year. (Doc. 37–2 at 53). This was three thousand dollars ($3,000.00) more per year than the salary paid to former Chief Mickey Pledger. (Doc. 37–1 at 15; Doc. 37–2 at 54). This was also more than was paid to Joe Brown, who served as Acting Chief for a brief period of time before Mickey Pledger was selected as Police Chief. (Doc. 37–1 at 8–9; Doc 37–10). Joyner's tax records reflect that she was paid approximately $42,863 by the Town in 2011. (Doc. 37–11, Joyner 2011 tax records).
Joyner testified that after she was given this raise, Mayor Williams offered her the position of permanent Police Chief at her current pay rate of approximately $45,000 per year. (Doc. 40–2 at 9–11). Although Joyner had previously asked for the job at a salary of $53,000, Mayor Williams explained that due to the decline in the economy, the Town did not have the funds to pay her the salary she requested. Id. Joyner rejected the Mayor's offer because the Town could not guarantee her re-appointment as Police Chief or reinstatement as Sergeant after a new council was elected the following year. (Doc. 40–1 at ¶¶ 11–15; Doc. 40–3 at 7).
The mayor of the City of Summerdale called Mayor Williams and told him that he knew of an individual, Stanley DeVane, who would be a good candidate for the position of Police Chief. (Doc. 37–1 at 11). DeVane worked for the Pardon and Parole Board for the state of Alabama and was a 25–year veteran of the Dothan Police Department where he served as a squad commander for nine years. (Doc. 37–12; Doc. 37–1 at 12). As a squad commander, DeVane supervised a twenty (20) officer patrol squad. (Doc. 37–12). DeVane holds a Bachelor's of Science Degree in Criminal Justice. He is also a graduate of the FBI National Academy. DeVane had completed more than 1,700 hours in law enforcement training. At the time he was hired by Elberta to be its Police Chief, DeVane had a total of thirty-four (34) years in law enforcement. (Doc. 37–12).
Williams made arrangements for DeVane to visit with him and three other council members. (Doc. 37–1 at 12). DeVane presented Williams with a salary request. (Doc. 37–1 at 13). Williams stated that they could not afford to hire DeVane at his requested salary level but would love to have him. (Doc. 37–1 at 13). DeVane was making more at the Pardon and Parole Board than the Town was offering. (Doc. 37–1 at 13).
At the end of 2011, it was discovered that the Town had a 26.79% increase in revenue over the previous year. (Doc. 27–9). As a result of increased sales tax revenue, ad valorem taxes and franchise fees, the Town was able to increase their salary offer to Stanley DeVane. (Doc. 37–1 at 23–24, Doc. 37–13 at 4). At the January 17, 2012, council meeting, the Town Council voted to appoint DeVane as Police Chief of the Town of Elberta. (Doc. 37–13 at 4). He was hired at a salary of $54,000. (Doc. 37–1 at 16–17, 20, Doc. 37–13 at 4).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The trial court's function is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “The mere existence of some evidence to support the non-moving party is not sufficient for denial of summary judgment; there must be ‘sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.’ ” Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. (internal citations omitted).
The basic issue before the court on a motion for summary judgment is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The moving party bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists. O'Ferrell v. United States, 253 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir.2001). In evaluating the argument of the moving party, the court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in its favor. Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir.1999). “If reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then a court should deny summary judgment.” Hinesville Bank v. Pony Exp. Courier Corp., 868 F.2d 1532, 1535 (11th Cir.1989) (citing Mercantile Bank & Trust v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 750 F.2d 838, 841 (11th Cir.1985) ).
Once the movant satisfies his initial burden under Rule 56(a), the non-moving party “must make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of each...
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