Juarez v. Brown

• Decision Date: 04 August 2017
• Docket Number: No.: 1:16-cv-00410-JMS-MPB,: 1:16-cv-00410-JMS-MPB
• Parties: ANTELMO JUAREZ, Petitioner, v. RICHARD BROWN, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

ANTELMO JUAREZ, Petitioner, v. RICHARD BROWN, Respondent.

No.: 1:16-cv-00410-JMS-MPB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

August 4, 2017

Entry Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Denying Certificate of Appealability

An Indiana jury convicted Antelmo Juarez of murder and criminal gang activity. He was sentenced in accord with that verdict. Mr. Juarez now seeks a writ of habeas corpus.

For the reasons explained in this Entry, Mr. Juarez's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied and the action is dismissed with prejudice. In addition, the Court finds that a certificate of appealability should not issue.

THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

I. Applicable Law

The federal habeas corpus statute "permits a federal court to entertain only those applications alleging that a person is in state custody 'in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.'" Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). "As amended by [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA")], 28 U.S.C. § 2254 sets several limits on the power of a federal court to grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner." Id. "Under the current regime governing federal habeas corpus for state prison inmates, the inmate must show, so far as bears on this case, that the state court which convicted him unreasonably applied a federal doctrine declared by the United States Supreme Court." Redmond v. Kingston, 240 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Morgan v. Krenke, 232 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2000)).¹

"A state-court decision involves an unreasonable application of this Court's clearly established precedents if the state court applies this Court's precedents to the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 131, 141 (2005) (internal citations omitted). "The habeas applicant has the burden of proof to show that the application of federal law was unreasonable." Harding v. Sternes, 380 F.3d 1034, 1043 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002)). In short, the standard of § 2254(d) is "difficult to meet . . . because it was meant to be." Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 7-8 (2011) (per curiam) (citing Supreme Court jurisprudence "highlighting the necessity of deference to state courts in § 2254(d) habeas cases").

The first step under § 2254(d)(1) is "to identify the 'clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States' that governs the habeas petitioner's claims." Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1449 (2013) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412; Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009)). In proceeding with the analysis, a federal habeas court "must determine what arguments or theories supported, or, [in the case of an unexplained denial on the merits], could have supported, the state court's decision; and then itmust ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme Court]." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).

II. Background

Following a jury trial, Juarez was found guilty of murder and criminal gang activity as a Class D felony. His convictions were affirmed in Juarez v. State, 2010 WL 5122618 (Ind.Ct.App. Dec. 13, 2010)("Juarez I"), and the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief was affirmed in Juarez v. State, 2015 WL 3767090 (Ind.Ct.App.), transfer denied, 37 N.E.3d 493 (Ind. 2015)("Juarez II"). The evidence associated with Mr. Juarez's offenses was summarized in his direct appeal:

On February 18, 2006, fifteen-year-old Juarez and his nineteen-year-old brother, Oscar Perez, were members of the Nortenos gang. That evening, as they were leaving their residence with some of their friends, Perez told Juarez to go back inside and get the gun, which was a SKS rifle. Juarez put the rifle into the back of a friend's Dodge Durango. At some point during the evening, Perez moved the rifle to another vehicle, which was an Acura.

The group later went to La Bamba, a club in Goshen. While they were in the club, the group of Nortenos got into a fight with a group of rival gang members, the Surenos. Security officers threw the Nortenos out of the club, and the Surenos followed them to the parking lot. The Surenos left the parking lot in a Chevrolet Malibu, while the Nortenos followed in the Durango and the Acura. The Durango pulled up beside the Malibu, and some Nortenos gang members shot paintballs at the Malibu. Juarez and Perez were passengers in the Acura, which was following the Malibu and the Durango.

After seeing that the altercation was continuing, Perez told Juarez to "hand me the gun real quick," and Juarez handed the rifle to Perez. Tr. p. 880. The Surenos became upset about the paintballs, and the driver of the Malibu rammed into the back of the Durango. Perez then rolled his window down and fired the rifle at the Malibu, killing fourteen-year-old Rogelio Reyes and wounding Saul Rodriguez.

Juarez I, 2010 WL 5122618, at *1.

Several of Mr. Juarez's habeas arguments relate to jury instructions. Final instruction 2 reads as follows:

Count I:

The undersigned affiant swears that on or about the 19th day of February, 2006, at the County of Elkhart and State of Indiana, one ANTELMO JUAREZ, did knowingly assist one Oscar Eduardo Perez in the killing of another human being, to wit: Rogelio Reyes, as the said Oscar Eduardo Perez did shoot the said Rogelio Reyes with a dangerous and deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm, and as a direct and proximate result of the shooting as aforesaid, the said Rogelio Reyes was fatally wounded and did languish and die in said County and State on the 19th day of February, 2006 . . . .

Final instruction 3 reads as follows:

The crime of murder as alleged in Count I is defined by statute as follows:

A person who knowingly aids, induces or causes another person in killing another human being commits murder, a felony.

To convict the defendant, the State must have proved each of the following elements:

The defendant:

5. knowingly

6. aided, induced, or caused

7. the killing of

8. another human being.

The State must prove that the defendant knowingly committed each element of this offense.

If the State failed to prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty.

If the State did prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty of murder, a felony.

Final instruction 6 states:

A person is responsible for the acts of his accomplice as well as his own. The acts of one person are attributable to all who are knowingly acting together during the commission of a crime. Accordingly, the State need not prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant personally, and acting by himself, committed all of the elements of the crime with which he is charged. However, the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant and another person or persons, acting together, committed all of the elements of the crime with which he is charged.

It is not necessary for the State to show that a defendant was a party to a preconceived scheme; it must merely show concerted action or participation in an illegal act by the defendant.

Although it is true that mere presence is not enough to show a person's participation in a crime, such presence may be considered with all other evidence to determine guilt. Factors considered by the fact-finder to determine whether a defendant aided another in the commission of a crime include: (1) presence at the scene of the crime; (2) companionship with another engaged in the crime; (3) failure to oppose the commission of the crime; and (4) the course of conduct before, during, and after the offense which tends to show complicity.

You are further instructed that accomplice liability applies to the contemplated offense and all acts that are a probable and natural consequence of the concerted action.

These instructions are discussed as part of Mr. Juarez's assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel in Part III.B. of this Entry.

III. Discussion

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Mr. Juarez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The controlling federal law on this subject is the "rigorous" standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979): "evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is sufficient to support a conviction so long as any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the offense to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Jones v. Butler, 778 F.3d 575, 581 (7th Cir. 2015). Therefore, "[f]ederal review of these claims . . . turns on whether the state court provided fair process and engaged in reasoned, good-faith decisionmaking when applying Jackson's 'no rational trier of fact' test." Gomez v. Acevedo, 106 F.3d 192, 199 (7th Cir. 1999).

Federal courts must look to state law for the substantive elements of the criminal offense. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16. To the extent an insufficient evidence claim involves an interpretation of state law, the state court's interpretation "binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus." Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (per curiam); see also Schad v. Arizona, 501U.S. 624, 636 (1991) (federal courts are not free to substitute their own interpretations of state statutes for those of a state's courts); Mulanney v. Wilber, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (exceptional circumstances being absent, United States Supreme Court accepted, as binding, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's construction of its state homicide law).

The Indiana Court of Appeals addressed this claim in Mr. Juarez's direct appeal, and in doing so first explained...