JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Roggio
| Decision Date | 30 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. 3:19-cv-06330 (GC) (TJB) |
| Parties | JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff, v. VINCENT ROGGIO, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
THIS MATTER comes before the Court following JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association's (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Summary Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 for a deficiency judgment stemming from Vincent Roggio (“Defendant”) appearing pro se, defaulting on a residential mortgage. The Court reaches its decision without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No 107) and Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 106) and Motion to Amend the Second Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 108) are DENIED.[1]
In April 2005, Defendant executed a $3.3 million loan from Washington Mutual Bank (“WaMu”) and pledged his real property, situated at 140 Rumson Road, Rumson, New Jersey 07760, (hereinafter, the “Property”) as collateral. (Compl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 1; Pl's Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute (“Pl.'s Undisputed Facts”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 107-33.) In February 2006, Defendant failed to make his monthly payment and therefore defaulted on the loan. (Pl.'s Undisputed Facts ¶ 3; See Decl. of Brian P. Scibetta in Supp. of Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Scibetta Decl.”) Ex. 5, ECF No. 107-6.) A foreclosure action (hereinafter the “Foreclosure Action”) was commenced by WaMu in June of 2006 in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division. (Id.) A final judgment was entered in the same court in 2018, which declared that Defendant owed $6,169,701.07 plus interest and costs that were taxed in the Foreclosure Action. (Pl.'s Undisputed Facts ¶ 6; See Final J., Scibetta Decl. Ex. 6, ECF No. 107-7.)
In September 2008, WaMu became insolvent and the Federal Deposit Insurance Company (“FDIC”), as receiver for WaMu, assumed all rights, titles, powers, privileges, and operations of WaMu. During this time, Plaintiff purchased certain WaMu assets and liabilities, and became the owner and servicer of all mortgage loans owned by WaMu. (Pl.'s Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 8, 9; See Purchase and Assumption Agreement, Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. K, ECF No. 107-32.) Plaintiff then became the plaintiff in the Foreclosure Action that WaMu commenced against Defendant.
The Superior Court of New Jersey entered a final judgment in Plaintiff's favor on February 26, 2018. (Pl.'s Undisputed Facts ¶ 6; See Final J., Scibetta Decl. Ex. 6.) Pursuant to the Foreclosure Action, Plaintiff took the Property to a Monmouth County Sheriff Sale in November of 2018 and successfully purchased the home with a $1,000 bid. (Pl.'s Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 10, 11; See Order, Scibetta Decl. Ex. 8; see Foreclosure Report, Scibetta Decl. Ex. 9.) The Sheriff's Report calculated the deficiency to be $6,327,508.50 and the deed to the home was then transferred to Plaintiff after the Superior Court of New Jersey approved and confirmed the sale on December 21, 2018. (Pl.'s Undisputed Facts ¶ 12; Order, Scibetta Decl. Ex. 8.)
Plaintiff timely filed this suit for a deficiency action on February 20, 2019. (See generally Compl.) As of January 31, 2022, the total outstanding debt on Defendant's loan was $7,687,491.99. (Pl.'s Undisputed Facts ¶ 15; Aff. of Dorothy Washington, Ex. H, ECF No. 10729.)
On February 10, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant motion seeking Summary Judgment for its deficiency claim. (See Pl.'s Mot. For Summ. J., ECF No. 107.) Defendant filed his Opposition to Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute on February 23, 2022, which the Court construes as Defendant's opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Def.'s Opp'n to Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts, ECF No. 110.) Plaintiff filed its Reply to Opposition on February 28, 2022. (Pl's Reply, ECF No. 111.) Defendant filed a Second Motion for Summary Judgment (see Def.'s Second Mot. For Summ. J., ECF No. 106) on February 3, 2022, and a Motion to Amend his Motion for Summary Judgment (see Def.'s Mot. to Am. Second Mot. For Summ. J., ECF No. 108) on February 10, 2022. Plaintiff filed its Opposition to Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment on February 22, 2022. (See Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Second Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 109.)
Fact discovery concluded on August 30, 2021. (Text Order, ECF No. 92.) During discovery, both sides had the opportunity to exchange their respective fair market valuations of the Property. (Aff. Of James Meehan in Supp. Of Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Meehan Aff.”), ECF No. 107-16.) Plaintiff relies on its expert, James Meehan (“Meehan”), who valued the Property at the time of foreclosure in November 2018 at $2,150,000. (Real Estate Appraisal of Single-Family Dwelling (“Appraisal”), Meehan Aff. Ex. 3, ECF No. 107-19.) Meehan arrived at this valuation after he personally inspected the Property, evaluated the sale history of the Property and similar properties in Rumson, New Jersey, and used general market knowledge based on fifteen (15) years of experience appraising properties. (Id.)
Defendant did not submit any expert valuation or report, but instead relies on an appraisal report by Walker Matlack (“Matlack”) of then Wachovia Bank from December 2004, listing the fair market value of the Property in 2004 at $5.5 million. (See Dec. 5, 2004 Appraisal (the “Wachovia Report”), Meehan Aff. Ex. 4, ECF No. 107-20.) Defendant has not identified that he plans to call Matlack as an expert or fact witness. Defendant also notified the Court that while he intends to rely upon the Wachovia Report, he believes “the report speaks for itself” and “will not be seeking expert testimony.” (See Def.'s Dec. 17, 2021 Letter to Hon. Tonianne J. Bongiovanni, U.S.M.J. (“Def's Dec. 17, 2021 Letter”), Scibetta Decl. Ex. 14, ECF No. 107-15.)
Plaintiff argues that they have met the elements for a deficiency judgment and that Defendant has not challenged any of the essential elements: a Foreclosure Judgment was entered; they brought the deficiency action within ninety (90) days of the Foreclosure Judgment; the property was neither redeemed nor was the debt paid off; and the amount owed by the Defendant exceeds the fair market value of the property. Chase also seeks to strike Defendant's answer and affirmative defenses for various reasons discussed below.
“[A]lthough pro se pleadings and filings must be ‘construed liberally,' the same summary judgment standard applies to pro se litigants.” Dinnerstein v. Burlington Cnty. Coll., No. 13-5598, 2017 WL 5593776, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2017), aff'd, 764 Fed.Appx. 214 (3d Cir. 2019). Summary judgment shall be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” if it could lead a “reasonable jury [to] return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. When deciding the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the Court must determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52. In doing so, the Court must evaluate the record as a whole. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000). The Court is not entitled to weigh the evidence and draws all factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 554 (1990)
Once the moving party asserts that no genuine dispute of a fact exists, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to present specific facts showing a genuine issue that needs to be resolved at trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “[R]ule 56 enables a party contending that there is no genuine dispute as to a specific, essential fact ‘to demand at least one sworn averment of that fact before the lengthy process of litigation continues.'” Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorp., 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990).
The Court must grant summary judgment if any party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[I]nferences, doubts, and issues of credibility should be resolved against the moving party.” Meyer v. Riegel Prods. Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 307 n.2 (3d Cir. 1983). Finally, “a party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(B). However, the nonmoving party is not required to “produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
To start, the Court finds that Defendant failed to properly follow Local Civil Rule 56.1. Local Rule 56.1 states:
The opponent of summary judgment shall furnish, with its opposition papers, a responsive statement of material facts, addressing each paragraph of the movant's statement,...
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